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“Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it labor in
vain.” (Psalm 127:1; ESV)

Abstract
Detecting programming errors and vulnerabilities in software is increasingly impor-
tant, and building tools that help with this task is an area of investigation, crucial for the
industry these days. When programming in an object-oriented language, one naturally
defines stateful objects that are non-uniform, i.e., their methods’ availability depends
on their internal state. One might represent their intended usage protocol with an au-
tomaton or a state machine. Behavioral types allow to statically check if all the code of a
program respects the usage protocol of each object.
In this thesis we present a tool that extends Java with typestate definitions. These
typestates are associated with Java classes and define the behavior of instances of those
classes, specifying the sequences of method calls allowed. This tool checks statically that
method calls happen in order, following the specified behavior.
The tool was implemented in Kotlin as a plugin for the Checker Framework. It is a
new implementation of the Mungo tool and supports prevention of null pointer errors,
state transitions depending on return values, assurance of protocol completion, drop-
pable states, and association of protocols with classes from the standard Java library or
from third-party libraries. Additionally, the tool integrates behavioral types with ac-
cess permissions, allowing objects to be shared in a controlled way using a language of
assertions. This language of assertions supports concepts like packing and unpacking,
including unpacking of aliases objects, and transferring of permissions between aliases.
To relieve the programmer from manually writing all the necessary assertions, the tool
implements an inference algorithm which analyzes the code statically and, given the uses
of objects, constructs all the required assertions.





A deteção de erros de programação e vulnerabilidades no software é cada vez mais
importante, e a criação de ferramentas que ajudem nesta tarefa é uma área de investi-
gação crucial para a indústria atualmente. Ao programar numa linguagem orientada a
objetos, definem-se naturalmente objetos com estado que não são uniformes, ou seja, a
disponibilidade dos seus métodos depende do seu estado interno. Pode-se representar
o protocolo de uso pretendido com um autómato ou uma máquina de estados. Os tipos
comportamentais permitem verificar estaticamente se todo o código de um programa
respeita o protocolo de uso de cada objeto.
Nesta tese apresentamos uma ferramenta que estende o Java com definições de type-
states. Esses estão associados às classes Java e definem o comportamento das instâncias
dessas classes, especificando as sequências de chamadas de métodos permitidas. Esta fer-
ramenta verifica estaticamente se as chamadas de métodos ocorrem pela ordem correta,
seguindo o comportamento especificado.
A ferramenta foi implementada em Kotlin como um plugin para o Checker Framework.
É uma implementação nova da ferramenta Mungo e suporta a prevenção de erros de
ponteiro nulo, transições de estado dependendo de valores de retorno, asseguração da
conclusão dos protocolos, objetos que podem ser «largados», e a associação de protocolos
com classes da biblioteca padrão do Java ou de terceiros. Além disso, esta integra tipos
comportamentais com permissões de acesso, permitindo que objetos possam ser parti-
lhados por meio de uma linguagem de asserções. Esta linguagem de asserções oferece
suporte para conceitos como packing e unpacking, incluindo unpacking de objetos parti-
lhados, e transferência de permissões entre variáveis que apontam para o mesmo objeto.
Para aliviar o programador de escrever manualmente todas as asserções necessárias, a
ferramenta implementa um algoritmo de inferência que analisa o código estaticamente e,
consoante os usos dos objetos, constrói todas as asserções necessárias.
Palavras-chave: Tipos comportamentais, programação orientada a objetos, typestates,
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access permission An abstract capability that characterizes the way a
shared resource can be accessed by multiple refer-
ences [74].
aliasing A situation in which a data location can be accessed
through more than one reference in a program.
assertion A logical proposition that should always hold at a
given point in code execution.
behavioral types Type disciplines that describe properties associated
with the behavior of programs [43].
dynamic checking Type-checking process that occurs in runtime [14].
explicitly typed language A language where types appear in the syntax of pro-
gram sources [14].
gradual typing Process that combines both static and dynamic check-
ing in the same program [75].
ill typed program A program that does not pass the type-checker [14].
implicitly typed language A language where types do not appear in the syntax
of program sources [14].
safe language A language in which all program fragments are
safe [14].
safe program A program that does not cause untrapped errors to
occur [14].
session type A notion of behavioral types where the interactions
between different parties are described [43, 78].




strongly checked language A language in which all programs are well-
behaved [14].
trapped error An error that causes the computation to stop imme-
diately. For example, division by zero or accessing an
illegal memory address [14].
type A range of values a program variable can assume dur-
ing the execution of a program [14].
type-checker Tool or algorithm that performs type-checking [14].
type-checking The process of checking programs to ensure they are
well-behaved [14].
type sound language A language where the absence of wrong behavior is
ensured for all possible runs expressed within that
language [14].
typestate A notion of behavioral types where the type of an
entity depends on the operations that are permitted,
when at a particular state [43, 32].
type system A tractable syntactic method for proving the absence
of certain program behaviors by classifying phrases
according to the kinds of values they compute [71].
typed language A language where the variables can be given nontriv-
ial types [14].
untrapped error An error that does not cause the computation to stop
immediately and that can go unnoticed. For example,
accessing an array off bounds in a language that has
no runtime bounds checks [14].
untyped language A language that does not have types or that has a sin-
gle universal type that contains all values [14].
usage type A description of all the possible states and permitted
operations for each state of an entity.
weakly typed language A language where the set of forbidden errors does not
include all untrapped errors [14].
well typed program A program that passes the type-checker [14].
well-behaved program A safe program where no forbidden errors can occur












Detecting programming errors and vulnerabilities in software is increasingly important,
and building tools that help with this task is an area of investigation, crucial for the
industry these days.
Programming errors result in programs that might malfunction in many ways. The
most common mistakes involve mixing values of different types, calling non-existing
functions, calling functions with the wrong number of parameters, accessing unautho-
rized parts of the memory, creating loops that might not terminate, de-referencing null
pointers, dangling pointers, division by zero... These mistakes might cause computations
to do not progress, producing unexpected behaviors or crashing due to runtime errors.
In modern programming languages, some of these common errors are detected thanks
to type systems implemented in compilers. Type systems ensure that if a program is well-
typed, nothing “goes wrong” [63]. By “wrong”, we mean the kind of bad behavior that
the type system was designed to rule out. Usually, type systems are used to detect errors
statically, by analyzing the source code, preventing the errors from happening at runtime.
Other techniques, usually not integrated with compilers, use deductive logics [1] and
model checking [17]. Since we are interested in preventing errors before the code is run,
we will focus on static error detection approaches.
1.2 Problem
Type systems nowadays are able to detect a lot of errors, but there are errors that are not
prevented in some programming languages. For example, C and Java still do not prevent
null de-referencing. Fortunately, languages like OCaml do prevent that, by considering
1
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null not being a value of every type. Go and Rust are also examples of modern languages
detecting more than data-errors: Go does dynamic deadlock detection; Rust controls
resource interference statically.
Unfortunately, the type of errors detected in modern languages is still limited. Mod-
ern languages for instance, do not statically ensure that methods are called in the right
moment and in the right order, which is a source of many errors, like accessing a variable
that was not initialized [6]. Additionally, the language frameworks that do allow one to
verify that methods are called in the right order either have limitations or require expert
users, and not average programmers, to provide complex specifications.
One real example of a method being called out of order was a bug found1 in Jedis.
Jedis2 is a Java client for Redis3, an in-memory database that persists on disk. The error
happened when there was an attempt to close a socket that timed out, in other words,
there was an operation being available on a state that should not allow that.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we present the implementation of a tool that type-checks a Java program
where objects are associated with typestates. These typestates are associated with Java
classes and define the behavior of instances of those classes, specifying the sequences
of method calls allowed. It checks statically that method calls happen in the prescribed
order, following the specified behavior.
This tool is a new implementation of Mungo [82, 54] which fixes issues and adds new
features. It was implemented in Kotlin [49, 50] as a plugin for the Checker Framework [79,
70].
The major features supported by this tool are:
• checking the absence of null pointer errors, fixing some issues that Mungo cur-
rently has;
• checking that protocols of objects are completed, even in some corner cases that
Mungo was not checking;
• a language of assertions that focuses on allowing a program that uses typestates to
be type-checked even in the presence of aliasing;
• an inference algorithm which analyzes the code statically and infers all the re-
quired assertions.
The language of assertions employs the notion of access permissions [10] and sup-






transferring of permissions between aliases. With this language, it is possible to share
objects between different threads, having assurance that their use follows the specified
behavior in the protocol, and that there is no interference between method calls that mu-
tate the state of the object. Furthermore, the inference algorithm infers all the required
assertions by building a constraints system and solving it with Z3 [22]. This relieves the
programmer from manually writing all the necessary assertions.
The tool also includes other features that improve the developer experience:
• support for protocols to be associated with classes from the standard Java library
or from third-party libraries, allowing the use of objects to be verified even when the
source code of their classes is not available to be edited with a Typestate annotation
(e.g. ensuring that hasNext is called before next in an iterator from the standard
library);
• support for “droppable” states, which allow one to specify states in which an object
may be “dropped” (i.e. stop being used) without having to reach the final state;
• support for transitions of state to depend on boolean values returned by methods,
not just on enumeration values, as the current version of Mungo requires;
• invalid sequences of method calls are ignored when analyzing the use of objects
stored inside other objects by taking into account that the methods of the outer
object will only be called in the order specified by the corresponding protocol, thus
avoiding false positives.
1.4 Thesis outline
The thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents a study on the concept of behavioral types;
• Chapter 3 presents a study on tools that employ the concept of behavioral types;
• Chapter 4 presents the first version of the tool, where linear use of objects is en-
forced;
• Chapter 5 presents a study on the concept of access permissions;
• Chapter 6 presents a study on tools that employ the concept of access permissions;
• Chapter 7 presents the second version of the tool, which allows objects to be shared;











Theoretical Work on Behavioral Types
When designing a programming language, it is important to forbid a set of errors from
ever happening. This set should include all untrapped errors, and some trapped errors.
If no forbidden error can occur during the execution of a program, we say that program
is well-behaved. A well-behaved program is also safe. Safety prevents errors being
unnoticed for too long, reducing debugging time and preventing arbitrary behavior from
happening later [14].
Traditional work on type systems has focused on the result of computations. With
the growth of concurrent systems, there is a need to verify the behavior of computations,
not just the result given. Behavioral Types are type disciplines that describe properties
associated with the behavior of programs [43]. Type systems that include this notion,
allow for the static verification of interactions and protocol compliance, like ensuring
that methods on an object are called in the correct order.
In this chapter, we study the concept of behavioral types. Section 2.1 presents the
notion of typestates. Section 2.2 presents the concept of session types. In section 2.3 we
discuss the differences between these and usage types. Section 2.4 presents a motivating
example for the use of behavioral types.
2.1 Typestates
Typestates are a notion of behavioral types where the type of an entity depends on the
operations that are permitted, when at a particular state [43]. Each type has associated
with it a set of typestates, and each typestate is the set of operations that can be safely
executed in that state. Therefore, typestates are similar to finite-state machines and type-
checking is then able to reject programs where there are sequences of method calls that
are not admissible [43]. For example, in a Java iterator, the next method should only be
5
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called after hasNext was called.
Garcia, Tanter, Wolff and Aldrich present in [32] the concept of typestate-oriented
programming, where the language directly supports the expression of typestates, instead
of having typestate checkers as an additional layer. One example of such language is
Plaid [77, 37]. In the Plaid programming language, the class of an object represents its
typestate, and that class can change dynamically during runtime. Not only the interface
(i.e. available methods) depends on the typestate, the behavior also depends on the
current state [32].
2.2 Session types
Session types describe the interactions between different partners. Originally, this con-
cept had in mind only two parties running in parallel and communicating via message
passing [41, 78, 86]. Takeuchi, Honda and Kubo were the first to present formally in [78]
a small language and its typing system based on the concept of interaction between pro-
cesses, important for concurrent systems. Interaction is seen as a chain of actions between
two parties, sometimes interleaved with actions with other parties [78]. The language also
provides a type inference system, where it can be proven that if the program is well-typed,
there will be no inconsistent communication patterns [78].
Since then, session types have been the subject of great study, and have been inte-
grated into some object-oriented programming languages, like Plaid [37], Mool [13] and
Mungo [82].
2.3 Typestates/Session types/Usage types
In the study of behavioral types, terms like typestate, session type and usage type appear
frequently and are sometimes used interchangeably. The term typestate is usually associ-
ated with a particular state, which can be seen as a set of available operations or the pre-
and post-conditions related with each operation. Session types have their roots in typed
π-calculus - a model of computation for concurrent systems that can represent processes,
parallel composition of processes, communication between those through channels and
creation of new channels [89]. Session types allow for protocol checking in channels, but
they have been incorporated in object-oriented languages where method calls are the
communication primitive, without the need for explicit channel creation. They can be
seen as a set of typestates. A usage type is a description of all the possible states and
permitted operations for each state.
Although originally typestates were in line with a contract-oriented, or assertion-based,
approach, it is possible to easily transform the assertion-like typestates into usage-like
ones [85]. In Mungo [82], a typestate is no different from a usage type.
The following is an example, from the language Bica [33], of a usage type, which
describes the session type of an object, which has a set of possible states (typestates). In
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this example, the type system ensures that method calls happen in order, for example,
ensuring that the eof method is called before read, to make sure the end of the file was
not reached yet.
Listing 2.1: Usage type example
1 enum Res {OK, ERROR}
2 class FileReadToEnd {
3 session Init
4 where Init = { open: <OK: Open, ERROR: end> }
5 Open = { eof: <TRUE: Close, FALSE: Read> }
6 Read = { read: Open }
7 Close = { close: end }
8 Res open() {...}
9 Bool eof() {...}
10 String read() {...}
11 void close() {...}
12 }
2.4 Motivating example: Checker Framework
The Checker Framework is a tool that makes Java’s type system more powerful and use-
ful [79]. It includes plugins that verify the absence of many types of bugs: null pointer
exceptions, unintended side effects, SQL injections, concurrency errors, mistaken equal-
ity tests. It also allows the programmer to add new typing rules and enforcing those by
the creation of new plugins. Checker Framework has been successful at detecting and
confirming the absence of errors in Java code [27, 70].
One of the most well known plugins is the Nullness Checker. It ensures that null
pointer exceptions are never thrown1. By default, the type of objects is considered dif-
ferent from null. If one wants a nullable type, it must indicate so with the @Nullable
annotation, like in the following example.
Listing 2.2: Checker Framework: Nullness Checker example
1 import org.checkerframework.checker.nullness.qual.Nullable;
2 public class ValueWrapper {
3 private @Nullable Object obj = null;
4 public boolean hasValue() {
5 return obj != null;
6 }
7 public Object getValue() { return obj; }
8 public void setValue(@Nullable Object obj) {
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This example presents a wrapper object which may store a reference to another object
or the null value. The hasNext method checks if an object is stored. The getValue method
retrieves the object (assuming it is not null). The setItem method stores a new object.
The Nullness Checker reports an error on line 7 indicating that the obj variable may
be null. It is a real error that could happen if hasValue is not called before calling getValue.
Unfortunately, there is no way to specify that we expect the nullness of obj to be checked
before with the hasValue method, creating a scenario where we need to use defensive pro-
gramming: always check that obj is not null inside getValue. This gives an example where
detecting data-errors is not enough and motivates the inclusion of behavior information
in types, which would enforce that methods are called in the correct order and would
avoid false positives like this, by pruning execution paths that do not occur.
2.5 Conclusion
Type systems have been focused on the result of computations. Now, there is the need to
also verify the behavior of computations and ensure that methods are called in the correct
order. Although the need for behavioral types is increased by the growth of concurrent
systems, this notion is also important for verifying properties of sequential programs.
Like in the motivating example, ensuring that methods are called in the proper order
increases safety and allows false positives to be avoided, by discarding execution paths
that do not occur. In the following chapter, we analyze some tools and programming










Practical work on Behavioral Types
This chapter presents tools and object-oriented languages that incorporate the concept
of behavioral types. In the following sections, we will present programming languages
and tools that employ a typestate-oriented approach (section 3.1) and ones that employ a
usage types approach (section 3.2). Section 3.3 summaries this chapter.
3.1 Typestate-oriented approaches
3.1.1 Plaid
Plaid [77, 37] is a programming language designed for component-based computing in
concurrent software. One of Plaid’s main characteristics is typestate-oriented program-
ming [32], where the class of an object represents its typestate, and that class can change
dynamically during runtime. Not only the interface (i.e. available methods) depends on
the typestate, the behavior also depends on the current state. Plaid also supports gradual
typing [75], which allows a programmer to mix dynamically and statically typed code.
Additionally, Plaid programs are interoperable with Java programs [38].
In Plaid, each class is represented as a state and each state is represented as a sub-
state of that. The main state should contain all the variables and methods available in
all sub-states. Each sub-state should contain the variables and methods available only
on those sub-states. Additionally, Plaid allows composition of multiple states in complex
ways. It supports hierarchical-states, which are states that are composed of other states;
and-states, which are states where both must be present, modeled using the with keyword;
and or-states, which are states where only one can be present in an object - a state that is
a case of another state [77].
The following is a simple example (from [77]) of a File with two sub-states: one where
the file is opened, allowing the file to be read or closed, and another where the file is
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closed and may be opened again. State transitions are declared with the use of this <-
NewState.
Listing 3.1: Plaid example: File
1 state File {
2 val filename;
3 }
4 state OpenFile case of File = {
5 val filePtr;
6 method read() { ... }
7 method close() { this <- ClosedFile; }
8 }
9 state ClosedFile case of File {
10 method open() { this <- OpenFile; }
11 }
Listing 3.2: Plaid example: File use
1 method readClosedFile(f) {
2 f.open();




The main features mentioned previously, constitute Plaid’s main advantages. Unfor-
tunately, it is not clear how one may specify, on a class declaration, what the initial state
of an object after initialization should be. It seems that this is done in client code every
time an object is initialized, using the @ operator, like in the following example:
Listing 3.3: Plaid example: File initialization
1 val file = new File @ ClosedFile;
That might compromise safety if an object starts in a state that was not designed to be
the initial state. Furthermore, Plaid does not include a way to force an object to reach a
certain final state, which could be useful for ensuring protocol termination.
3.1.2 Fugue
Fugue is a modular static checker for languages that compile to the Common Language
Runtime1, integrating typestates with an object-oriented programming language. Fugue
allows the programmer to add declarative specifications on interfaces, marking methods
that are used for allocating or releasing resources, limiting the order in which object’s
methods are called, or even providing preconditions and postconditions. Fugue then
ensures that resources are not used before allocated or after being released, ensures that




called. Fugue is modular because it only analyzes method declarations, allowing for faster
checking [24].
The following is an example of a class for socket objects from [24].
Listing 3.4: Fugue example: A class for socket objects
1 [WithProtocol("raw","bound","connected","down")]
2 class Socket {
3 [Creates("raw")]
4 public Socket (...);
5 [ChangesState("raw", "bound")]
6 public void Bind (EndPoint localEP);
7 [ChangesState("raw", "connected"), ChangesState("bound", "connected")]
8 public void Connect (EndPoint remoteEP);
9 [InState("connected")]
10 public int Send (...);
11 [InState("connected")]
12 public int Receive (...);
13 [ChangesState("connected", "down")]
14 public void Shutdown (SocketShutdown how);
15 [Disposes(State.Any)]
16 public void Close ();
17 }
The WithProtocol annotation declares the possible states. The Creates annotation
specifies the initial state of an object when created. The ChangesState annotation specifies
that if the object is in the state indicated on the first argument, the method may be
called and the object transits to the state indicated in the second argument. The Dispose
annotation declares that a method is used for releasing resources. It is also possible to
declare the availability of fields in classes, like in the following example from [24].







7 private Socket socket;
8 ...
9 }
Fugue is very useful and has been used to check, for example, the implementation of
an internal Microsoft Research web site, detecting multiple errors, including connections
to a database not being properly disposed. Still, Fugue has some limitations. It does not
allow protocol checking on static fields, it ignores the concurrency aspect of the language
(i.e. does not control the use of shared variables) and ignores exception control flow
during analysis [24].
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3.1.3 Contractor.NET
Contractor.NET [91] is a Visual Studio extension that uses contract specifications with
typestate information to verify client code. The typestate information is inferred from
the class source code in a way that is enabled preserving [15]. This means that states are
grouped if they have the same set of actions enabled. This level of abstraction has been
useful to detect issues in various case studies including specifications of Microsoft Server
protocols [91]. The following is an example (from [91]) of a class implementation with
contract specifications and the corresponding inferred typestate (figure 3.1).
Listing 3.6: Contractor.NET example: Train door controller
1 public class Door {
2 public bool danger, closed, moving;
3 private void Invariant() {
4 Contract.Invariant(danger ? !closed : true);
5 }
6 public Door() {
7 closed = true; moving = false; danger = false;
8 }
9 public void Open() {
10 Contract.Requires(closed && !moving); closed = false;
11 }
12 public void Close() {
13 Contract.Requires(!closed && !danger); closed = true;
14 }
15 public void Start() {
16 Contract.Requires(!moving);
17 moving = true; if (!danger) closed = true;
18 }
19 public void Stop() {
20 Contract.Requires(moving); moving = false;
21 }
22 public void Alarm() {
23 Contract.Requires(!danger); danger = true; closed = false;
24 }
25 public void Safe() {
26 Contract.Requires(danger); danger = false;
27 }
28 }
The ability to infer typestates from the class source code is useful not only for later
static verification of client code, but also to confirm that the contract specification was
defined as intended: one only needs to look at the inferred typestate and check if it
matches what was expected. The concept of enabled preserving provides a good com-
promise between size and precision of the inferred typestate [15], but since it is an
over-approximation, non-determinism may exist and invalid client sequences might be
accepted [91], like in the following example provided by the authors.
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Figure 3.1: Contractor.NET example: Train door abstraction
Figure 3.2: Contractor.NET example of non-determinism and over-approximation
3.2 Usage types approaches
3.2.1 Bica
Bica integrates channel session types with object-oriented programming by extending
the Java language with session type annotations. These annotations are included in the
class source code and describe the changes in object’s interfaces. The interface of an
object is the set of available methods, which changes over time dynamically. Such objects
are called non-uniform. In contrast to other work on session types for object-oriented
languages, channels are not required to be created and completely used within a single
method. Several methods can operate on the same channel, thus allowing encapsulation
of channels in objects. Bica verifies statically that clients use objects according to the
specified session types [33].
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Listing 3.7: Bica example: FileReadToEnd
1 enum Res {OK, ERROR}
2 class FileReadToEnd {
3 session Init
4 where Init = { open: <OK: Open, ERROR: end> }
5 Open = { eof: <TRUE: Close, FALSE: Read> }
6 Read = { read: Open }
7 Close = { close: end }
8 Res open() {...}
9 Bool eof() {...}
10 String read() {...}
11 void close() {...}
12 }
In the previous example, the file has four states, where open, eof, read, close are avail-
able for each state respectively. The first state is Init. Upon calling the open method, the
state transition depends on the return value. That return value is checked in a switch
statement, and the state changes to Open or the final one. When the file is open, the
client must check if the end of the file was reached. If it did, the state changes to Close,
otherwise it changes to Read. On the Read state, one may call the read operation, returning
to the Open state. On the Close state the close method is available, and if called, the file
goes to the final state, where no operations are available.
In Bica, non-uniform objects must be strictly used in a linear way. That is enforced
statically. It has the downside of not allowing these objects to be stored in shared data
structures. Support for session types on interfaces is also lacking. If a class C implements
interface I, the interface should be interpreted as the specification of minimum method
availability [33].
3.2.2 Mool
Mool [13] is a object-oriented language, designed for concurrent systems, where protocols
can be specified in the form of usage types, attached to class definitions. These usage
types specify: the availability of methods; the tests clients must perform on the result
of methods; and if the object must be used in a linear way or if it can be shared. Mool
extends modular session types by eliminating channel operations, and by considering
method calls as the only communication primitive, for both sequential and concurrent
code. Furthermore, instead of making a distinction between linear and shared objects,
Mool allows linear objects to evolve into shared ones. The status of an object that can
only be referenced by a single thread is described by the lin (linear) qualifier. For shared
objects, the un (unrestricted) qualifier is used. Shared objects do not evolve into linear
ones since the number of references to an object is not tracked. To enable an operation to
be shared, the sync method modifier is used [12].
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The following is an example adapted from Mool’s tutorial2.
Listing 3.8: Mool example: File
1 class File {
2 usage lin{open; Read} where
3 Read = lin{canRead;
4 <lin{read; Read} + lin{close; end}>};
5
6 int linesInFile; int linesRead;
7
8 unit open() {
9 linesRead = 0;
10 linesInFile = 5;
11 }
12 string read() {
13 linesRead = linesRead + 1;
14 "reading line... \n";
15 }
16 boolean canRead() {
17 linesInFile != linesRead;
18 }





24 class Main {
25 usage lin{main; end};
26 unit main() {








Looking at the usage type declared on the File class, we observe that when a file is
initialized, it starts on a state where only linear use is allowed, and only the open method
is available. If open is called, the file moves to the Read state. The method’s name and the
name of the state the object transits to, upon that method being called, are separated by a
semicolon. In the Read state, one must call canRead to make sure there is something to be
read. The transition now depends on the return value of canRead. If it returns true, the
read method is available otherwise, the close method is available and it makes a transition
to the final state, where no operations can be done. This decision is represented by <>
and a plus sign to signify the disjunction between the two choices.
2http://gloss.di.fc.ul.pt/tryit/tools/Mool
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The plus sign may also be used to add more available methods on non decision states
(between {}). An asterisk can be used to create a state where the object remains in it when
its available methods are called. An example follows.
Listing 3.9: Mool example: File reader
1 class FileReader {
2 usage lin{open; Next} where
3 Next = lin{next; <Next + Done> + toString; Next}
4 Done = *{toString + getCounter};
5 ...
6 }
Channels as conceived in session type theory are special entities used to carry mes-
sages. Mool abstracts this notion by making method calls the communication primitive,
which allows for more natural code in the context of object-oriented programming. Fur-
thermore, allowing linear objects to evolve into shared ones gives more flexibility, instead
of forcing a separation between linear and shared objects. Despite that, aliasing of linear
types is forbidden, while aliasing of unrestricted types is completely allowed. Limited
forms of aliasing without loosing track of an object state should be allowed, but this is still
a topic of research. Additionally, Mool does not consider the treatment of exceptions [12].
3.2.3 Mungo
Mungo [82] is a tool that extends Java with typestate definitions [54]. These typestates
are associated with Java classes and define the behavior of instances of those classes,
specifying the sequences of method calls allowed. The Mungo tool checks statically that
method calls happen in order, following the specified behavior.
Typestate definitions are written in .protocol files and associated with the respective
Java class using an annotation. The following is an example of a file reader. It is adapted
from an example shown in Mungo’s web page [82].





5 public class File {
6 public File(String filename) { /* ... */ }
7 public Status open() { /* ... */ }
8 public Boolean hasNext() { /* ... */ }
9 public byte read() { /* ... */ }
10 public void close() { /* ... */ }
11 }
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Listing 3.11: Mungo example: File protocol
1 typestate FileProtocol {
2 Init = {
3 Status open(): <OK: Open, ERROR: end>
4 }
5 Open = {
6 Boolean hasNext(): <TRUE: Read, FALSE: Close>,
7 void close(): end
8 }
9 Read = {
10 byte read(): Open,
11 void close(): end
12 }
13 Close = {
14 void close(): end
15 }
16 }
When an object is initialized, its state is the first one defined in the protocol. In this
example, if we create a File, we are only allowed to call the open method. The open method
returns OK or ERROR. If the return value is OK, we move to the Open state, if not, we
reach the end state, and nothing can be done with the object later because it reached the
final state. In this case, the transition depends on the return value of this method. In
the Open state, we have the hasNext method to ensure that we actually have something to
read. If it returns TRUE, we move to the Read state. If it returns FALSE, then we move
to the Close state, and in that case, the only choice left is to close the file. On the Read
state we can read, and then we move directly to the Open state again. The return value
makes no difference to the transition in this case. From the Open or Read states, we can
also close the file.
Other examples of Mungo’s usage are available on a repository3. One such example4
shows Mungo detecting a state, declared on a typestate that could never be reached,
warning about a possible human error.
Listing 3.12: Mungo example: Store protocol
1 typestate StoreProtocol {
2 Start = {
3 BuyResult buy(String): <OK: end, KO: end>
4 }
5 Receipt = {
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Listing 3.13: Mungo example: State not reachable warning
1 StoreProtocol.protocol: 5-3: Warning
2 State not reachable: Receipt.
3.3 Summary
Much work has been done to produce tools that verify that behavior in programs is correct.
Plaid, for instance, includes many great features, like typestate-oriented programming,
gradual typing and control over aliasing and mutability. These concepts should be part
of languages. Fugue reads annotations of methods and class fields to ensure correct use
of objects. Unfortunately, adding annotations can be considered a burden, and since
Fugue does not check the body of methods, some errors might escape unnoticed. Con-
tractor.NET includes typestate inference, but since it overapproximates, invalid client
sequences might be accepted. Bica is a small object-oriented language that supports ses-
sion type annotations. Sadly, the project is old and no longer maintained. Mool is also an
object-oriented language like Bica, and allows the programmer to specify for each state,
if the object can be shared or not. Mungo is a more recent project, designed to verify Java
code, but it lacks some features. In the following chapter, we discuss the implementa-
tion of a tool which is inspired by Mungo and discuss the features Mungo lacks that are










Typestate-oriented tool: version 1
In this chapter, we are going to discuss the implementation of a tool that type-checks a
Java program where objects are associated with typestates. These typestates are associated
with Java classes and define the behavior of instances of those classes, specifying the
sequences of method calls allowed. It checks statically that method calls happen in the
prescribed order, following the specified behavior.
This tool is inspired by Mungo [82, 54], which was built in Java using the JastAdd
framework [47, 28]. Initially, the objective was to extend Mungo, but the result ended up
being a completely new implementation with support for new features like droppable
states and association of protocols with classes from the standard Java library or from
third-party libraries. Furthermore, it allows for state transitions to depend on boolean
return values, not just on enumeration values, allowing for common Java code to be
accepted and removing this artificial restriction that was not necessary for the verification
of code. Finally, the new implementation fixes issues around the prevention of null
pointer errors and analysis of the flow of execution.
This chapter presents the first version of the tool where objects must be used in a
linear way (i.e. no aliases are allowed). In the following sections, we will discuss the
framework and language used for the implementation (section 4.1), the features the tool
provides (section 4.2), implementation details (section 4.3), and the differences between
Mungo and our tool (section 4.4).
4.1 Design choices
To implement this tool, we have decided to use the Checker Framework [79, 70], instead
of the JastAdd framework, and use the Kotlin language [49, 50], instead of Java. In the
following subsections we will discuss the features that Checker and Kotlin give us over
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JastAdd and Java, which were the tools used for the implementation of Mungo.
4.1.1 Checker Framework
The Checker Framework is a tool that enhances Java’s type system to make it more pow-
erful and useful by letting software developers detect and prevent errors in their Java
programs [79]. This framework includes many plugins that help finding bugs. For exam-
ple, the Nullness Checker is a plugin that avoids the presence of NullPointerExceptions that
are very common is Java.
Additionally, the Checker Framework allows one to write their own plugins, including
declarative and procedural mechanisms for writing type-checking rules and support
for flow-sensitive local inference [70]. Plugins can be written in Java or any other Java
interoperable language because Checker is well-integrated with the Java toolset [70].
Since it also provides basic checking functionalities from which we can extend, we could
focus on implementing the concrete aspects of our type system.
We believe the change from JastAdd to the Checker Framework is helpful. JastAdd
includes its own language that is used to define the semantics of the implemented type
system. This may be useful but editor support for JastAdd is lacking (except for syntax
highlighting), which can hurt productivity. Besides that, it seems JastAdd is not actively
maintained while the Checker Framework, on the other hand, it is. As an example, while
developing the tool, we found an issue in Checker, which we reported1, and it took less
than one hour to get a response.
Additionally, the Checker Framework has been heavily tested and used by others. For
example, the Checker’s team evaluated the framework by writing pluggable type-checkers
and running them on over two million lines of existing code, and found hundreds of
bugs in the process, including a potential null-pointer error in Guava [35] (which at the
time was called Google Collections), even though it was already heavily tested [27]. They
also observed the use of the framework by computer science students in their projects to
eliminate null pointer errors [27]. Currently, the Checker Framework is used, for example,
by Guava, to check the absence of null-pointer errors in its code, and used in the KMS
Compliance Checker [53] by Amazon. Checker was also used as a foundation for ReImInfer,
a type inference tool for ReIm, a type system for reference immutability, implemented
for Java [42]. Finally, we note that the Checker Framework was presented in the Google
Summer of Code of 2019 [16] and mentioned in an article by Oracle [52], which shows
that Checker is not unknown to the Java community.
4.1.2 Kotlin
Kotlin [49, 50] is a new modern language developed by JetBrains. It is interoperable




features that make the code more concise and safe, in comparison with Java, increasing
productivity and safety [50].
One of those features is the fact that the null value is not assignable to variables unless
they are marked as nullable and uses of nullable values are checked to make sure they
are not null. This limits the existence of NullPointerExceptions, which may still happen
when interacting with Java code that was not annotated, but the error surface is greatly
reduced.
Listing 4.1: Null checking in Kotlin
1 var output: String
2 output = null // Compilation error
3
4 val name: String? = null // Nullable type
5 println(name.length()) // Compilation error
6
7 if (name != null) {
8 println(name.length()) // OK
9 }
Another feature is called “smart casts”. If one checks the type of an object in an if
statement, Kotlin is able to automatically cast the type of that value inside the if body.
Notice how in Java, one would need to use the instanceof keyword and cast the value
inside the if. In Kotlin, the cast is automatic and instead of instanceof, one just needs to
write is. The code gets more concise and readable.
Listing 4.2: Smart casting in Kotlin
1 fun calculateTotal(obj: Any) {
2 if (obj is Invoice)
3 obj.calculateTotal()
4 }
Additionally, Kotlin supports lambdas, functions declarations, which unlike in Java,
do not need to be declared inside a class, and extends data structures with many utility
functions, like map and filter. This allows code to be written in a more functional style
and reduces the amount of code that needs to be written to process data in collections.
Listing 4.3: Lambdas and collection processing in Kotlin
1 val numbers = listOf("one", "two", "three", "four")
2 val longerThan3 = numbers.filter { it.length > 3 }
3 println(longerThan3)
Many other features could be mentioned but these were the ones that provided a
greater increase in productivity in the development of this tool.
Kotlin is used, for example, in Android development [83] and is supported by the
Spring Framework [44]. Kotlin is therefore stable, and we believe it creates a good foun-
dation for the future of this tool as well.
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4.2 Type-checker features
In this section, we will be discussing how programmers can use this tool and which
features are available for use. We start by explaining how protocols may be defined
and associated with each class, then we present useful annotations that may be used,
we discuss the fact that our tool prevents null pointer errors, it ensures that protocols
reach completion, it supports “droppable” states, and that protocol specifications may be
associated with classes from libraries which source code is not available.
4.2.1 Protocols
This tool requires that protocol specifications be associated with each Java class if one
desires to check the behavior of instances of those classes. Protocol specifications are
written in text files usually with the .protocol extension. Since these protocols resemble
finite-state machines, they declare the states and the available transitions between those.
Each specification must follow the grammar in listing 4.4. Note that id is a meta-variable
ranging over values of the set of all the valid Java identifiers.
Listing 4.4: The grammar of protocol specifications
1 Select := id | id "." Select
2
3 Package := "package" Select ";"
4
5 Import := "import" "static"? Select ("." "*")? ";"
6
7 Destination := Select | State | DecisionState
8
9 Decision := id ":" ( id | State )
10
11 DecisionState := "<" Decision ( "," Decision )* ">"
12
13 Arguments := "(" Select ( "," Select )* ")"
14
15 Method := Select id Arguments ":" Destination
16
17 Methods := Method ( "," Method )*
18
19 State := "{" Methods ( "," "drop" ":" "end" )? "}"
20
21 NamedState := id "=" State
22
23 Protocol := "typestate" id "{" NamedState* "}"
24
25 Start := Package? Import* Protocol
Protocols may start with a package statement and zero or more import statements. Just
like in Java classes, these statements indicate to which package the protocol belongs and
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which classes it wants to import. This is important for the resolution of Java types used
in the protocol.
Following that, the keyword typestate must be used, followed by the name of the
protocol. The name is used only for presentation purposes when reporting errors and
does not need to match the file name. After the name, between curly brackets, zero or
more named states may be declared. No state may be called end. The end state is the final
state which is always implicit in the protocols and allows for no method calls. The initial
state in the protocol is the first declared. If no state is declared, end is simultaneously the
first and final state.
For each state, a set of methods which are allowed on that state may be declared. Each
method in the protocol is composed by a return type, a list between parentheses of the
types of the parameters separated by commas, and the state to which the method transits
to in that given state. The destination state may be a name of another declared state,
an anonymous state (i.e. a state declaration starting and ending with curly brackets),
or a decision state. Each decision state is composed of pairs. For each pair, the first
component is the name of a value from an enumeration or a boolean literal, depending
on if the method returns an enumeration or a boolean value. The second component
indicates to which state the method transits to depending on the return value of the
method call, which may be the name of a state or an anonymous state.
Additionally, each state may optionally include a “droppable” transition. This is
a special transition that happens implicitly when an object is no longer used, which
moves the object’s state to the final state. The lack of return type and parentheses avoids
ambiguity with methods, allowing the parser to easily understand that drop: end is a
special transition. This feature will be further explained later.
Listing 4.5: Example of an iterator protocol
1 typestate Iterator {
2 HasNext = {
3 boolean hasNext(): <true: Next, false: end>
4 }
5 Next = {
6 boolean hasNext(): <true: Next, false: end>,
7 Object next(): HasNext
8 }
9 }
In this example is presented a protocol for a Java iterator. This protocol has two
declared states, HasNext and Next and the implicit end state. In the HasNext state, only
the hasNext method is available to be called (line 3). In the Next state, both hasNext and
next methods are available (lines 6 and 7). When the hasNext method is called, and if it
returns true, the iterator transits to the Next state. If the method returns false, the iterator
transits to the end state. When the next is called, the iterator transits to the HasNext state.
To associate a protocol with a Java class, the Typestate annotation should be placed
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on top of the class declaration. The annotation accepts one string argument which is the
path, relative to the class file, to the protocol file. If the extension is not mentioned and
the file is not found, a file with the same name but ending with the .protocol extension is
searched. If a protocol file is still not found, an error is reported.
Listing 4.6: Typestate annotation
@Typestate("Iterator.protocol")
public class Iterator {
...
}
With the protocol associated with the class, the type-checker will ensure that instances
of that class follow the respective protocol.
Listing 4.7: Correct iterator example
1 Iterator it = new Iterator();
2 while (it.hasNext()) {
3 it.next();
4 }
This example would be accepted by the type-checker. When the iterator is instantiated
(line 1), it is in the HasNext state, the first one declared in the protocol. The hasNext
method is allowed because it is available on that state (line 2). If the method returns
true, the flow of execution goes into the loop body, where the next method is called (line
3). That call is allowed because now the iterator is in the Next state. After the call, the
iterator returns to the HasNext state. When hasNext returns false, the loop finishes, and
the iterator is left in the end state, and no other method is called on the iterator.
Listing 4.8: Incorrect iterator example
1 Iterator it = new Iterator();
2 do {
3 it.next();
4 } while (it.hasNext())
This example would not be accepted by the type-checker. When the iterator is instan-
tiated, it is in the HasNext state (line 1). Immediately after that, the next method is called
before any hasNext call is performed (line 3). This goes against what is defined in the
protocol because the next method is not available in the HasNext state.
4.2.2 State refinement
Besides the Typestate annotation, there are some other useful annotations that may be
used. One example is the Requires annotation. This annotation may be used in the
parameters of method declarations to indicate in which states the object pointed by the
parameter is expected to be in. If this annotation is not used, the type-checker assumes
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that the object may be in any state. The annotation expects a string argument or an array
of strings with the names of the required states.
Listing 4.9: Require annotation




Imagine an example where there is a file object that must be opened first, then it can
be read, and then it must be closed, and suppose there is a readFile method which expects
the file to be in the Open state so that the method can immediately read it and close it. To
allow the code to be type-checked, one can use the Requires annotation before the type of
the parameter with a string argument with the name of the Open state.
Another useful annotation that the tool offers is the Ensures annotation. This annota-
tion may be used in the parameters of method declarations to indicate in which states the
object pointed by the parameter is left in after the method call. The annotation expects a
string argument or an array of strings with the names of the states.
Listing 4.10: Ensures annotation
1 void readFile(




Now suppose that the readFile method expects a file which is opened, reads it and then
leaves the file in a state in which it can be closed, leaving the responsibility of closing the
file to the caller. To allow the code to be type-checked, one can use the Ensures annotation
before the type of the parameter with a string argument with the name of the Close state.
Notice how different annotations can be combined to specify what the method does.
Finally, the tool provides the State annotation. This annotation may be used in the
return types of method declarations. It is similar to the Ensures annotation in that it
indicates the states in which an object is in after the method call but instead of referring
to an object passed in a parameter, it refers to the object returned by the method. If this
annotation is not used, the type-checker assumes that the object may be in any state. The
annotation expects a string argument or an array of strings with the names of states.
Listing 4.11: State annotation
1 @State("Open") File newFile() {




Imagine there is a newFile method which returns a new file already opened, ready to
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be read. To allow the code to be type-checked, one can use the State annotation before
the return type of the method with a string argument with the name of the Open state.
4.2.3 Nullness checking
Null pointer errors are very common in Java. Because of this, it is crucial for the type-
checker to be able to detect these errors before runtime. For every object type used in a
program, the type-checker assumes the type is not nullable (contrary to the default type
system of Java). If the programmer desires that a type be nullable, it can use the Nullable
annotation. The annotation may be used before any type, in variable declarations, in
parameter declarations and in return types of methods. The type-checker then ensures
that no operations that could raise a null pointer error are performed. Additionally, the
type-checker is able to refine the type of nullable values when a comparison with null is
made in if statements or in the conditions of loops.
Listing 4.12: Nullness checking example
1 @Nullable @State("Open") File tryOpening() {
2 File file = new File();
3 return file.open() ? file : null;
4 }
5
6 void main1() {
7 @Nullable file = tryOpening();




12 void main2() {
13 @Nullable File file = tryOpening();





In this example there is a tryOpening method which creates a new file, attempts to
open the file, and if it succeeds, it returns the newly created file otherwise, it returns null
(line 3). The type-checker would report an error in the main1 method because there is an
attempt to call the read method in a potentially null value (line 8). In the main2 method,
no error would be reported since before calling methods on the file, it is checked that the
file variable is not null (line 14).
4.2.4 Protocol completion
When working with objects whose use is expected to follow a protocol, it is important
not only to ensure that method calls are performed in valid sequences, but that objects
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are used to completion (i.e. until they reach the final state). This ensures that the im-
plementation is correct by preventing method calls from being forgotten and by freeing
resources that are no longer necessary. For example, this can be used to ensure that the
close method on a socket is called after the socket is no longer in use.
Listing 4.13: Socket protocol example
1 typestate Socket {
2 NotConnected = {
3 void connect(): Connected
4 }
5 Connected = {
6 void send(String): Connected,
7 void close(): end
8 }
9 }
Imagine for example a protocol for a socket which may be in the NotConnected, Con-
nected or end states. In the initial state, the socket is not connected and only the connect
method is allowed (line 3). When the socket is connected, messages can be sent via the
send method (line 6). Finally, the socket can be closed via the close method (line 7). Closing
the socket makes it reach the end state, where no other operations are allowed.
Listing 4.14: Socket usage: example 1
1 void main1() {





In this first example, the type-checker would report an error since the socket is not
used until its protocol is completed. Notice how the socket was created, connected, a
message was sent, but the socket was not closed.
Listing 4.15: Socket usage: example 2
1 void main2() {





In this second example, the type-checker would report no errors, since the use of
the socket follows the protocol and the socket is properly closed when it is no longer
necessary.
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Listing 4.16: Socket usage: example 3
1 void main3() {




6 s.send("Hello World!"); // Error
7 }
In this third example, the type-checker would report an error. Even though the socket
was closed, there was an attempt to send another message after the fact. That is not
allowed since when an object is in the end state, no method calls are allowed.
4.2.5 Droppable states
It makes sense to force a protocol to reach the final state, for example, if we want to make
sure that some resources are freed or to make sure a protocol finishes. On the other hand,
there are cases where that is not strictly necessary. For example, there are scenarios where
one does not need an iterator to iterate for all elements of a collection, but just a few.
To support this kind of scenario, protocol specifications support a special kind of
transition. This transition represents the “dropping” of an object and transits it to the
end state. It happens implicitly when an object is no longer used. This is similar to how
the drop method is automatically called in Rust when an object goes out of scope2.
One key feature of this special transition is that it does not need to be defined in
all states. This allows the programmer to indicate in which states the object may be
“dropped”. States that do not include this transition are states where the object cannot be
“dropped”. This notion of “droppability” was also proposed in [23].
Listing 4.17: Example of an iterator protocol with “droppable” transitions
1 typestate Iterator {
2 HasNext = {
3 boolean hasNext(): <true: Next, false: end>,
4 drop: end
5 }
6 Next = {
7 boolean hasNext(): <true: Next, false: end>,




In this example is defined a protocol for an iterator which may be “dropped” in any




This means that one may stop using the iterator if it is either in the HasNext state or in
the Next state.
4.2.6 Protocols for classes of libraries
For the type-checker to ensure that method calls are performed in correct order, each
class needs to be associated with a protocol. That is easily done for classes which the
programmer owns: by adding the Typestate annotation. But not very class used in a project
is owned by the programmer of that project. It is very common to use third-party libraries
and specially the standard library of Java. Since classes belonging to those libraries might
not be associated with protocol specifications, the tool allows the programmer to associate
protocol files with classes or interfaces in a configuration file.
The content of this configuration file follows the same syntax of .properties files, com-
monly used in the Java community. Each line in the file is a mapping from a key to a value.
In this instance, the key is the full qualified name of a class or interface and the value is
the path (relative to the configuration file) of the protocol file. An example is presented
in listing 4.18, where the standard Iterator class of Java is associated with a protocol.
Listing 4.18: Example of a configuration file
1 java.util.Iterator=Iterator.protocol
To allow for common code in Java to be type-checked with our tool, it is not enough
to associate other classes or interfaces with protocols. For example, the type-checker
must know that when the iterator method is called on a list, a new iterator in the HasNext
state is returned. To account for this situation, we make use of a feature that is already
available through the Checker Framework: stub files3. A stub file is Java source code that
omits method bodies and allows one to write annotations for a library when the code is
not available to be edited.
Listing 4.19: Example of a stub file
1 package java.util;
2
3 public interface List<E> {
4 @State("HasNext") Iterator<E> iterator();
5 }
In this example is shown the content of a stub file which provides an annotation for
the iterator method in the List interface of the standard Java library. With the use of the
State annotation, we inform the type-checker that the returned iterator is in the HasNext
state, allowing the code presented in listing 4.20 to be type-checked4.
3https://checkerframework.org/manual/#stub
4With the exception that generics are not yet fully supported.
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Listing 4.20: Example of the use of the standard iterator
1 import java.util.*;
2
3 public class Main {
4 public static void main(String[] args) {
5 Iterator<String> it = Arrays.asList(args).iterator();






The type-checker is implemented as a plugin for the Checker Framework [79]. It works
by visiting each class and analyzing each method in two phases. In the first phase, the
content of methods is analyzed to infer the types of variables and fields. In the second
phase, using the inferred types, errors are reported when type incompatibility exists or
when invalid operations are performed. Additionally, it is ensured that the protocol of
objects is completed and that objects are used in a linear way.
Forcing the linear use of objects associated with a protocol is important to ensure that
there was no other piece of code that could have changed the state of an object, break-
ing the assumptions of the static analysis, and compromising the checking of protocol
compliance. There are techniques that can be employed to relax this restriction without
compromising the checking process. These will be used in the second version of the tool,
which will be presented later. For the first version, linearity is enforced.
In the following sections, we will discuss the type system employed and implementa-
tion details.
4.3.1 Type system
Each variable or field declaration and each expression in the code is associated with a
Java type, which is statically known. To be able to track the state of each object, we need a
parallel type system with other types that will represent the information the type-checker
needs. To that end, we introduce a type system where every value has a type from the
lattice in figure 4.1.
Unknown is the top type. It includes all possible values. Primitive is the type of all
primitive values, like integers and booleans. Object contains all objects, not including the
null value. This detail is important because that allows us to ensure statically that null
pointer errors do not occur. Null is a type that only includes the null value.
Moved is a type applied to variables that point to an object that was passed as a
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Figure 4.1: Type System Lattice
type cannot be used, because they no longer own the data. This ensures that objects are
used linearly.
This draws inspiration from the ownership concept of the Rust language: if something
takes ownership of some data, such data is considered to have been “moved”, and the
previous reference cannot be used [88]. This also avoids the need to nullify variables after
a value is obtained, as also proposed in [9].
The NoProtocol, Ended and State types are subtypes of Object. NoProtocol applies to
all objects that do not have a protocol specification associated with it. The Ended type is
applied to objects which protocol has completed. The State type represents objects which
are in a specific state. In practice, each State type is distinguished by the name of the state
it refers to and the protocol that declared that state.
Finally, the Bottom type is the subtype of all types. All operations are allowed on it.
Conceptually, it is an empty set, which means no value introduced in the language has
the Bottom type. We attribute this type to variables in contexts where the code that uses
them is never reached, to computations that might generate an error or just as a way to
avoid propagating errors. For example, imagine we call a method on an object which is
in a state that does not allow for that, the type of the object after that invocation will be
the Bottom type.
Every type is conceptually a set of all the values that belong to that type. In practice, a
type may be one of the singleton types presented in figure 4.1 or an union type comprising
of a set of those types. For example, union types are useful so that we can specify that an
object is in a state from a set of states or that a variable may point to an object in a certain
state or be null.
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In the implementation, the representation of each type follows these properties:
• union types do not include unions in their structure;
• a set with the Unknown type is just the Unknown type;
• a set with only one type is just that type;
• an empty set is just the Bottom type;
• the Bottom type does not appear in union types since it represents the empty set;
• if the Object type is present in an union type, NoProtocol, Ended and State are not
since they are already subtypes of Object.
In the following listings, we define the semantics concerning the creation of the types
presented and their subtyping relationship in ML. Additionally, we define two functions
to compute the union of two types and the intersection of two types. Assume that the ML
lists do not include repeated values.
Listing 4.21: Types definition
1 type ttype =
2 | Unknown | Object
3 | State of string | Ended | NoProtocol
4 | Null | Primitive | Moved
5 | Bottom | Union of ttype list
The type definition includes all the singleton types in the type system and an union
type with a list of types.
Listing 4.22: createType function
1 let createType (types:ttype list) : ttype =
2 let types = flatTypes types in
3 let types = if contains Object types
4 then filter_not inObject types
5 else types
6 in match types with
7 | [] -> Bottom
8 | [t] -> t
9 | types -> if contains Unknown types
10 then Unknown
11 else Union types
The createType functions takes a list of types. If that list contains union types, they are
removed and the types in the union are directly included in the list (using the flatTypes
function in line 2). If the list contains the Object type, subtypes of it are removed (line
4). If the list is then empty, the Bottom type is returned (line 7). If the list contains only
one type, such type is returned (line 8). If the list contains the Unknown type, Unknown is
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returned (line 10). Otherwise, an union type is returned containing the types in the list
(line 11).
Listing 4.23: isSubtype function
1 let rec isSubtype (a:ttype) (b:ttype) : bool =
2 match a with
3 | Unknown -> b = Unknown
4 | Object ->
5 begin match b with
6 | Unknown | Object -> true
7 | Union bTypes -> contains Object bTypes
8 | _ -> false
9 end
10 | State _ | Ended | NoProtocol ->
11 begin match b with
12 | Unknown | Object -> true
13 | Union bTypes ->
14 (contains a bTypes) || (contains Object bTypes)
15 | _ -> a = b
16 end
17 | Moved | Null | Primitive ->
18 begin match b with
19 | Unknown -> true
20 | Union bTypes -> contains a bTypes
21 | _ -> a = b
22 end
23 | Bottom -> true
24 | Union aTypes -> for_all (fun a -> isSubtype a b) aTypes
The isSubtype function returns true if and only if the first type is a subtype of the
second according to the lattice provided in figure 4.1. Unknown is only a subtype of
Unknown (line 3). Object is subtype of Unknown, Object and an union that includes Object
(lines 4 to 9). Remember that the representation of union types does not include Unknown,
so it is enough to check that Object is in the union. A type representing a state is subtype
of Unknown, Object, itself and any union containing itself or Object (lines 10 to 16). The
same goes for Ended and Protocol. Moved, Null and Primitive are subtypes of Unknown,
themselves and any union containing one of them (lines 17 to 22). Bottom is a subtype of
any type (line 23). An union type is a subtype of another type if the types in the union
are all subtypes of the other type (line 24).
Listing 4.24: union function
1 let union (a:ttype) (b:ttype) : ttype = createType [a; b]
The union function accepts two types and returns the type that corresponds to the
union of the two. The implementation of this function is very simple because it simply
reuses the createType presented previously.
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Listing 4.25: intersection function
1 let rec intersection (a:ttype) (b:ttype) : ttype =
2 match a with
3 | Unknown -> b
4 | Object ->
5 begin match b with
6 | Unknown -> a
7 | Object -> a
8 | Union bTypes -> createType (
9 map (fun b -> intersection a b) bTypes)
10 | _ -> if isSubtype b Object then b else Bottom
11 end
12 | State _ | Ended | NoProtocol
13 | Moved | Null | Primitive -> if isSubtype a b then a else Bottom
14 | Bottom -> a
15 | Union aTypes -> createType (
16 map (fun a -> intersection a b) aTypes)
The intersection function accepts two types and returns the type that corresponds
to the intersection of the two. The intersection of any type with Unknown is that type
(line 3). The intersection of Unknown or Object with Object is Object (lines 6 and 7). The
intersection of Object with an union type is computed by intersecting the types of the
union with Object (lines 8 and 9). The intersection of a singleton type which is subtype of
Object with Object is that type (line 10). The intersection of any other type with Object is
Bottom (line 10). The intersection of a singleton type with another type is that singleton
type if it is subtype of the other otherwise, it is Bottom (line 13). An intersection with
Bottom is always Bottom (line 14). The intersection of an union type with another type is
the result of intersecting the types of the union with the other type (lines 15 and 16).
4.3.2 Architecture
In the first phase of the type-checking process, the types of variables and fields are in-
ferred. To do that, each class is visited independently. If the class is associated with a
protocol (i.e. has a Typestate annotation), the non-static methods of that class are analyzed
in a order that follows the protocol, a process that we are going to call class analysis. If
the class is not associated with a protocol, then we assume a trivial one for it. That trivial
protocol has only one state. In that state, the object may be “dropped”, all its methods
are available to be called, and any method calls leave the object in the same state.
When analyzing each method of a class, each expression in the method is analyzed
independently. For each expression, a transfer function is called. This function accepts a
pair of stores and returns another pair of stores. Each store is a mapping between variables
or fields and their respective types. The first element of the pair is called the then store,
and the second is called the else store. The then store refers to the information that is true
when a given expression evaluates to true. The else store refers to the information that
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is true when a given expression evaluates to false. If the expression does not evaluate
to a boolean, then both stores should be the same. The input that the transfer function
receives is the result of analyzing the previous expressions. The return value of the
transfer function is the result of analyzing that expression.
The existence of these two stores is important, for example, when dealing with an
if statement. The then store will correspond to the information that is true in the then
branch, while the else store will correspond to the information that is true in the else
branch.
Listing 4.26: Two stores example
1 Iterator it = new Iterator();
2 if (it.hasNext()) {
3 // it: Next
4 it.next();
5 } else {
6 // it: end
7 }
Consider for example the hasNext method call on an iterator object in the condition of
an if statement. When the call returns true, then the iterator is in the Next state otherwise,
the iterator is in the end state. With the distinction between the two stores, we can
distinguish between what is true in one branch and what is true in the other branch.
For the first expression in the method, the input to the transfer function corresponds
to the entry store of the method. For the last expressions in the method, the results of
their transfer functions are merged to produce the exit store of the method. This is done
because the method might have multiple return statements. These entry and exit stores
are important to track what is true at the beginning of the method call and what is true
after the method call. We can think of these as the pre-condition and the post-condition
of the method, respectively.
During the analysis, there might be the need to merge stores. The result of merging
two stores is a store that includes all the variables or fields in the two stores, and when
the same variable or field is present in both, the union of the corresponding types is
computed.
In the second phase of the type-checking process, checks are performed and potential
errors are reported. Each statement and expression in the code is visited to ensure that
types are compatible. For example, the type of an expression to be passed to a method
call needs to be a subtype of the type of the parameter. Additionally, we ensure that
operations are only performed when it is safe to do so. For example, operations on null
that could raise a null pointer error are reported and method calls are only accepted if
the object is in a state that allows for that call. Finally, protocol completion is ensured by,
in general, checking the end of methods.
35
CHAPTER 4. TYPESTATE-ORIENTED TOOL: VERSION 1
4.3.3 Class analysis
To allow for the precise inference of the types of fields of objects, we analyze each method
of a class in an order that follows the protocol. Since we only consider as input, for
the analysis of a method, the results obtained from analyzing methods that lead to that
method, we avoid false positives. In other words, we exclude invalid sequences of method
calls from our consideration. What follows is an explanation of the algorithm with line
references pointing to the relevant lines of pseudocode in listing 4.27.
Listing 4.27: Class analysis in pseudocode
1 let stateToStore = Map<State, Store>()
2 let methodToStore = Map<Method, Store>()
3 let stateQueue = Queue<State>()
4
5 fun mergeStateStore(state, store) {
6 let current = stateToStore[state]
7 let new = merge(current, store)
8 if (current != new) {





14 fun mergeMethodStore(method, store) {
15 let current = methodToStore[method]
16 let new = merge(current, store)
17 if (current != new) {








26 while (stateQueue.size > 0) {
27 let state = stateQueue.take()
28 let store = stateToStore[state]
29 for ((method, destination) in state.transitions) {
30 let entryStore = mergeMethodStore(method, store)
31 if (entryStore == null) continue
32





The algorithm in the class analysis starts by analyzing the constructors and inferring
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what are the types of the fields after the initialization. After analyzing the constructors,
we merge the resulting stores, save the merged store and associate it with the initial state
(line 24). This store contains the facts that are true in that state. The initial state is now
added to a queue (line 10).
For each state in the queue we analyze each method available in that state. The method
analysis needs an initial store to start with, so that it can then output an inferred store
with the facts that are true after the method call. Because of that, each method is also
associated with a store (line 2), which might be updated during the algorithm. We need
the mappings from state to store (line 1) and method to store (line 2) to be different
because the same method might be reachable from different states with different stores.
The initial store for each method is computed by merging the store associated with
the state we are processing and the previous store associated with that method (line 30).
If no store was previously associated with a method, we default to the empty store, where
all the fields have the Bottom type. If the initial store is not different from the previous
store associated with the method, the method is skipped (line 31). Otherwise, the store
associated with the method is updated with the new merged store and the method is
analyzed (line 33).
After analyzing each method, the inferred stores are merged with the stores of the
respective destinations states (line 35). If no store was previously associated with a state,
we default to the empty store. If the new merged store is different from the previous store
associated with the state, the state is added to the queue (line 10).
The same states or the same methods might be analyzed more than once, but there is
a fixed point. The algorithm stops when the queue is empty (line 26). We know that the
queue will become empty because states are not requeued if their respective stores did
not change and because the number of states in protocols is finite.
4.3.4 Inference and checking
In the following sections, we will discuss how types are introduced, how types are inferred
when analyzing each type of expression or statement, what properties need to be checked
for each expression or statement, and how that is done.
4.3.4.1 Type introduction
Each Java type appearing in declarations has a corresponding type from our type system.
In general, the Java type java.lang.Object corresponds to the Object type in our type system.
Any primitive type, like an integer or a boolean, corresponds to the Primitive type. The
null value has the Null type. Any Java type associated with a class that has no protocol,
corresponds to the NoProtocol. For Java types of objects with protocol, the associated type
depends on the location of the declaration.
For return types of methods that can be analyzed (i.e. which source code is available),
the type is the union of all the states in the protocol expect end or the union of the states
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specified in a State annotation. For return types of methods of other libraries, the type
is Unknown unless a State annotation is provided for that method in a stub file. This is
because we cannot be sure of the state of an object and if there are aliases to it, if it came
from a method that we cannot analyze.
For parameters, the initial type is the union of all the states in the protocol except
end or the union of the states specified in a Requires annotation. The end state is not
considered because there is no reason to return or pass to a method objects that can no
longer be used.
For public field declarations, the type corresponds to Unknown. Since public fields
may be modified without calling any of the methods of the class, it is difficult to track in
what ways those fields may be altered. By applying the Unknown type, we preserve cor-
rectness, since no operations can be performed on Unknown, and we help the programmer
to use good practices such as not exposing the fields of an object.
For local variable declarations or private field declarations, the initial type is the union
of all the states in the protocol. Since the type may change during the execution of the
code, such changes are tracked during the inference process.
For any of the cases previously mentioned, if the Nullable annotation is used before
any Java type, then the corresponding type will initially include the Null type, which can
be potentially refined during the inference process.
4.3.4.2 Method parameters
When analyzing a method, an initial store is needed as input to the analysis of the first
expression in the method. The initial store for a non-static method is the result of merging
the type information provided by the class analysis, which includes information about
the fields of the object, with the type information of the parameters just introduced.
The initial store for a static method is only composed by the type information of the
parameters. The initial type of the parameters is computed using the reasoning explained
in section 4.3.4.1.
Listing 4.28: Types of parameters (1)
1 void useIterator(Iterator it) {
2 // it: State "HasNext" | State "Next"
3 ...
4 }
In this example, the initial store of the method only contains information about the it
variable which has initially the State "HasNext"| State "Next" type, which is the union of
all the possible states of the iterator except end.
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Listing 4.29: Types of parameters (2)
1 void useIterator(@Requires("HasNext") Iterator it) {
2 // it: State "HasNext"
3 ...
4 }
In this example, the initial store of the method only contains information about the it
variable which has initially the State "HasNext" type. Unlike the previous example, since
the Requires annotation was used, the set of states considered was refined, allowing the
method to assume that it receives an iterator only in the HasNext state.
4.3.4.3 Object instantiations
When a new object without protocol is initialized, its type is NoProtocol. When a new
object with protocol is initialized, its type corresponds to the first state in its protocol.
Listing 4.30: Object instantiation example
1 Iterator iterator = new Iterator();
2 // iterator: State "HasNext"
4.3.4.4 Assignments
When an assignment statement is analyzed, the type of the variable or field becomes
the type of the assigned expression, and the type of the expression becomes Moved after
the statement (when dealing with object types). By changing the type of the assigned
expression to Moved, we transfer the ownership of that object to the assignee, and since
no operations are allowed on the Moved type, we ensure that each object is used linearity.
Listing 4.31: Assignments example (1)
1 Iterator it1 = new Iterator();
2 // it1: State "HasNext"
3 Iterator it2 = it1;
4 // it1: Moved
5 // it2: State "HasNext"
In this example, a new iterator is created and assigned to the variable it1, which now
has the State "HasNext" type. When it1 is later assigned to it2, the it1 variable gets the
Moved type and it2 gets the type State "HasNext", which corresponds to the type of it1
before the assignment. This means that now it2 has ownership of the iterator while it1
lost ownership of it. If one wants to use the iterator, it must now do it via the it2 variable.
In the checking phase, assignments are analyzed to ensure that the type of the as-
signed expression is a subtype of the expected type of the assignee. This expected type
corresponds to what was explained in section 4.3.4.1. For example, if we try to assign null
to a variable or field, an error will be reported unless the Nullable annotation is provided.
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Listing 4.32: Assignments example (2)
1 Iterator it1 = null; // Error
2
3 @Nullable Iterator it2 = null; // Ok
Note that assignments on parameters with the Ensures annotation cannot be per-
formed. This is important so that we can ensure that when the ownership of the object is
returned to the caller, the object is in the specified state.
4.3.4.5 Return statements
When a return statement is analyzed, the type of the returned expression becomes Moved
after the statement (when dealing with object types). Although return statements immedi-
ately return control to the caller, it is important to track this “move” of data, for example,
when returning an object referenced from a field. By updating the type information of
this field, other methods reachable by that method will have information about the fact
that the data on that field is no longer owned by the object.
After the inference phase, the checking phase ensures that the returned expression is
subtype of the expected type to be returned. The expected return type is computed as
explained in section 4.3.4.1.
Listing 4.33: Return example (1)
1 class Wrapper {
2 private Iterator iterator = new Iterator();
3 public @State("HasNext") Iterator get() {
4 return this.iterator;
5 // this.iterator: Moved
6 }
7 }
In this example, there is a wrapper object that stores an iterator object that can be
retrieved via the get method, which is expected to return an iterator in the HasNext state.
When analyzing the return statement, the type of this.iterator becomes Moved after that
statement. This information will be provided to the analysis of methods that are reachable
after the get call, ensuring that it is known that the ownership of the iterator was lost.
Listing 4.34: Return example (2)
1 class Wrapper {
2 private Iterator iterator = new Iterator();
3 public @State("HasNext") Iterator get() {
4 // this.iterator: State "HasNext" | Moved





If the protocol of the wrapper were to allow for multiple get calls, then when get is
called, this.iterator might be in the HasNext state or it might have been “moved” by a
previous get call. And since State "HasNext"| Moved is not a subtype of State "HasNext",
an error would be reported in the checking phase.
4.3.4.6 Method calls
To be able to call a method, the receiver (i.e. the object on which the call is performed)
needs to be in a state that allows for that method call, and the types of the argument
expressions need to be subtypes of the types of the corresponding parameters. These type
compatibility checks are performed in the checking phase, while the types are computed
in the inference phase.
When analyzing a method call on an object, the current type of the receiver is retrieved
from the stores given as input to the analysis of this call. Knowing the current type and
the method call, the inference phase computes the type of the object after that method
call and saves that information in the stores that result from this analysis step.
The following listings present the ML representation of a protocol, the ML implemen-
tation of a function that given the current type, the name of the method, and the protocol,
returns true if the method may be safely called on that type, and the ML implementation
of a function that returns the new type of the object after the method call.
Listing 4.35: Protocol representation
1 type
2 label = string and
3 destination =
4 ExternalState of string |
5 DecisionState of (label * string) list and
6 method_name = string and
7 transition = method_name * destination and
8 typestate = string * (transition list) and
9 protocol = typestate list
The protocol is represented with a list of states. Each state is a pair with its name
and a list of transitions. Each transition is a pair with the name of the method and the
destination state, which may be the name of another state or a decision state. Decision
states are represented with a list of pairs, where each pair contains the label and the
corresponding name of the destination state given that label.
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Listing 4.36: available function
1 let rec available (t:ttype) (m:string) (p:protocol) : bool =
2 match t with
3 | Unknown | Object
4 | Ended | Moved | Null | Primitive -> false
5 | NoProtocol | Bottom -> true
6 | State state ->
7 let (_,transitions) =
8 find (fun ((name,_)) -> state = name) p in
9 exists (fun ((method,_)) -> method = m) transitions
10 | Union types -> for_all (fun it -> available it m p) types
The available function returns false for the Unknown and Object types since there is no
guarantee that methods may be safely called on objects with these types. The function
also returns false for the Ended, Moved, Null and Primitive types, since method calls are
not allowed on these. For objects with the NoProtocol type, any method call is allowed.
If an object is in a given state, the method call is allowed if it is available in that state
according to the protocol. Any method call is allowed in the Bottom type. Finally, for
union types, the method is available if it is available for all the types in the union.
Listing 4.37: transition function
1 let rec transition (t:ttype) (m:string) (p:protocol) : ttype =
2 match t with
3 | Unknown | Object | NoProtocol | Bottom -> t
4 | Ended | Moved | Null | Primitive -> Bottom
5 | State state ->
6 let (_,transitions) = find (fun ((name,_)) -> state = name) p in
7 let transition = find_opt (fun ((method_name,_)) -> method_name = m) transitions in
8 begin match transition with
9 | None -> Bottom
10 | Some(_,ExternalState name) ->
11 if name = "end" then Ended else State name
12 | Some(_,DecisionState list) ->
13 createType (map (fun ((_, name)) -> if name = "end" then Ended else State name) list
↪→ )
14 end
15 | Union types -> createType (map (fun it -> transition it m p) types)
If an object has the Unknown or the Object types, the type after the method call remains
the same, since it is unknown what the new type may be after the method call. If an object
has the Ended, Moved, Null or Primitive types, the new type is Bottom, since method calls
are not allowed on these types and any attempt to call a method on these would produce
an error. Giving the object the Bottom type avoids the propagation of errors. Objects with
the NoProtocol type remain with the same type. If an object is in a given state, the new
type corresponds to the destination state, given that method call. If the method is not
available on that state, the new type is Bottom. Objects with the Bottom type remain with
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the same type. Finally, for union types, the new type is the union of all the types that
result from taking each type and applying the transition function to them.
Listing 4.38: Method calls example (1)
1 void main() {
2 File file = new File();
3 // file: State "Init"
4 file.open();
5 // file: State "Open"
6 file.read();
7 // file: State "Read"
8 file.close();
9 // file: Ended
10 }
In this example, there is a file with a simple protocol: in the first state it must be
opened, then it must be read, and then it must be closed. After the file is closed, no
operations may be performed on it. In the main method, the object file is created, and
then all the methods are called in the correct order so, this example type-checks.
Listing 4.39: Method calls example (2)
1 void main() {
2 File file = new File();
3 // file: State "Init"
4 file.open();
5 // file: State "Read"
6 file.close(); // Error
7 // file: Bottom
8 }
Now imagine that after the file object being instantiated and opened, there is an
attempt to close the file before reading from it. In the inference phase, when analyzing
the close method, the current state of the object would be Read and the type after the
method call would be Bottom, because the method is not available in the Read state. This
technique is used to avoid propagating errors. In the checking phase, an error would be
reported since we cannot call the close method while the file is in the Read state.
One important aspect of analyzing method calls is making sure that objects are still
used in a linear way. To that end, when analyzing a method call, the receiver and the
argument expressions are all marked with the Moved type after the program point where
they are evaluated, following the order they appear in the code (i.e. the order in which
they would be evaluated). This step is important to ensure that the receiver object is
not passed into the parameters (which would create an alias between this and one of the
parameters), and to ensure that there is no aliasing between the parameters. This works
because the parameter types never include the Moved type, which means that if one of
them was previously “moved”, a type incompatibility with the parameter type would be
reported.
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Listing 4.40: Method calls example (3)
1 object.compareTo(object); // Error
Consider for example an object that implements a compareTo method which allows
the object to be compared with another object of the same type. In this example, there
is an attempt to compare the object to itself. Immediately after the receiver expression
is analyzed, it is marked with the Moved type, which means that when the argument
expression is analyzed, it already has the Moved type, which will be incompatible with
the type of parameter, causing an error to be reported.
Note that the receiver object having the Moved type is only true when the argument
expressions are evaluated. Immediately after the method call, the receiver object will
have the type corresponding to calling the given method in the given state.
Finally, we need to know the type of the method call expression itself and the types
of the arguments after the method call is performed. The type of the method call cor-
responds directly to the return type. The types of the arguments are in general Moved,
because they were delegated to a different method. The exception is when the Ensures
annotation is used. This annotation informs us that the ownership of the object passed in
the parameter is returned to the caller in a given set of states. Therefore, if this annotation
is provided in a parameter, then the type of the corresponding argument expression will
be the union of the states indicated in that annotation.
Listing 4.41: Method calls example (4)
1 void openFile(




6 void main() {
7 File file = new File();
8 // file: State "Init"
9 openFile(file);
10 // file: State "Open"
11 ...
12 }
Consider for example an openFile method which expects to receive a file in the Init
state and then returns it to the caller in the Open state. In this example, although file
is temporally set with the Moved type, after the method call is performed, file does not
remain with the Moved type and instead gets the State "Open" type, according to the
Ensures annotation provided in the declaration of the method.
Note that the analysis of static method calls is performed in a similar way as non-static
method calls, the only difference is that there is no receiver object to be concerned about.
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4.3.4.7 Control flow statements
In Java, statements are generally executed from top to bottom, in the order that they
appear in the code. However, control flow statements are used to break up the flow of
execution. These include decision-making statements (if-else, switch), looping statements
(for, while, do-while), and branching statements (break, continue, return) [18].
To ease the reasoning about the flow of execution of programs, each method declara-
tion is analyzed not by visiting each node in the abstract syntax tree, but by visiting each
node in a control flow graph [3], which is built by the Checker Framework.
Additionally, as explained before, the result of analyzing each expression in the code
is composed by a then store and by an else store, with information about what are the
types of variables when such expression evaluates to true or false (respectively). If the
expression does not evaluate to a boolean, both stores should be the same.
Listing 4.42: If-else statement example
1 Iterator it = new Iterator();
2 // it: State "HasNext"
3 if (it.hasNext()) {
4 // it: State "Next"
5 it.next();
6 } else {
7 // it: Ended
8 }
Imagine for example that the hasNext method of an iterator is called on the condition
of an if-else statement. After the call, the iterator may be in the Next state or in the end
state, depending on if the method returned true or false, respectively. Because the result
of analyzing the method call produces a then store, where the iterator is in the Next state,
and an else store, where the iterator is in the end state, we can propagate the information
of each store to each respective branch, allowing us to keep track of the precise state of
the iterator.
Listing 4.43: While statement example
1 Iterator it = new Iterator();
2 // it: State "HasNext"
3 while (it.hasNext()) {
4 // it: State "Next"
5 it.next();
6 // it: State "HasNext"
7 }
8 // it: Ended
The same reasoning is applied when the method call is performed on the condition of a
while statement. The only differences are that the information in the then store propagates
to the body of the loop and the information in the else store propagates to the program
point reached when the loop exits, as seen in this example.
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In protocol specifications, the state to which an object transits to, when a method call
is executed, may also depend on an enumeration value, not just a boolean value. If this
enumeration value is checked in a switch statement, then we can refine the state of the
object for each case.
Listing 4.44: Switch statement example
1 Iterator it = new Iterator();
2 switch(it.hasNext()) {
3 case TRUE:




8 // it: Ended
9 break;
10 default:
11 // it: Bottom
12 }
Imagine a different implementation of an iterator where the hasNext method returns
an enumeration value, TRUE or FALSE, instead of a boolean value. When the method
returns TRUE, the state of the iterator is Next, and when it returns FALSE, the state of
the iterator is end. For the default case of the switch statement, the type of the iterator is
Bottom since that case is not reachable.
Listing 4.45: Switch statement example (2)
1 Iterator it = new Iterator();
2 BooleanEnum hasNext = it.hasNext();
3 if (hasNext == TRUE) {
4 // it: State "Next"
5 it.next();
6 } else {
7 // it: Ended
8 if (hasNext == FALSE) {
9 // it: Ended
10 } else {
11 // it: Bottom
12 }
13 }
Since the result of analyzing the hasNext method call is only composed of two stores,
the then store and the else store, and since the method call does not return a boolean value,
we look at a switch statement as if it was composed by multiple if statements, where each
one of the if statements compares the returned value with each of the enumeration values.
Since a comparison evaluates to a boolean value, we can make use of the resulting stores
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to refine the type information for each case. This is exemplified in listing 4.45.5
In our type system, values might be nullable and operations on null that would raise
a null pointer error are disallowed. Because of this, it is important to refine the type
information of a value if one checks that it is not null, to avoid reporting unnecessary
errors. To that end, when analyzing a comparison expression that sees if a value is not
null, the resulting then store is such that the Null type is excluded from the type of the
value.
Listing 4.46: Not null comparison example
1 void use(
2 @Nullable @Requires("HasNext") Iterator iterator
3 ) {
4 // iterator: State "HasNext" | Null
5 if (iterator != null) {
6 // iterator: State "HasNext"
7 }
8 }
Imagine a method which receives an iterator in the HasNext state or the null value. If
the variable, which potentially holds the iterator, is checked to see if it is not null, then we
can be sure that the value is not null and we can safely perform operations on the iterator.
4.3.4.8 Protocol completion
Protocol completion is verified in the checking phase. To ensure that the protocol of all
objects reaches completion, we need to consider all the places on the code where an object
might no longer be used. For example, if an object is used inside a method and is neither
returned nor delegated to another method, then the object is no longer used.
To handle such cases, the exit stores of each method, which contain all the type infor-
mation about the variables and fields at the end of the method, are read and the type of
each variable and field in those stores is verified. If the variable corresponds to a parame-
ter with an Ensures annotation, the type of the variable needs to match what is specified
in the annotation. If that is not the case, the corresponding type needs to be either Ended
(the protocol has completed), Moved (the object was delegated) or the object needs to be
in a “droppable” state (i.e. any state with the drop: end transition). Otherwise, an error is
reported.
Listing 4.47: Protocol completion example (1)
1 void main() {
2 File file = new File();
3 // file: State "Init"
4 // Error: protocol of file was not completed
5 }
5Currently, the example as is would not work because the method call is disconnected from the if state-
ments. It is only used to exemplify the reasoning employed for switch statements.
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In this example, a file object was created but not used. Since the object was not
delegated, its protocol was not finished, and the file was not in a “droppable” state, an
error was reported.
Additionally, each assignment in the code is verified to ensure that the type of the
assignee, before the statement, was either Ended, Moved or the object was in a state in
which it could be “dropped”. This is important because assignments might makes us lose
the reference to the object that was previously pointed by the variable or field. Remember
that assignments on parameters with the Ensures annotation are disallowed.
Listing 4.48: Protocol completion example (2)
1 void main() {
2 @Nullable File file = new File();
3 // file: State "Init"
4 file = null;
5 // file: Null
6 // Error: protocol of file was not completed
7 }
Imagine now that a file object is created, assigned to a variable, and then that variable
is overwritten with the null value. Since the assignment was performed when the file
object was not ready to be “dropped”, an error is reported.
Furthermore, objects returned from method calls must be assigned to a variable so
that they can be used until the protocol is completed, unless the returned object is already
in a state in which it can be “dropped”.
Listing 4.49: Protocol completion example (3)
1 @State("Init") File createFile() {
2 return new File();
3 }
4 void main() {
5 createFile();
6 // Error: returned object not used
7 }
In this example, the file object is instantiated with a helper method, createFile. Notice
how that method is used but the returned file is not used. In this instance, an error would
be reported.
Moreover, if an object associated with a protocol is passed to a method that cannot be
analyzed, an error is reported, since it is unknown if the method will properly finish the
protocol of the object.
Finally, the stores resulting from the class analysis, associated with the end states and
each “droppable” state, are checked to ensure that each field has type Ended, Moved or that
the object pointed by the field is in a state in which it can be “dropped”. This is important
to ensure that objects that are referenced from other objects have their protocol completed
when their owner also finishes its protocol.
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Listing 4.50: Protocol completion example (4)
1 @Typestate("File.protocol")
2 public class FileWrapper {
3 // Error: protocol of file was not completed
4 private File file = new File();
5 public void open() {
6 // this.file: State "Init"
7 file.open();
8 // this.file: State "Open"
9 }
10 public String read() {
11 // this.file: State "Open"
12 return file.read();
13 // this.file: State "Read"
14 }
15 public void close() {
16 // this.file: State "Read"
17 }
18 }
Consider for example a scenario (listing 4.50) where a file object is used through a
wrapper object which implements the same interface and protocol as the file. The open
method calls the open method of the file (line 7) and the read method calls the read method
of the file (line 12). However, the close method does not close the file (line 16). This implies
that when the wrapper object reaches the end state (when its close method is called), the
file, which is stored inside of it, is still in the Read state, which is not a “droppable” state.
In this example, an error would be reported because the protocol completion of the file
was compromised.
4.4 Comparison with Mungo
In this section, we will present examples that highlight the features supported by the
tool we implemented and that compare it with the current (as of this writing) version of
Mungo6.
With the examples, we illustrate that our tool is able to check what Mungo checks,
find errors that the Mungo could not find, and that it includes additional features. Note
that all examples presented in the Mungo’s repository are correctly handled by our im-
plementation, only requiring the addition of some annotations.
In the following examples, files with Ok in their name are files where no errors are
expected, and files with NotOk in their name are files where errors are expected. The
examples are simple in nature as to present specifically the relevant features and issues
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Table 4.1 summarizes and compares the features supported by Mungo and our tool.
Square symbols show where only partial support exists for a given feature or where issues
exist.
Features Mungo Our tool
Basic checking X X
Decisions on enumeration values X X
Decisions on boolean values × X
Nullness checking 1,2 X
Linearity checking 1,3 X
Force protocol completion 3 X
Class analysis × X
State refinement via annotations × X
Droppable transitions × X
Protocols for classes of libraries × X
Improved flow analysis × X
Decisions based on equality checks in conditions × X
Table 4.1: Comparison between Mungo and our tool
4.4.1 Basic checking
The first example presents a very simple file protocol. This example is used to show that
both tools are able to verify the correct use of objects, associated with a protocol, in basic,
but common, cases.
Listing 4.51: FileProtocol.protocol
1 typestate FileProtocol {
2 Init = {
3 FileStatus open(): <OK: Read, ERROR: end>
4 }
5 Read = {
6 String read(): Close
7 }
8 Close = {
9 void close(): end
10 }
11 }
On the initial state, the first declared in the protocol, which is the Init state, one can
only open the file, since it is a precondition for the read operation. The open method
returns an enumeration value which indicates if the operation succeeded. If the open call
returns OK, the operation has succeeded and the state transits to Read, where one can
read the file. If the open call returns ERROR, it means that the file could not be opened,
1Some errors are reported but they are a bit cryptic.
2obj != null refinement does not exist.
3Some corner cases are not handled.
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and the protocol finishes. After reading the file, the state changes to Close, where one
must free resources by calling the close method. After calling close, the protocol ends, and
no other operations are allowed.
Listing 4.52: Ok.java
1 public class Ok {
2 public static void main(String args[]) {
3 File f = new File();
4










Both tools can verify the correct use of the file in the Ok.java file and report no errors,
which is correct. They ensure that method calls are called in the correct order according
to the specified protocol. Both are also able to understand that if the open call (line 5)
returns OK, the file is in the Open state, allowing a read (line 7) and then a closing (line
8), and if it returns ERROR, the protocol has ended.
Listing 4.53: NotOk.java
1 public class NotOk {
2 public static void main(String args[]) {






In the NotOk.java file, both tools can detect the error. They detect that the read method
(line 5) is called without the open being called first. The Mungo reports that it found the
use of the read method while it expected to find a state in which the open operation is
allowed. Our tool reports the same issue, but in different words: the read method cannot
be called in the Init state.
Listing 4.54: Mungo’s output
1 NotOk.java: 3-14: Semantic Error
2 Object created at NotOk.java: 3. Typestate mismatch. Found: String read(). Expected:
↪→ FileStatus open().
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Listing 4.55: Our tool’s output




4.4.2 Decisions on boolean values
The following example presents an iterator protocol. In the first state, one can only call
the hasNext method, to ensure that there are items in the iterator. If hasNext returns true,
the state changes to Next and the next item can be obtained by calling the next method.
The protocol then returns to the HasNext state. If hasNext returns false, there are no more
items and the protocol finishes.
Listing 4.56: JavaIteratorProtocol.protocol
1 typestate JavaIteratorProtocol {
2 HasNext = {
3 boolean hasNext(): <true: Next, false: end>
4 }
5 Next = {
6 String next(): HasNext
7 }
8 }
Notice in the protocol that the state change upon calling hasNext depends on the
boolean value that is returned (line 3). This example tests if both tools support decisions




3 public class Ok {
4 public static void main(String args[]) {
5 JavaIterator it = new JavaIterator(Arrays.asList(args).iterator());
6





The first code example shows the correct use of the iterator. For illustrative purposes,
this iterator implementation is a wrapper around a standard iterator from the Java library.
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3 public class NotOk {
4 public static void main(String args[]) {
5 JavaIterator it = new JavaIterator(Arrays.asList(args).iterator());
6





The second code example shows the incorrect use of the iterator. Notice how in line 7,
the loop condition is the negation of the return value of the hasNext call.
Listing 4.59: Mungo’s output
1 JavaIteratorProtocol.protocol: 3-5: Semantic Error
2 Method boolean hasNext() should return an enumeration type.
3
4 JavaIteratorProtocol.protocol:3,25: error: unexpected token "true"
5
6 JavaIteratorProtocol.protocol:3,37: error: unexpected token "false"
Mungo reports that the hasNext method should return an enumeration value and
reports syntax errors when it reads the true and false tokens in line 3 of the protocol. This
illustrates that Mungo does not support decisions on boolean values.
Listing 4.60: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk.java:5: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: JavaIteratorProtocol{
↪→ Next}
2 JavaIterator it = new JavaIterator(Arrays.asList(args).iterator());
3 ^




Our tool does support boolean values, which can be checked in the conditions of if
statements or loops. It reports no errors in the Ok.java file and detects the issues resulting
from the wrong code in line 7 of the NotOk.java file. Since the return value of hasNext was
negated, the loop will exit when there are items to be read, which means the protocol will
not complete (first error), and the loop will be entered when the protocol has reached the
end state, where the next call (line 8) is not allowed (second error).
This feature is useful because it allows one to use, for example, an iterator in a more
natural way, without having to use an enumeration value and testing it in a switch state-
ment, which is more verbose.
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4.4.3 Nullness checking
Null pointer errors are very common in Java so, it is important that tools avoid those
issues by analyzing the code statically while allowing for common programming patterns.
The following examples will compare how the two tools handle null values.
Listing 4.61: FileProtocol.protocol
1 typestate FileProtocol {
2 Init = {
3 FileStatus open(): <OK: Read, ERROR: end>
4 }
5 Read = {
6 String read(): Close
7 }
8 Close = {
9 void close(): end
10 }
11 }
This example makes use of the same file protocol presented in section 4.4.1.
Listing 4.62: Ok.java
1 public class Ok {
2 public static void main(String args[]) {
3 @Nullable File f = args.length == 0 ? null : new File();
4





10 public static void use(@Requires("Init") File f) {










In the first code example, a variable f is declared (line 3), which might contain a null
value or point to a file. The variable is declared with a Nullable annotation, provided by
our tool, which is used to declare nullable variables. If the variable does not contain a
null value (line 5), the file is passed to the use method, which expects a file in the Init
state (notice the use of the Requires annotation in line 10). Note that Mungo will read the
code as if the annotations Nullable and Requires were not there.
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Listing 4.63: NotOk.java
1 public class NotOk {
2 public static void main1(String args[]) {
3 @Nullable File f = new File();
4
5 switch (f.open()) {
6 case OK:
7 System.out.println(f.read());
















The second code example presents two attempts to use a file. In the main1 method
(line 2), a file is initialized (line 3), attempted to be opened (line 5), and if the open
operation succeeded, a read is performed (line 7). After that, the variable f, which pointed
to the file, is assigned to null (line 8), and then the file is attempted to be closed (line 9).
In the main2 method (line 16), the use method is called with a null value (line 17). The
use method is the same as in the previous code example, expecting a non-null file in the
Init state.
Listing 4.64: Mungo’s output
1 NotOk.java: 8-13: Semantic Error
2 Object reference is used uninitialised.
3
4 NotOk.java: 0-0: Semantic Error
5 Object created at NotOk.java: 3. Typestate mismatch. Found: end. Expected: void close().
↪→
6
7 Ok.java: 3-25: Semantic Error
8 Object reference is used uninitialised.
Mungo detects the null assignment in line 8 of the NotOk.java file, reporting an used
uninitialised error. It also reports the incorrect close method call in line 9, although
without providing a line number and without indicating that the issue is directly related
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with an attempt to call close on a null value.
Unfortunately, it also reports a false positive in the Ok.java file because it does not
refine the type of the variable upon comparing it with null in a condition expression (line
5). Moreover, Mungo produces a false negative in the NotOk.java file by not detecting
that a null value is being used as a parameter for the use method (line 17).
Listing 4.65: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk.java:8: error: Cannot override because object has not ended its protocol. Type:
↪→ FileProtocol{Close}
2 f = null;
3 ^
4 NotOk.java:9: error: Cannot call close on null
5 f.close();
6 ^
7 NotOk.java:17: error: incompatible types in argument
8 use(null);
9 ^
10 found : Null null
11 required: FileProtocol{Init} File
12 3 errors
Our tool detects all the null related issues in the NotOk.java file. It detects the attempt
to call the close method on a null value (line 9) and reports a type incompatibility when
calling the use method with null (line 17), where a non-null value was expected. Our
implementation also reports that, by overriding the f variable (line 8), we might lose a
reference to another file which is left with a non-completed protocol. In the Ok.java no
error is reported, since the tool is able to refine the type of the f variable upon comparing
it with null (line 5), avoiding a false positive.
4.4.4 Linearity checking
Linear use of objects is important. If linearity is not enforced, it is hard to know if there
was some other piece of code that changed the state of an object, breaking the assumptions
of the static analysis, and making it difficult to properly check protocol compliance and
completion. In the following examples, we will compare how both tools handle situations
where there is more than one reference to an object.
Listing 4.66: FileProtocol.protocol
1 typestate FileProtocol {
2 Read = {
3 String read(): Read,
4 void close(): end
5 }
6 }
To focus on the linearity enforcement of the two versions, the examples will work
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with a simplified version of the file protocol: there is no open method, multiple reads are
allowed and, at any point, the file may be closed by calling the close method.
Listing 4.67: Ok.java
1 public class Ok {
2 public static void main1() {
3 File f = new File();
4 use(f);
5 }
6 public static void main2() {
7 File f = new File();
8 File f2 = f;
9 use(f2);
10 }





In the first code example, there are two uses of files. In the main1 method (line 2), a
file is declared (line 3) and then passed as a parameter to the use method (line 4), which
will read and close the file (lines 12-13). In the main2 method (line 6), a file is declared
(line 7), being referenced by the f variable, and then also referenced by the f2 variable
(line 8), which is then passed as a parameter to the use method (line 9). These two cases
respect linearity and, even though a second reference to the file is present in main2, only
the second one is used.
Listing 4.68: NotOk.java (Part 1)
1 import java.util.function.Supplier;
2
3 public class NotOk {
4 public static void main1() {





10 public static void main2() {
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Listing 4.69: NotOk.java (Part 2)
16 public static void main3() {
17 File f = new File();





23 public static void main4() {
24 File f = new File();





30 public static void main5() {
31 File f = new File();












In the second code example, there are five cases where linearity is broken with the
consequence of breaking the file protocol, allowing reads when the file has already been
closed. In the main1 method (line 4), a file is created, used in the use method (which
will read it and close it), and then there is an attempt to read it again. In the main2
method (line 10), a file is used twice. In the main3 method (line 16), a file is created and
referenced by two variables. The second variable is used to pass the file to the use method
and then there is an attempt to read the file again (line 20). In the main4 method (line 23),
two variables reference the same file and are both used to pass the file to the use method.
And finally, in the main5 method (line 30), a file is created and referenced from within
a lambda function. Before the lambda is called, the file is closed, forbidding the read
operation (line 33) that would happen when the lambda is called (line 36).
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Listing 4.70: Mungo’s output
1 NotOk.java: 6-9: Semantic Error
2 Object reference is used uninitialised.
3
4 NotOk.java: 12-9: Semantic Error
5 Object reference is used uninitialised.
6
7 NotOk.java: 18-15: Semantic Error
8 Object reference is used uninitialised.
9
10 NotOk.java: 25-15: Semantic Error
11 Object reference is used uninitialised.
Mungo reports multiple Object reference is used uninitialised errors, which seem cryptic,
since the variables are clearly initialized, making it hard to understand what Mungo is
actually trying to enforce. Mungo is also unable to detect that an object is referenced
from inside a lambda, which is then called in the wrong order, breaking the protocol of
the file.
Listing 4.71: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk.java:7: error: Cannot call read on moved value
2 f.read();
3 ^
4 NotOk.java:13: error: incompatible types in argument
5 use(f);
6 ^
7 found : Moved File
8 required: FileProtocol{Read} File
9 NotOk.java:20: error: Cannot call read on moved value
10 f.read();
11 ^
12 NotOk.java:27: error: incompatible types in argument
13 use(f);
14 ^
15 found : Moved File
16 required: FileProtocol{Read} File




Our tool is able to detect all the issues in the NotOk.java file. Every time a reference is
assigned to a new variable or passed as a parameter to a method, the variable that had a
hold of that reference will be marked with the Moved type, which will disallow uses of it.
That can be observed by the errors reported. In line 7, it is reported that a read call is not
allowed on a “moved value”. In line 13, a file with the Moved type is not compatible with
a file in the Read state. In lines 20 and 27 the errors reported match the ones reported in
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lines 7 and 13 respectively. Finally, in line 27, it is detected that the f variable is being
referenced from inside a different closure, which is completely disallowed in this version
of the tool.
Additionally, it is important to handle the case where an object is passed into a method




3 public class NotOk2 {
4 public static void main1() {
5 List<File> list = new LinkedList<>();
6 list.add(new File());
7 File f1 = list.get(0);







In this example, there is a linked list capable of storing files. A single file is stored
(line 6) and then retrieved twice (lines 7-8), which creates two references to the same file.
The code does not follow the file protocol since the file is read, closed, and then read
again.
Listing 4.73: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk2.java:6: error: Passing an object with protocol to a method that cannot be analyzed
2 list.add(new File());
3 ^
4 NotOk2.java:7: error: incompatible types in assignment
5 File f1 = list.get(0);
6 ^
7 found : FileProtocol{Read} | Ended | Moved File
8 required: FileProtocol{Read} File
9 NotOk2.java:8: error: incompatible types in assignment
10 File f2 = list.get(0);
11 ^
12 found : FileProtocol{Read} | Ended | Moved File
13 required: FileProtocol{Read} File
14 NotOk2.java:9: error: Cannot call read on ended protocol, on moved value
15 f1.read();
16 ^
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Our tool currently reports various errors. The first error (line 6) indicates that an
object with protocol is being delegated to a method that cannot be analyzed. The two
following errors (lines 7 and 8) indicate that the object returned by the get method might
be aliased (i.e. includes the Moved type) which is not compatible with the type of the
variable assigned to. The two last errors (lines 9 and 11) report that methods cannot be
called on these potentially aliased objects. The reason we consider these to be aliased is
because the get method cannot be analyzed.
Unfortunately, Mungo crashes with this last example for an unknown reason to us.
4.4.5 Force protocol completion
It is important that the protocol of objects reaches completion, to ensure necessary method
calls are not forgotten, thus ensuring correctness, and ensuring that used resources are
freed. The following examples will compare the two tools in their enforcement of protocol
completion. To focus on the protocol completion aspect of typestate checking, these
examples already present linear use of objects.
Listing 4.74: FileProtocol.protocol
1 typestate FileProtocol {
2 Read = {
3 String read(): Read,
4 void close(): end
5 }
6 }
This example makes use of the same file protocol presented in section 4.4.4.
Listing 4.75: Ok.java
1 public class Ok {
2 public static void main1() {





8 public static void main2() {









In the first code example there are two uses of files. In the main1 method (line 2), a
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file is declared, then read, and then closed. In the main2 method (line 8), a file is declared
and then passed to the use method (line 10), which will then read and close the file (lines
14-15). Both cases show the correct completion of the file’s protocol.
Listing 4.76: NotOk.java
1 public class NotOk {
2 public static void main1() {
3 File f = new File();
4 }
5
6 public static void main2() {








In the second code example there are two cases where files are created but not used
to completion. In the main1 method (line 2), a file is created but not used. In the main2
method (line 6), a file is declared and passed as a parameter to the use method, which
does nothing (line 11).
Listing 4.77: Mungo’s output
1 NotOk.java: 3-14: Semantic Error
2 Object created at NotOk.java: 3. Typestate mismatch. Found: end. Expected: String read
↪→ (), void close().
3
4 NotOk.java: 7-14: Semantic Error
5 Object created at NotOk.java: 7. Typestate mismatch. Found: end. Expected: String read
↪→ (), void close().
Mungo is able to detect both issues where the files in lines 3 and 7 are not closed,
being left in their initial state, thus the error that it found the end state while it expected
read or close calls.
Listing 4.78: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk.java:3: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol{Read}
2 File f = new File();
3 ^
4 NotOk.java:11: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol{Read}
5 public static void use(File f) {
6 ^
7 2 errors
Our tool also detects the same issues, although the second one is reported in the
declaration of the parameter of the use method (line 11).
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Although both tools detect the errors in the previous code examples, there are some
corner cases that should be handled as well, for example, when an object with protocol is





3 public class NotOk2 {
4 public static void main1() {




9 public static class FileWrapper {
10 public File file = new File();
11 }
12
13 public static void main2() {
14 FileWrapper file = new FileWrapper();
15 }
16 }
In this example, the main1 method (line 4) includes the creation of a linked list and
then the addition of a single file (lines 5-6). The program then terminates without the file
having reached the end of its protocol. In the main2 method (line 13), an object without
protocol is created which holds a reference to a file (line 10). That file will not be used to
completion.
Listing 4.80: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk2.java:6: error: Passing an object with protocol to a method that cannot be analyzed
2 list.add(new File());
3 ^
4 NotOk2.java:10: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol{Read} |
↪→ Ended | Moved
5 public File file = new File();
6 ^
7 2 errors
Our tool detects the first issue by reporting that an object with protocol was passed
into a method that cannot be analyzed and it also detects the second issue by reporting
that the protocol of the file stored inside the wrapper object was not completed.
Unfortunately, Mungo crashes with this last example for an unknown reason to us.
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4.4.6 Class analysis
When an object with protocol is stored inside another object, it is also important to check
that its protocol is followed and that it reaches completion. Our tool is able to ensure
that the use of objects with protocol inside another object, comply with their respective
protocols, thanks to the class analysis explained in section 4.3.3.
Listing 4.81: FileProtocol.protocol
1 typestate FileProtocol {
2 Read = {
3 String read(): Read,




1 typestate FileWrapperProtocol {
2 Init = {
3 void init(File): Read
4 }
5 Read = {
6 String read(): Read,
7 void close(): end
8 }
9 }
This example makes use of the same file protocol presented in section 4.4.4 and makes
use of a FileWrapper. This wrapper holds a reference to a file. Its protocol matches the
file protocol except that it needs to be initialized by the use of the init method, which
receives a file and then allows the file to be operated (line 3 of the FileWrapper protocol).
Listing 4.83: OkFileWrapper.java
1 @Typestate("FileWrapperProtocol")
2 class OkFileWrapper {
3 private @Nullable File file = null;
4 public void init(File file) {
5 this.file = file;
6 }
7 public String read() {
8 return file.read();
9 }




The first code example presents a correct implementation of the FileWrapper. Initially,
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the file field is initialized with a null value (line 3). Notice the use of the Nullable annota-
tion. The field is updated with a non-null value in the init method (line 5), which must be
called first according to the protocol. Then, the read (line 7) and close (line 10) methods




2 class NotOkFileWrapper1 {
3 private @Nullable File file = null;
4 public void init(File file) {
5
6 }
7 public String read() {
8 return file.read();
9 }




The second code example presents an incorrect implementation of the FileWrapper. It
matches the previous example except that there is no initialization of the file field with a
non-null value in the init method (line 5).
Listing 4.85: NotOkFileWrapper2.java
1 @Typestate("FileWrapperProtocol")
2 class NotOkFileWrapper2 {
3 private @Nullable File file = null;
4 public void init(File file) {
5 this.file = file;
6 }
7 public String read() {
8 return file.read();
9 }




The third code example also presents an incorrect implementation. It matches the
first implementation except that the close method (line 11) does not call the close method
of the file stored inside the wrapper.
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Listing 4.86: NotOkFileWrapper3.java
1 @Typestate("FileWrapperProtocol")
2 class NotOkFileWrapper3 {
3 private @Nullable File file = null;
4 public void init(File file) {
5 this.file = file;
6 }








The fourth code example also presents an incorrect implementation of the FileWrapper.
Even though the file is properly initialized, notice how when the read method of the
wrapper (line 7) is called, the close method of the file is called (line 8), and when the close
method of the wrapper (line 11) is called, the read method of the file is called (line 12).
Listing 4.87: Mungo’s output
1 NotOkFileWrapper1.java: 3-31: Semantic Error
2 Object reference is used uninitialised.
Mungo is only able to report an error related with a null value in the NotOkFileWrap-
per1 file. All of the other issues are not detected.
Listing 4.88: Our tool’s output (Part 1)
1 NotOkFileWrapper1.java:4: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol
↪→ {Read}
2 public void init(File file) {
3 ^
4 NotOkFileWrapper1.java:8: error: Cannot call read on null
5 return file.read();
6 ^
7 NotOkFileWrapper1.java:11: error: Cannot call close on null
8 file.close();
9 ^
10 NotOkFileWrapper2.java:3: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol
↪→ {Read}
11 private @Nullable File file = null;
12 ^
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Listing 4.89: Our tool’s output (Part 2)
13 NotOkFileWrapper3.java:3: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol
↪→ {Read}
14 private @Nullable File file = null;
15 ^
16 NotOkFileWrapper3.java:8: error: Cannot call close on ended protocol
17 file.close();
18 ^




Our tool enforces protocol compliance of objects inside other objects and ensures that
if the outer object reaches the end of its protocol, all of the inner objects are also used to
completion. For the examples given, our tool detects the following errors:
• in the NotOkFileWrapper1 file, it is detected that the file passed as parameter is not
used (line 4), leaving the file field with a null value, which also results in the read
and close being called on null (lines 8 and 11).
• in the NotOkFileWrapper2 file, since the close method of the file is not called when
the close method of the wrapper is called, the file is left in the Read state, without
completing its protocol, thus the fourth error.
• in the NotOkFileWrapper3, since the file’s close method was getting called in the
read method of the wrapper, subsequent reads and a close will result in reads and
closings being performed in a file which has already completed its protocol, thus
the errors in lines 8 and 12. Additionally, since it is possible to call the close method
of the wrapper immediately after initialization, which actually performs a read on
the file, the file might be left in the Read state, thus the last error reported.
Note that, if an object is not associated with a protocol specification, a trivial protocol
is attributed to it. That trivial protocol has only one state. In that state, the object may
be “dropped”, all its methods are available to be called, and any method call leaves the
object in the same state.
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Listing 4.90: NotOkFileWrapper4.java
1 class NotOkFileWrapper4 {
2 private @Nullable File file = null;
3 public void init(File file) {
4 this.file = file;
5 }
6 public String read() {
7 return file.read();
8 }




This fifth example presents an implementation of a FileWrapper where the close method
does not actually close the file stored inside (line 10). Additionally, there is no Typestate
annotation which would associate this implementation with a protocol specification. This
means that the wrapper allows methods to be called in any order.
Listing 4.91: Our tool’s output
1 NotOkFileWrapper4.java:2: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol
↪→ {Read} | Null
2 private @Nullable File file = null;
3 ^
4 NotOkFileWrapper4.java:4: error: Cannot override because object has not ended its
↪→ protocol. Type: FileProtocol{Read} | Null
5 this.file = file;
6 ^




Since methods of this wrapper object may be called in any order, multiple errors are re-
ported. The first error is reported because the protocol of the file might not be completed.
This may happen in a scenario where the wrapper object is “dropped” immediately after
the init method is called. The second error is reported because one could call the init
method multiple times, which would overwrite the file field and make us lose a reference
to the previous file, which protocol was not completed. The third error is reported be-
cause the read method could be called before the init method, which means that there
could be an attempt to call a method on a null value.
Unfortunately, Mungo crashes with this last example for an unknown reason to us.
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4.4.7 State refinement via annotations
This example presents an important feature implemented in our tool. It allows one to use
annotations to specify the states in which an object passed in a parameter should be in,
using the Requires annotation, the states in which an object passed in a parameter is left
in, using the Ensures annotation, and in which states an object that is returned is in, using
the State annotation.
Listing 4.92: FileProtocol.protocol
1 typestate FileProtocol {
2 Init = {
3 FileStatus open(): <OK: Read, ERROR: end>
4 }
5 Read = {
6 String read(): Close
7 }
8 Close = {
9 void close(): end
10 }
11 }
This example makes use of the same file protocol presented in section 4.4.1.
Listing 4.93: Ok.java
1 public class Ok {
2 public static void main() {
3 File f = createFile();
4










15 public static @State("Init") File createFile() {
16 return new File();
17 }
18




In the main method of the Ok.java file, a file is first created with the help of the
createFile method (line 3). Notice how before the return type of the createFile method
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there is a State annotation indicating that the returned file is in the Init state (line 15).
After that, there is an attempt to open the file (line 5). If that succeeds, the file is read, by
passing it to the static read method (line 7), and then closed (line 8). Notice how the static
read method uses the Requires and Ensures annotations to indicate that it expects a file in
the Read state and that the file is left in the Close state.
Listing 4.94: NotOk.java
1 public class NotOk {
2 public static void main() {
3 File f = createFile();
4











16 public static @State("Init") File createFile() {
17 return new File();
18 }
19




In the main method of the NotOk.java file, a file is first created with the help of the
createFile method (line 3). After that, there is an attempt to open the file (line 5). If that
succeeds, the file is read by directly calling the read method of the file (line 7), then the
file is passed into the static read method (line 8), and then there is an attempt to close
the file (line 9). Notice how the static read method expects a file in the Read state but is
receiving it in the Close state.
Listing 4.95: Mungo’s output
1 NotOk.java: 8-14: Semantic Error
2 Object reference is used uninitialised.
3
4 Ok.java: 7-14: Semantic Error
5 Object reference is used uninitialised.
Mungo reports two errors. One in the Ok.java file and one in the NotOk.java file. The
message of these errors does not make it clear what the issue is. Also note that we did not
expect any error to be reported in the Ok.java file.
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Listing 4.96: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk.java:8: error: incompatible types in argument
2 read(f);
3 ^
4 found : FileProtocol{Close} File
5 required: FileProtocol{Read} File
6 1 error
Our tool successfully verifies the use of the file in the Ok.java file and also detects the
error in line 8 of the NotOk.java file, reporting that the static read method expected a file
in the Read state but received one in the Close state.
4.4.8 Droppable transition
In the following example we show that our tool supports “droppable” transitions, which
may be used in any state where an object may safely stop being used, without the need to
reach the end state.
Listing 4.97: MyComparatorProtocol.protocol
1 typestate MyComparatorProtocol {
2 Start = {




This example makes use of a comparator object. The protocol of this comparator has
only one declared state. On that state, the compare method may be called. After the
method call, the object remains in the same state. Additionally, the object may be safely
“dropped” in that state, as indicated by the drop: end transition (line 4).
Listing 4.98: MyComparator.java
1 @Typestate("MyComparatorProtocol")
2 public class MyComparator {
3 public int compare(int a, int b) {
4 return a < b ? -1 : a > b ? 1 : 0;
5 }
6 }
The compare method of the comparator object receives two integer values and returns
−1 if the first is smaller than the second, returns 1 if the first is greater than the second,
and returns 0 if both are equal.
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Listing 4.99: Ok.java
1 public class Ok {
2 public static void main() {




In the main method of the Ok.java file, a comparator object is first initialized. Follow-
ing that, the compare method is called with two integers values, and the result is printed
to the standard output channel. Then, the object is no longer used.
Mungo reports a syntax error in the protocol specification since it does not support the
drop: end transition. Our tool does not report any errors since the use of the comparator
object follows the specification.
4.4.9 Protocols for classes of libraries
In the following example we show that our tool supports that protocol specifications be
associated with classes using a configuration file and that it supports stub files, which
allow one to write annotations for a library when the code is not available to be edited.
Listing 4.100: Configuration file
1 java.util.Iterator=JavaIterator.protocol
To use this feature, a configuration file needs to be provided to map the full qualified
name of a Java class with a protocol specification.
Listing 4.101: Stub file
1 package java.util;
2
3 public interface List<E> {
4 @State("HasNext") Iterator<E> iterator();
5 }
Additionally, a stub file is provided to indicate that the iterator method of a list returns




3 public class NotOk {
4 public static void main(String[] args) {
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In this example, the array of arguments provided to the main method is taken to
produce a list of strings. Then the iterator method on that list is called, and the next
method is called without calling the hasNext method first.
Listing 4.103: Mungo’s output
1 None
Listing 4.104: Our tool’s output




Mungo does not report any errors because the iterator has no protocol associated with
it. Our tool reports that the next method is being called when the iterator is in the HasNext,
which means that the incorrect use of the iterator is properly detected.
4.4.10 Improved flow analysis
When type checking, it is important to understand the flow of execution so that type
information is propagated in a correct way, first to avoid false negatives, and second, to
reduce false positives. In our tool, the Checker Framework is responsible for building the
control flow graph, so we did not need to implement that functionality. Since Checker has
been used by other projects and battle tested, we trust its implementation. This section
presents two examples.
Listing 4.105: JavaIteratorProtocol.protocol
1 typestate JavaIteratorProtocol {
2 HasNext = {
3 Boolean hasNext(): <True: Next, False: end>
4 }
5 Next = {
6 String next(): HasNext
7 }
8 }
The first example makes use of an iterator which, for illustrative purposes, is a wrap-
per around the standard Java iterator. The iterator has two states, the HasNext state,
where one must check if there are items to be obtained, and the Next state, where one
can extract the next item. The hasNext method (line 3), available in the HasNext state,
returns an enumeration value, instead of a boolean value, so that the protocol is accepted
by Mungo.
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3 public class NotOk {
4 public static void main(String[] args) {
5 JavaIterator it = new JavaIterator(Arrays.asList(args).iterator());
6











The code for the first example shows the use of an iterator. There is a loop that keeps
running while there are items in the iterator. In the loop body, the hasNext method is
called (line 8). If it returns True, the next item is extracted, via the next method (line 10),
and the loop continues. If it returns False, the loop stops.
Notice that the loop condition is not true but false (line 15). This means that at most
one item will be obtained from the iterator. This is the case because the continue statement
jumps to the condition, which evaluates to false, not the loop body. If there is more than
one item in the iterator, the iterator will not be used to completion. Mungo does not
detect that, while our tool does, as one can see by the following outputs.
Listing 4.107: Mungo’s output - If condition is false
1 None
Listing 4.108: Our tool’s output - If condition is false
1 NotOk.java:5: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: JavaIteratorProtocol{
↪→ HasNext} | Ended
2 JavaIterator it = new JavaIterator(Arrays.asList(args).iterator());
3 ^
4 1 error
Mungo seems to wrongly assume that a continue statement jumps to the beginning
of a loop, when in actuality, a continue statement jumps to the condition expression. If
the condition were to be always true, there would be no practical difference, but if the
condition were to be false, like in the example, bugs could go unnoticed.
Our tool, besides avoiding the previous false negative, also avoids a false positive in
the case a literal boolean value true is used in the condition expression of a loop. In that
74
4.4. COMPARISON WITH MUNGO
instance, it recognizes that when that condition is evaluated, the loop body will always be
entered. This is useful because there are code generation tools, like StMungo [54], which
produce loops with true conditions. This can be illustrated by changing the previous
example to use true instead of false in the loop condition (line 15). Our tool reports no
error in this scenario, which is correct. This particular case required special code, since it
is not supported by Checker outside of the box, although there are plans for that7.
Listing 4.109: Our tool’s output - If condition is true
1 None
In the following example, which makes use of the same file protocol presented in
section 4.4.1, we test how both tools handle the possible flows of execution around a
switch statement.
Listing 4.110: NotOk.java
1 public class NotOk {
2 public static void main(String args[]) {
3 File f = new File();
4
5 switch (f.open()) {
6 case OK:











In this example, a file is created (line 3), and then opened (line 5). If the open operation
failed, by returning ERROR, nothing more is done. If the open operation succeeded, by
returning OK, the file is read (line 7). After the read operation, the file should be closed,
but that only happens if the read method returns a string with the content "CLOSE".
Listing 4.111: Mungo’s output
1 None
Mungo does not detect that it is possible that no case in the switch statement matches,
assuming that the code for the "CLOSE" case will always run.
7https://github.com/typetools/checker-framework/issues/3249
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Listing 4.112: Our tool’s output
1 NotOk.java:3: error: Object did not complete its protocol. Type: FileProtocol{Close} |
↪→ Ended
2 File f = new File();
3 ^
4 1 error
Our tool understands that it is possible that the file is not closed so, it reports that the
file either is the end state, or was left in the Close state, after the file was read.
4.4.11 Decisions based on equality checks in conditions
If a method returns an enumeration value, and if one is only interested in knowing if that
matches or not another value, it might be too verbose to check it in a switch statement.
The following example presents an enumeration value being compared with the use of a
== operator.
Listing 4.113: JavaIteratorProtocol.protocol
1 typestate JavaIteratorProtocol {
2 HasNext = {
3 Boolean hasNext(): <True: Next, False: end>
4 }
5 Next = {
6 String next(): HasNext
7 }
8 }




3 public class Main {
4 public static void main(String[] args) {
5 JavaIterator it = new JavaIterator(Arrays.asList(args).iterator());
6





In this example, an iterator is created and items are retrieved until there are no more
items in it. Notice that the hasNext method returns an enumeration value, which is
compared against Boolean.True with a == operator (line 7).
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Listing 4.115: Mungo’s output
1 Main.java: 0-0: Semantic Error
2 Object created at Main.java: 6. Typestate mismatch. Found: String next(), end, Boolean
↪→ hasNext(). Expected: <True, False>.
Mungo currently forces enumeration values to be checked in a switch statement. Be-
cause of this, Mungo reports an error indicating that it expected <True, False> (a decision
state), but instead found the end state, a next call and a hasNext call.
Listing 4.116: Our tool’s output
1 None
Our tool reports no errors in this example since it supports decisions to be based on
equality checks done in conditions, properly recognizing what will be the new state of
the object after the method call, according to the value returned.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a tool for type-checking Java programs where objects are
associated with typestates. This tool was inspired by Mungo [82, 54]. We also discussed
the features this tool supports and the improvements over the current version of Mungo.
In the following chapters, we will discuss how aliasing may be allowed, instead of forcing











Theoretical work on Access Permissions
If multiple references to the same object exist, type information can get outdated if the
object changes state via another reference. In the first version of the tool, we enforced
that objects were used in a linear way to ensure that method calls on objects followed
the protocol. While enforcing linear use of objects made the task of checking protocol
compliance easier, it restricted what a programmer could do. For example, it is very
common to have shared data, something that is not possible if linear use is enforced. In
the following sections, we discuss different approaches that allow programs that share
resources to be verified.
5.1 Owicki-Gries method and Rely-Guarantee
The Owicki-Gries method is an axiomatic method for proving properties of parallel
programs [69]. The system Owicki and Gries proposed includes the Hoare logic [39]
rules for sequential programs and a rule for parallel composition. This rule allows one to
compose two programs into a concurrent program but requires that their proofs do not
“interfere” [84, 55].
{P1} c1 {Q1} {P2} c2 {Q2} the two proofs are non-interfering
{P1 ∧ P2} c1||c2 {Q1 ∧Q2}
Figure 5.1: Owicki-Gries method
Rely-Guarantee reasoning [51] is a compositional verification method for shared
memory concurrency based on the Owicki-Gries method. In this system, specifications
have four components: the pre-condition, which describes the initial state of the program;
the post-condition, which relates the initial state to the final state; the rely condition,
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which describes the interference the program can tolerate; and the guarantee condition,
which describes the interference it imposes on other concurrent programs [51, 84].
5.2 Separation Logic
Separation Logic [73, 67, 45] is based on the logic of bunched implications [66], and
includes the notion of resources. This program logic extends Hoare logic with new con-
nectives and the separation conjunction. It has been mainly used to reason about sequen-
tial programs that manipulate pointer data structures. In this approach, each program
state is divided into a heap and a store part, allowing explicit local reasoning about the
memory. With the separation formula, one can ensure that two programs accessing the
same location do not interfere to verify program behavior [74, 84].
Concurrent Separation Logic [11, 68] is a new realization of Separation Logic to
allow reasoning about parallel programs that share resources. With this logic, if two
threads operate on disjoint parts of the memory, they can be verified in a safe and isolated
way. Additionally, this logic introduces the notion of resource invariants, where each rule
includes a precise separation logic assertion that always holds during the execution of the
program except when a thread is inside an atomic block [74, 84].
{P } C {Q} {P ′} C′ {Q′}
{P ∗ P ′} C||C′ {Q ∗Q′}
Figure 5.2: Disjoint concurrency rule
5.3 Access permissions
Access permissions are abstract capabilities that characterize the way a shared resource
can be accessed by multiple references [74].
This notion is built on Linear Logic [34], which treats permissions as linear resources,
and Separation Logic [73, 67], which reasons about program behavior against specifica-
tions. Classic Separation Logic does not support concurrent reads of a memory location
by multiple references or threads. To add support for concurrency, Boyland (2003) and
Bornat et al. (2005) combined Separation Logic with access permissions [74, 10, 8].
Access permissions are used to ensure that only a reference can write on a particu-
lar location at any given time, and to ensure that if a location is read by a thread, all
other threads only have read permission for that location. This avoids interference in
concurrent programs [74].
Plural [7] and Plaid [64] are examples of tools for Java where access permissions
are combined with typestate abstractions to verify protocol compliance in sequential and
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concurrent programs. Since then, many approaches were used to verify program behavior
in concurrent programs with shared-memory [74].
5.3.1 Fractional permissions
Fractional permissions [10] are concrete mathematical values between 0 and 1 inclusive.
These represent the permission for a shared resource. The absence of permission is
represented by the value 0. Full permission is represented by the value 1. Shared read-
only access is represented by a value strictly between 0 and 1. Fractional permissions
can be split into a number of fractions and distributed among multiple references. For
example, a permission s can be split into s1 and s2 such that s = s1 + s2, allowing two
references to have access to the same resource. Permissions that were split may also be
joined again. [74].
5.3.2 Counting permissions
Counting permissions [8] are similar to fractional permissions. While fractional permis-
sions are values between 0 and 1 inclusive, counting permissions are values between 0
and a maximum constant value. The value 0 represents the absence of permission and
the maximum constant value represents full permission. Read-only access is represented
by a value between 0 and the maximum constant value [74].
5.3.3 Symbolic permissions
Symbolic permissions [7] are a simplified extension of fractional permissions. Instead of
using concrete fractional values to represent and split permissions, symbolic permissions
are represented with five types of permissions: unique, full, share, pure, and immutable.
Like other types of permissions, these may be split and joined [74].
Unique provides exclusive access to a reference to read and modify the referenced
object. Full grants a reference read and write access while also granting read-only access
to other references. Share allows references to read and modify the object. Pure gives
read-only access to a reference while other references may read or modify the object.
Immutable gives read-only access to all references [74].
5.4 Other approaches
Other proposed approaches that provide aliasing control include view-based typestates [62],
adoption and focus [29], and capability calculus [19]. View-based typestates are a gen-
eralization of access permissions that allows the creation of views, which are projections
of an object where the fields and methods have specific permissions [62]. The adoption
and focus strategy relaxes linearity by allowing one to alias objects via adoption, and get
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a temporary linear view on an object via focus [29]. Capability calculus is a compiler inter-
mediate language that supports region-based memory management [81, 80] and includes a
safe type system, which controls the permissibility of operations, such as memory access
and deallocation, and tracks aliasing information [19].
5.5 Motivating example: Cell example
To show the usefulness of access permissions, consider the following example, which
makes use of a cell object and an item object. The protocol and implementation of the
cell are provided in listings 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. The protocol and implementation
of the item are provided in listings 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.
Listing 5.1: Cell protocol
1 typestate Cell {
2 NoItem = {
3 void setItem(Item): OneItem,
4 drop: end
5 }
6 OneItem = {
7 Item getItem(): OneItem,




Listing 5.2: Cell class
1 public class Cell {
2 private Item item = null;
3 public Item getItem() {
4 return this.item;
5 }
6 public void setItem(Item item) {
7 this.item = item;
8 }
9 }
The cell can hold at most one item, which means the cell’s protocol has only two states:
one in which there is no item stored, and other in which there is one item stored. There
are two methods that operate in this cell: getItem and setItem. The getItem can only be
called if the cell has one item and it returns the currently stored item. The setItem method
is used to store an item on the cell and can be called in both states, either to store a item
for the first time or to overwrite a previously stored item.
82
5.5. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: CELL EXAMPLE
Listing 5.3: Item protocol
1 typestate Item {
2 S0 = {
3 void changeState(): S1,
4 drop: end
5 }
6 S1 = {




Listing 5.4: Item class
1 public class Item {
2 private int state = 0;
3 public int getState() {
4 return this.state;
5 }
6 public void changeState() {
7 this.state = 1;
8 }
9 }
The item has two states, S0 and S1, and one method, changeState. Calling the method
in the S0 state, changes the state of the item to S1. Calling the method in S1, keeps the
item in the same state.
Listing 5.5: Main 1
1 Cell c = new Cell();
2 c.setItem(new Item());
3




8 Item item2 = c.getItem();
9
10 item2.changeState();
Consider the first scenario (listing 5.5) where a cell is created (line 1), an item is stored
(line 2), then borrowed via the getItem method (line 4), and used by the caller (line 6).
With linearity enforced, the item would be “moved” from the cell to the caller of the
getItem method, and the cell would lose the ownership of the item. We would like to
be able to temporarily borrow the item, use it, and then “return” it to the cell, without
having to create an explicit method for that, allowing it to be borrowed again later.
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Listing 5.6: Main 2
1 Cell c = new Cell();
2 c.setItem(new Item());
3
4 Item item = c.getItem();
5







13 Item item2 = c.getItem();
14 item2.changeState();
The second scenario (listing 5.6) is similar to the previous one except that the item
held by the cell is used in a separate thread (line 7). In this instance, we would like that
the item be made available again to the cell after the thread finishes its execution (line
11).
Listing 5.7: Main 3
1 Cell c = new Cell();
2 c.setItem(new Item());
3
4 Item item = c.getItem();
5






12 Item item2 = c.getItem();




In the third scenario (listing 5.7), we expect the type-checker to report an error because
we are trying to borrow the item a second time from the cell and use it without waiting
for the thread to finish (line 14). If we do not call the join method on the thread first,
there is no guarantee that no data-race will occur.
Although these scenarios are simple in nature, they show a common pattern that
exists in imperative programming languages: sharing of objects. The sharing may occur
in sequential and concurrent contexts, in single-threaded and multi-threaded contexts.
Forcing the linear use of objects makes it easier to statically keep track of the state of the
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objects, but prevents common uses cases, as we seen.
Although borrowing is a concept already existing in languages like Rust [72], this
concept alone is not enough for a typestate-oriented language. Since the types evolve, we
need to ensure that borrowed objects are still used in a way that respects their protocol
and does not break the assumptions the owners made.
Access permissions enable the sharing of objects in a controlled way while still allow-
ing for the use of objects to be checked statically. In the next chapter, we will explore tools
and languages that either support access permissions directly or that allow specifications











Practical work on Access Permissions
In this chapter, we will explore tools and languages that either support access permissions
directly or that allow specifications to indicate which memory locations are required and
modified. The languages and tools analyzed are Spec#, Chalice, Dafny, VeriFast, and
Plaid. To study these, we will be using the motivating example presented in the previous
chapter and test how these verify it in the three scenarios. Table 6.1 summarizes the
results obtained from analyzing each language and tool.






















× × × × X
Concurrency
support
× X × X X
Actively
maintained
× × X X ×
Table 6.1: Comparison of languages and tools
6.1 Spec#
The Spec# language is a superset of C#, an object-oriented language targeted for the
.NET Platform. Spec# adds support for distinguishing non-null object references from
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possibly-null object references, method pre- and postconditions, a discipline for manag-
ing exceptions, and support for constraining the data fields of objects. Spec# includes
an automatic program verifier, called Boogie [5], which checks specifications statically [4,
59].
One of the key features of Spec# is the introduction of concepts like aggregate objects,
peers, and owners, to enforce an ownership discipline, which controls the use of objects
referenced by other objects in its fields, allowing invariants between them to be verified.
Unfortunately, Spec# does not check for concurrency errors such as data races and dead-
locks [59]. In the following listings, we present an implementation of the motivating
example in Spec#.
Listing 6.1: Spec#: Item class




5 ensures state == 0;
6 { state = 0; }
7
8 public void ChangeState()
9 modifies state; ensures state == 1;
10 { state = 1; }
11 }
The Item class has a state field that may hold an integer value: 0 or 1. The initial state
value is 0 and may be changed to 1 by calling the ChangeState method. Notice how in the
constructor (line 5) and in the ChangeState method (line 9), there are ensures clauses that
specify what is the value of the state field after they are ran. Additionally, the ChangeState
method includes a modifies clause (line 9) that indicates that the method may change the
value of the state field.
Listing 6.2: Spec#: Cell class
1 using Microsoft.Contracts;
2
3 class Cell {
4 [Peer] public Item? item = null;
5
6 public Item GetItem()
7 requires item != null; ensures item == result;
8 { return item; }
9
10 public void SetItem([Captured] Item i)
11 modifies item; ensures i == item;
12 { item = i; }
13 }
The Cell class has an item field which may hold a reference to an item or may be null.
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The field must be public otherwise Spec# will not allow the exposure of the item via the
GetItem method. After initialization, the item field is null. There is a GetItem method (line
6), which can only be called if item is not null, and which returns the current stored item.
There is also a SetItem method (line 10) which stores an item in the cell, by modifying
the item field, like specified in the modifies clause. Notice the use of two annotations, Peer
(line 4) and Captured (line 10).
The Peer annotation is used when the field references an object that can also be ac-
cessed by clients of the enclosing class. For example, in a typical collection-iterator
pattern, the iterator has a field that references the collection. This field would be marked
as Peer since clients of the iterator may also access the collection directly [59]. In this
example, this annotation will allow clients of the cell to use the item directly.
The Captured annotation indicates that the SetItem method has the right to take own-
ership of the object referenced by the parameter, and that a caller should not expect to be
able to directly use the object after the call [59] (expect later, by borrowing the item via
the GetItem method).
Listing 6.3: Spec#: Main
1 class Main {
2 void Run() {
3 Cell c = new Cell();
4 c.SetItem(new Item());
5 Item item = c.GetItem();
6 item.ChangeState();




In the Run method of the Main class, a cell is created (line 3), an item is created and
stored in it (line 4), and then borrowed (line 5). After borrowing the item, the ChangeState
method is called on the item (line 6). Following that, the item may be borrowed again
(line 7). The code is accepted by Spec#.
Unfortunately, since Spec# does not check for concurrency errors [59], there will be
no guarantee of the absence of data races in the scenario where the state of the item is
changed in a separate thread.
6.2 Chalice
Chalice is an imperative language and program verifier for reasoning about concurrent
programs [60, 58]. Like Spec#, Chalice is also built on Boogie [5].
It supports thread creation, locking and channels. To allow for code verification, pro-
grammers indicate the assumptions about their code via annotations, which the verifier
then analyzes to check that they are never violated. These annotations can indicate that
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a parameter must not be null, a memory location can safely be accessed by a thread, or
that a memory location is protected by a certain lock [60].
The key feature of the Chalice language is that it centers around access permissions.
To require permission to write on a field f of an object o, one must use acc(o.f) in the
requires clause of a method. To require only read access, one can use rd(o.f) [60]. Chalice
does not use modifies clauses to know what locations can be modified by a method call
instead, it deduces those locations by looking at the permissions that the method requires.
If a method does not demand access to a memory location, then that method cannot
modify that location [60]. Note that the annotations acc and rd can only refer to fields.
If one requires full permission to all the fields of an object, one can use acc(o.*). In the
following listings, we present an implementation of the motivating example in Chalice.
Listing 6.4: Chalice: Item class
1 class Item {




6 ensures acc(state) && state == 1
7 { state := 1; }
8 }
The Item class has a state field that may hold an integer value: 0 or 1. The initial
state value is specified when initializing the object. That value may be changed to 1 by
calling the ChangeState method. Notice how in the ChangeState method (line 4), there is a
requires clause (line 5) that requests full permission to write in the state field, and there
is a ensures clause (line 6) that specifies that the permission is returned to the caller and
that the value of the state field after the method call is 1.
Listing 6.5: Chalice: Cell class
1 class Cell {
2 var item: Item;
3
4 method GetItem() returns (res: Item)
5 requires rd(item) && item != null
6 ensures rd(item) && res == item && res != null
7 { res := item; }
8
9 method SetItem(i: Item)
10 requires acc(item) && i != null
11 ensures acc(item) && i == item && item != null
12 { item := i; }
13 }
The Cell class has an item field which may hold a reference to an item or may be null.
There is a GetItem method (line 4), which can only be called if item is not null, and which
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returns the current stored item. Notice how it requires read access to the item field, and
then returns that permission to the caller (lines 5 and 6). There is also a SetItem method
(line 9) which stores an item in the cell, by modifying the item field. To do that, the
method requires full permission to the item field, and then returns that permission to the
caller (lines 10 and 11).
Listing 6.6: Chalice: Main 1
1 class Main {
2 method Main() {
3 var c := new Cell { item := null };
4 var i := new Item { state := 0 };
5 call c.SetItem(i);
6 call item := c.GetItem();
7 call item.ChangeState();




In the first scenario (listing 6.6), in the Main method, a cell is initialized with its item
field having a null value (line 3), an item is initialized with its state field having a 0 integer
value (line 4), and the item is stored in the cell (line 5). After that, the item is borrowed
from the cell (line 6), its state is changed (line 7), and then the item is borrowed again
(line 8). The code is accepted by Chalice.
Listing 6.7: Chalice: Main 2
1 class Main {
2 method Main() {
3 var c := new Cell { item := null };
4 var i := new Item { state := 0 };
5 call c.SetItem(i);
6 call item := c.GetItem();
7 fork tk := item.ChangeState();
8 join tk;




The second scenario (listing 6.7) is similar to the previous one, except the state of the
item is changed in a separate thread (line 7), and before trying to use the item again, we
wait for the thread to finish (line 8). The code is also accepted by Chalice, as expected.
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Listing 6.8: Chalice: Main 3
1 class Main {
2 method Main() {
3 var c := new Cell { item := null };
4 var i := new Item { state := 0 };
5 call c.SetItem(i);
6 call item := c.GetItem();
7 fork tk := item.ChangeState();
8 call item2 := c.GetItem();






In the third scenario (listing 6.8), there is an attempt to use the item before ensuring
that the thread has finished (line 10). In this instance, Chalice reports an error, which is
correct. The ChangeState method requires full permission to the state field of the item,
but that permission was transferred to the thread, and can only be obtained again after
the join statement, which waits for the thread to finish.
6.3 Dafny
Dafny is an imperative and sequential language, with support for generic classes, dy-
namic allocation, inductive datatypes, and specification constructs, including pre- and
postconditions, frame specifications (read and write sets), and termination metrics [56,
20].
Its static verifier, powered by Boogie [5] and Z3 [22], is then used to verify the func-
tional correctness of programs, being able to prove that there are no runtime errors, such
as index out of bounds, null dereferences and division by zero, and that the code termi-
nates, except in specially designated loops [65]. Although Dafny does not seem to include
concurrency support, it has been used to model concurrency [57], to verify concurrent
programs [61], and as a subject of future extension with concurrency support [26]. In the
following listings, we present an implementation of the motivating example in Dafny.
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Listing 6.9: Dafny: Item class
1 class Item {
2 var state: int;
3
4 constructor()
5 ensures state == 0




10 ensures state == 1
11 { state := 1; }
12 }
The Item class has a state field that may hold an integer value: 0 or 1. The initial state
value is 0 and may be changed to 1 by calling the changeState method. Like in Spec#, in
the constructor (line 5) and in the changeState method (line 10), there are ensures clauses
that specify what is the value of the state field after they are ran. Also like in Spec#, the
changeState method includes a modifies clause (line 9) that indicates that the method may
change the value of the state field. The only difference is syntactical: instead of writing
modifies state, one writes modifies ‘state, with a backtick, to indicate that the state field may
be changed. In Dafny, modifies state would indicate that the object pointed by state may
be changed, not the field itself, which in this case does not make sense, since state holds
an integer, not an object reference.
Listing 6.10: Dafny: Cell class
1 class Cell {
2 var item: Item?;
3
4 constructor()
5 ensures item == null
6 { item := null; }
7
8 method getItem() returns (res: Item)
9 requires item != null
10 ensures res == item
11 { return item; }
12
13 method setItem(i: Item)
14 modifies ‘item
15 ensures item == i
16 { item := i; }
17 }
The Cell class implementation is very similar to the Spec# one. It has an item field
which may hold a reference to an item or may be null. After initialization, the item field
is null. There is a getItem method (line 8), which can only be called if item is not null,
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and which returns the current stored item. There is also a setItem method (line 13) which
stores an item in the cell, by modifying the item field, like specified in the modifies clause.
Listing 6.11: Dafny: Main
1 method Main() {
2 var c := new Cell();
3 var i := new Item();
4 c.setItem(i);
5 var item := c.getItem();
6 item.changeState();
7 var item2 := c.getItem();
8 item2.changeState();
9 }
In the Main method, a cell is created (line 2), an item is created (line 3), and stored
in the cell (line 4). After that, the item is borrowed (line 5), and its state is changed by
the changeState method (line 6). Following that, the item may be borrowed again (line 7).
The code is accepted by Dafny.
Unfortunately, since Dafny does not have built-in support for threads, we cannot test
the scenarios where the state of the item is changed in a separate thread.
6.4 VeriFast
VeriFast is a verification tool, based on separation logic [67], for single-threaded and
multithreaded C and Java programs [46]. The main features of VeriFast include: checking
that a method satisfies its corresponding method contract, which can specify the structure
of the heap and provide an upper bound on the set of modifiable memory locations via
permissions; support for predicates, inductive data types, functions and lemmas [76].
In the following listings, we present an implementation of the motivating example in
Java with VeriFast specifications.
Listing 6.12: VeriFast: Item class
1 //@ predicate Item(Item i; int state) = i.state |-> state;
2
3 public class Item {
4 private int state = 0;
5
6 public void changeState()
7 //@ requires Item(this, _);
8 //@ ensures Item(this, 1);
9 { state = 1; }
10 }
The Item class has a state field that may hold an integer value: 0 or 1. The initial state
value is 0 and may be changed to 1 by calling the changeState method. Notice the use of
the Item predicate to reason about the current state of the item.
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Listing 6.13: VeriFast: Cell class
1 //@ predicate Cell(Cell c; Item item) = c.item |-> item;
2
3 public class Cell {
4 private Item item;
5
6 public Cell()
7 //@ requires true;
8 //@ ensures Cell(this, null);
9 { item = null; }
10
11 public Item getItem()
12 //@ requires Cell(this, ?i) &*& i != null;
13 //@ ensures Cell(this, i) &*& result == i;
14 { return item; }
15
16 public void setItem(Item i)
17 //@ requires Cell(this, _) &*& i != null;
18 //@ ensures Cell(this, i);
19 { item = i; }
20 }
The Cell class has an item field which may hold a reference to an item or may be null.
The initial item field value is null (line 9). There is a getItem method (line 11), which can
only be called if item is not null, and which returns the current stored item. There is also
a setItem method (line 16) which stores an item in the cell, by modifying the item field.
Notice the use of the Cell predicate to reason about the state of the cell, before and after
each method call.
Listing 6.14: VeriFast: Main 1
1 public class Main {
2 public static void main(String[] args)
3 //@ requires true;
4 //@ ensures true;
5 {
6 Cell c = new Cell();
7 c.setItem(new Item());
8
9 Item item = c.getItem();
10 item.changeState();
11




In the first scenario (listing 6.14), in the Main class, a cell is created and an item is
stored inside of it (lines 6 and 7). After that, the item is borrowed from the cell (line 9),
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its state is changed (line 10), and then the item is borrowed again (line 12). The code is
accepted by VeriFast.
Listing 6.15: VeriFast: Runnable class
1 class StateChanger implements Runnable {
2
3 private Item item;
4
5 //@ predicate pre() = this.item |-> ?i &*& i != null &*& Item(i, _);
6 //@ predicate post() = this.item |-> ?i &*& i != null &*& Item(i, _);
7
8 public StateChanger(Item i)
9 //@ requires i != null &*& Item(i, _);
10 //@ ensures pre();
11 {
12 this.item = i;
13 }
14
15 public void run()
16 //@ requires pre();





For the following scenarios, which make use of threads, there was the need for the
declaration of a StateChanger class, which implements the Runnable interface, because
VeriFast does not parse lambda expressions.
Listing 6.16: VeriFast: Main 2
1 public class Main {
2 public static void main(String[] args) {
3 Cell c = new Cell();
4 c.setItem(new Item());
5
6 Item item = c.getItem();
7








The second scenario (listing 6.16) is similar to the previous one, except the state of the
item is changed in a separate thread, and before trying to use the item again, we wait for
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the thread to finish. Unfortunately, the code is not accepted by VeriFast, reporting that
the changeState call (line 13) cannot be performed. The reason seems to be that it has no
knowledge that the heap chunk for the item, available in the post-condition, corresponds
to the same item required in the pre-condition. Because the Runnable interface requires
the specification of two predicates, pre and post, which are independent from one and
another, there seems to be no way of informing the verifier that the item is still the same.
Listing 6.17: VeriFast: Main 3
1 public class Main {
2 public static void main(String[] args) {
3 Cell c = new Cell();
4 c.setItem(new Item());
5
6 Item item = c.getItem();
7
8 Thread t = new Thread(new StateChanger(item));
9 t.start();
10






The third scenario (listing 6.17) presents a data-race example, where there is an at-
tempt to call changeState on the item without waiting for the thread that borrowed it to
finish first. In this instance, VeriFast reports that there is no heap chunk available to allow
for the changeState call outside the thread.
6.5 Plaid
Plaid [77, 37] is a typestate-oriented programming language designed for concurrency. It
includes the concept of access permissions [64, 7], which are associated with each type to
express the aliasing and the mutability of the corresponding object’s typestate [74]. Fur-
thermore, access permissions information is used to automatically parallelize code [38].
Unfortunately, since Plaid does not seem to be maintained any longer, we could not
reproduce the motivating example. If we could, the example would look something like
what is presented in the following listing (according to what we could gather from [77]
and [2]).
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Listing 6.18: Plaid example
1 state Item {
2 val int state = 0;
3 method void changeState() {




8 state Cell {
9 val shared Item item = null;
10 }
11
12 state Cell0 case of Cell {
13 method void setItem(unique Item i)
14 [unique Cell0 >> unique Cell1]
15 {
16 this.item = i;




21 state Cell1 case of Cell {





27 method void main() {
28 val unique cell = new Cell;
29 val unique i = new Item;
30 cell.setItem(i);
31
32 val item1 = cell.getItem();
33 item1.changeState();
34




There are many approaches that can be used to specify program behavior and reason
about protocols. Languages like Spec#, Chalice, Dafny, and VeriFast, are very rich, allow-
ing one to express with precision what is the expected behavior of a program. Nonetheless,
they have the drawback of potentially being more difficult to use due to their complexity
and due to the undecidability of specifications in the general case. Spec# targets the
.NET Platform but forces programs to follow an ownership discipline, which may impose
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some overhead. Chalice is the most interesting among the four languages because it has
built-in support for threads and includes the concept of access permissions, from which
we expect to get some inspiration from. Dafny does not support threads but is actively
maintained. VeriFast is available for C and Java, but the specifications are usually very
verbose. Plaid is distinguishable from the other languages since it does not require com-
plex specifications and has built-in support for typestate-oriented features and access
permissions. Unfortunately, it does not seem to be maintained.
In conclusion, the current technology is, in general, able to verify the motivating












Typestate-oriented tool: version 2
In this chapter, we are going to present a language of assertions that focuses on allowing
a program that uses typestates to be type-checked even in the presence of aliasing. The
chapter starts by presenting the language of assertions (section 7.1). Following that, we
present the inference algorithm, which removes the need for assertions to be explicitly
written (section 7.2). Then, we compare our language of assertions and tool with other
languages and tools (section 7.3). In the last section, we test our tool with some examples
(section 7.4).
7.1 Language of assertions
In the following sections, we start by presenting the components of our language and their
meaning (section 7.1.1). Then we discuss the guarantees that the assertions provide and
the well-formedness properties (sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3). Following that, the concepts
of packing and unpacking are expanded upon as well as transferring of permissions
(sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.5). Immediately after, it is explained how protocol completion
is ensured (section 7.1.6). Next, it is explained how to check if an assertion is implied
by another (section 7.1.7), how to compute the upper bound between two assertions
(section 7.1.8), and how nullable values and union types are handled (section 7.1.9).
7.1.1 Introduction
Each assertion in the language is composed of access, equality, typeof, packed and unpacked
predicates.
Access predicates specify the fractional permissions [10] for access locations. A frac-
tional permission is represented with a fractional number between zero and one. If the
fraction is equal to zero, it means there is no access to that location, so no reads and no
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writes are allowed. If the fraction is equal to one, there is full access to that location, so
reads and writes are both allowed. If the fraction is a value between zero and one, only
reads are allowed.
An access location may represent a local variable or a field of an object. Conceptually,
we can think of a local variable as a field of the closure of a function call. Because of that,
we are not going to distinguish between the stack and the heap, and we will be thinking
only in terms of memory locations. These access locations may also refer to the object
pointed by a variable or field. Even though an object is the composition of its fields, we
will need to be able to reason about the access permission to an object itself, separately
from its fields. The need for it will be explained later.
Equality, typeof, packed and unpacked predicates, talk about locations. A location repre-
sents a local variable or a field of an object.
Equalities assert that two locations point to the same object (they hold the same mem-
ory address number). Tracking equalities is useful so that we can transfer permissions
between two locations, for example, to restore full access to an object that was aliased
between two locations.
Typeof predicates indicate the current type of an object pointed by a variable or field.
Packed and unpacked predicates specify that an object is packed or unpacked, respec-
tively, via the associated location. When an object is packed, the concrete types of its fields
are hidden behind the abstract typestate view. When an object is unpacked, the concrete
types of its fields are exposed.
For illustrative purposes, the syntax used to represent the assertions is formalized by
the following grammar.
Listing 7.1: Assertions’ grammar
1 Assertion := Term | Term "∧" Assertion
2 Term := Access | Equality | TypeOf | Packed | Unpacked
3
4 Access := "access" "(" AccessLocation "," f ")"
5 Equality := "eq" "(" Location "," Location ")"
6 TypeOf := "typeof" "(" Location "," t ")"
7 Packed := "packed" "(" Location ")"
8 Unpacked := "unpacked" "(" Location ")"
9
10 Location := id | id "." Location
11 AccessLocation := id | id "." "0" | id "." AccessLocation
In the grammar, f is a meta-variable ranging over all rational numbers between zero
and one; id is a meta-variable ranging over values of the set of all the valid Java identifiers;
t is a meta-variable ranging over values of the set of all the types in the type system.
Assertions are represented as conjunctions of the predicates mentioned. Access predi-
cates are represented as access(x,f), where x is an access location and f a fractional value.
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An access location is represented as a sequence of Java identifiers separated by dots, po-
tentially terminated with .0 if the access location refers to the object itself. Equalities are
represented as eq(x,y), where x and y are locations. A location is also represented as a
sequence of Java identifiers separated by dots, except it never terminates with .0. Typeof
predicates are represented as typeof(x,T), where x is a location and T a textual representa-
tion of a type from our type system. Packed and unpacked predicates are represented as
packed(x) and unpacked(x) respectively.
In the following sections, code may also be presented to show how the ideas are im-
plemented in practice. In the implementation, assertions are represented by the structure
presented in the following listing.
Listing 7.2: Assertions’ type structure
1 type assertion = {
2 accesses: access list;
3 equalities: equality list;
4 typeOfs: typeOf list;
5 packs: packed list;
6 unpacks: unpacked list;
7 } and
8
9 access = Access of accessLoc * fraction and
10 equality = Equality of loc * loc and
11 typeOf = TypeOf of loc * ttype and
12 packed = Packed of loc and
13 unpacked = Unpacked of loc and
14
15 fraction = int * int and
16 loc = string list and
17 accessLoc = string list * bool
Access predicates are represented as a pair with an access location and a fractional
value. Equalities are pairs of two locations. The typeof predicate is a pair with a location
and a type from our type system. Packed and unpacked predicates are composed of a
location. A fraction is represented as a pair of integers. A location is represented with a
non-empty list of valid Java identifiers. An access location is represented with a tuple with
a non-empty list of valid Java identifiers and a boolean value. If the boolean value is false,
the access location refers to a memory location, like a variable or a field. If the boolean
value is true, the access location refers to the object pointed by the variable or field.
An example of an assertion in textual form and the corresponding data structure that
represents it, in the implementation, are presented in the following listings.
Listing 7.3: Assertion example produced by the grammar in listing 7.1
access(x,1) ∧ access(y,1) ∧
access(x.0,0) ∧ access(y.0,1) ∧
eq(x,y) ∧ typeof(y,State "HasNext") ∧ packed(y)
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Listing 7.4: Assertion example according to the type structure in listing 7.2
{
accesses = [
Access((["x"], false), (1, 1));
Access((["y"], false), (1, 1));
Access((["x"], true), (0, 1));
Access((["y"], true), (1, 1))
];
equalities = [Equality(["x"], ["y"])];
typeOfs = [TypeOf(["y"], State "HasNext")];
packs = [Packed ["y"]];
unpacks = [];
}
In this example, there is full access to read or write into x and y, no access to the
object via x, full access to an object via y, y is packed and in state HasNext, and x and y
are aliases. An example of Java code where this assertion would hold true, is presented
in the following listing.
Listing 7.5: Example of Java code where an assertion holds
1 Iterator x = collection.iterator();
2 Iterator y = x;
3 // access(x,1) ∧ access(y,1) ∧
4 // access(x.0,0) ∧ access(y.0,1) ∧
5 // eq(x,y) ∧ typeof(y,State "HasNext") ∧ packed(y)
Details regarding the language of assertions, and how it works in practice, will be
explained in the following sections.
7.1.2 Assertions’ guarantees
This language of assertions guarantees that:
1. The usage of objects will follow the corresponding protocol, even in the presence of
aliasing;
2. No data-races occur at the level of variables and fields;
3. Method calls that change the state of an object do not interfere with each other.
The following listings present examples of code that contains bad behavior that would
be detected by our type system.
Listing 7.6: Wrong method order example
1 Iterator it = collection.iterator();
2 it.next(); // Error: Cannot call "next" in HasNext state
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In the first example, the method next is being called in a newly created iterator without
ensuring that there are items to be read. The hasNext should have been called first.
Listing 7.7: Data-race example
1 Iterator it = collection.iterator();
2









In the second example, the same iterator object is being manipulated by two different
threads, which are both trying to read all the items of the iterator. This is an example of
bad behavior since, for example, by the time one of the threads attempts to call next, the
other thread might have read all the items already.
7.1.3 Assertions’ well-formedness
An assertion, to be well-formed, must respect the following properties. Assume that the
fractional values f1 and f2 are greater than zero (f1 > 0 ∧ f2 > 0).
1. An access predicate that refers to an object pointed by a variable or field can only
hold if read access to that variable or field is available. For example, access(x.0,f1)
holds if access(x,f2) holds, and access(x.y.0,f1) holds if access(x.y,f2) holds;
2. An access predicate that refers to a field of an object can only hold if read access to
the variable or field that holds that object is available. For example, access(x.y,f1)
holds if access(x,f2) holds;
3. An equality predicate, such as eq(x,y), can only hold if access(x,f1) ∧ access(y,f2)
holds. This means that we need at least read access to the variables/fields x and y,
ensuring they do not get overwritten;
4. A typeof predicate with Unknown always holds;
5. A typeof predicate with a type that is subtype of Null | Primitive, such as typeof(x,Null),
can only hold if access(x,f1) holds. This means that we need at least read access to
the variable/field x, ensuring it does not get overwritten;
6. A typeof predicate with a type that is not a subtype of Null | Primitive (and it is
not Unknown), such as typeof(x,State "HasNext"), can only hold if access(x,f1) ∧
access(x.0,f2) holds. This means that we need at least read access to the variable/field
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x, ensuring it does not get overwritten, and at least read access to the object pointed
by x, ensuring its state does not change;
7. Predicates such as packed(x) or unpacked(x) can only hold if access(x,f1)∧ access(x.0,f2)
holds;
8. An object cannot be packed and unpacked at the same time via the same variable
or field;
9. If packed(x) is true, no predicates over the object’s fields via x should exist in the
assertion;
10. The sum of all fractional permissions that allow access to the same location, must
be a value less or equal than one. For example, if x and y are the only variables that
point to the same object, and access(x.0,k1) ∧ access(y.0,k2) holds, then the sum of
k1 and k2 must be a number less or equal to one.
A function that checks if an assertion is well-formed, may be defined by the following
ML code. The code for property 10 is omitted for brevity.
Listing 7.8: Checking assertions’ well-formedness (Part 1)
1 let isValid (a:assertion) : bool =
2 (* Properties 1 and 2 *)
3 for_all (fun (Access((x, dotZero), (f1, f2))) ->
4 f1 = 0 ||
5 if dotZero
6 then hasAccess a x
7 else hasAccess a (parent x)
8 ) a.accesses &&
9 (* Property 3 *)
10 for_all (fun (Equality(x, y)) ->
11 hasAccess a x &&
12 hasAccess a y
13 ) a.equalities &&
14 (* Properties 4, 5 and 6 *)
15 for_all (fun (TypeOf(x, t)) ->
16 isUnknown t || (
17 hasAccess a x &&
18 (isNullOrPrimitive t || hasAccessDotZero a x))
19 ) a.typeOfs &&
20 (* Property 7 and 8 *)
21 for_all (fun (Packed x) ->
22 hasAccess a x &&
23 hasAccessDotZero a x &&
24 not (isUnpacked a x)
25 ) a.packs &&
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Listing 7.9: Checking assertions’ well-formedness (Part 2)
25 (* Property 7 and 8 *)
26 for_all (fun (Unpacked x) ->
27 hasAccess a x &&
28 hasAccessDotZero a x &&
29 not (isPacked a x)
30 ) a.unpacks &&
31 (* Property 9 *)
32 for_all (fun (Packed x) ->
33 not (hasPredicatesOverFields a x)
34 ) a.packs
Each for_all call checks if the predicates follow the properties. The parent function,
given a location with more than one identifier, returns a new location without the last
identifier, and given a location with only one identifier, the function just returns it. The
hasAccess function checks if the assertion contains an access predicate such as access(x,f),
where f > 0. The hasAccessDotZero function checks if the assertion contains an access
predicate such as access(x.0,f), where f > 0. The isPacked and isUnpacked functions check if
in the assertion the locations are packed or unpacked, respectively. The hasPredicatesOver-
Fields function checks if the assertion contains predicates over locations prefixed with x,
like access(x.y,f) or typeof(x.z,T). The isNullOrPrimitive function returns true if the given
type is a subtype of Null | Primitive.
Note that in the implementation, if an access predicate for a certain access location is
absent, it is assumed that the associated fractional permission is zero, if a typeof predicate
for a certain location is absent, it is assumed that the associated type is Unknown, and if a
packed predicate for a certain location is absent, it is assumed that the associated object is
unpacked.
7.1.4 Packing and Unpacking
When an object is packed, the concrete types of its fields are hidden behind the abstract
typestate view. When an object is unpacked, the concrete types of its fields are exposed.
In our system, methods can only be called on packed objects, to ensure that the invariants
hold before the execution of methods. But since accessing objects stored in fields of other
objects is also a use case, it is important to be able to perform packing and unpacking on
objects, coercing between their abstract typestate views and their concrete views.
The concepts of packing and unpacking applied to typestates were probably intro-
duced in [25], and have been used in other approaches, for example in [7] and [62]. An
earlier appearance of these concepts, although not applied to typestates, is [87]. Origi-
nally, unpacking was not allowed for aliased objects [25]. Later Bierhoff and Aldrich [7]
refined the notion of unpacking to instead pack and unpack specific permissions, which
allows unpacking of shared objects. Our approach also allows for aliased objects to be
unpacked and packed in a consistent way.
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To allow packing or unpacking of an aliased object, we need to “remember” the per-
mission to the object we unpacked or packed. This is the reason why access predicates
such as access(x.0,f), are needed. Although 0 is not a valid field name, we use this rep-
resentation to refer to the access permission for an object itself, without referring to its
fields.
To illustrate how packing and unpacking work in practice, imagine an object with
field y, which stores a reference to another object for which it has read access. Suppose
for example that for any state of the object, the following invariant holds.
access(y,1)∧ access(y.0,1/4)∧ packed(y)
Now assume that there is a reference for that object in variable x, such that the follow-
ing assertion holds. Notice that there is only read permission available for that object via
x, which means that this object may be aliased.
access(x.0,1/2)∧ packed(x)
To unpack the object pointed by x, one just needs to multiply the access fractions in the
invariant (1 and 1/4) by the object’s access fraction (1/2), combine the modified invariant
with the previous assertion, and replace packed(x) with unpacked(x). This process results
in the following assertion.
access(x.0,1/2)∧unpacked(x)∧
access(x.y,1/2)∧ access(x.y.0,1/8)∧ packed(x.y)
Packing is only allowed if all the truths about the fields of the object are consistent
with the invariant. In the previous assertion, x could be packed again, since 1× 1/2 = 1/2,
1/4 × 1/2 = 1/8 and the object referenced by the field y is packed, like required by the
invariant. Given that packing is allowed, one just needs to remove the predicates that
refer to fields of the object and replace unpacked(x) with packed(x).
But if instead of the previous assertion, we had the following one, we would not be
able to pack x again since 1/4× 1/2 , 0.
access(x.0,1/2)∧unpacked(x)∧
access(x.y,1/2)∧ access(x.y.0,0)
The following listings present the pack and unpack operations and their helper func-
tions implemented in ML.
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Listing 7.10: revealedInv function
1 let revealedInv (t:ttype) (f:fraction) (x:loc) (inv:ttype->assertion) : assertion =
2 let assertion = inv t in
3 {
4 accesses = map (fun
5 (Access((y, zero), k)) -> Access((x @ y, zero), multFrac k f)
6 ) assertion.accesses;
7 equalities = map (fun
8 (Equality(a, b)) -> Equality(x @ a, x @ b)
9 ) assertion.equalities;
10 typeOfs = map (fun
11 (TypeOf(y, t)) -> TypeOf(x @ y, t)
12 ) assertion.typeOfs;
13 packs = map (fun
14 (Packed y) -> Packed(x @ y)
15 ) assertion.packs;
16 unpacks = map (fun
17 (Unpacked y) -> Unpacked(x @ y)
18 ) assertion.unpacks;
19 }
The revealedInv function, given a type, a fraction, a location and an inv function,
gets the invariant corresponding to the given type, and returns a new assertion that
corresponds to the invariant but modified to be exposed: locations referring to fields
are prefixed with the location to the object and access predicates have their fractional
values multiplied by the fraction initially passed as parameter. The inv function, given
a type, returns the corresponding invariant in the form of an assertion. This invariant
indicates what is true about the fields of the object when in a given typestate and must
only include predicates over locations accessible via those fields. Invariants may be
provided by the programmer or inferred by executing an algorithm similar to the class
analysis (section 4.3.3).
Listing 7.11: unpack function
1 let unpack (a:assertion) (x:loc) (inv:ttype->assertion) : assertion =
2 let Access(_, f) = getAccess a (x, true) in
3 let TypeOf(_, t) = getTypeOf a x in
4 let revealed = revealedInv t f x inv in {
5 accesses = a.accesses @ revealed.accesses;
6 equalities = a.equalities @ revealed.equalities;
7 typeOfs = a.typeOfs @ revealed.typeOfs;
8 packs = (remove (Packed x) a.packs) @ revealed.packs;
9 unpacks = a.unpacks @ ((Unpacked x) :: revealed.unpacks);
10 }
The unpack function, given an assertion, a location and an inv function, takes the
current fractional permission to the object in the given location (using the getAccess func-
tion), takes the current type of the object (using the getTypeOf function), computes the
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revealed invariant (with the revealedInv function), and returns a new assertion that com-
bines the revealed invariant with the given assertion, with the additional care of replacing
the packed predicate for an unpacked predicate for the location we are unpacking.
Listing 7.12: pack function
1 let pack (a:assertion) (x:loc) (inv:ttype->assertion) : assertion =
2 let Access(_, f) = getAccess a (x, true) in
3 let TypeOf(_, t) = getTypeOf a x in
4 let revealed = revealedInv t f x inv in {
5 accesses = remove_list revealed.accesses a.accesses;
6 equalities = remove_list revealed.equalities a.equalities;
7 typeOfs = remove_list revealed.typeOfs a.typeOfs;
8 packs = (Packed x) :: remove_list revealed.packs a.packs;
9 unpacks = remove_list revealed.unpacks (remove (Unpacked x) a.unpacks);
10 }
The pack function, given an assertion, a location and an inv function, takes the current
fractional permission to the object in the given location, takes the current type of the
object, computes the revealed invariant, and returns a new assertion without the predi-
cates that are common between the revealed invariant and the given assertion, with the
additional change that the object becomes packed instead of unpacked.
7.1.5 Permission transfer
Since assertions track equality between memory locations, it is possible to transfer permis-
sions. Making use of aliasing information is an idea also suggested in [10]. For example,
imagine a context in which variables x and y are alias to the same object, which means
that eq(x,y) is true, and that there is 1/2 access to the object via x — access(x.0,1/2) — and
also 1/2 access to the object via y — access(y.0,1/2). If one wants to perform a mutable
operation on the object, it needs full permission to it. Since x and y are known to be alias,
the access permission of one can be transferred to the other, for example, from x to y,
resulting in assertion access(x.0,0) ∧ access(y.0,1), which allows one to perform a mutable
operation on the object via the variable y.
If two variables are alias to the same object, it is also possible to assert equalities
between their fields, which also allows permissions to be transferred between their fields
and objects referenced by those fields.
Additionally, by knowing that two variables point to the same object, it is possible to
intersect the types of both, to get a more refined knowledge of the type of the object. For
example, given assertion eq(x,y) ∧ typeof(x,State "HasNext"| State "Next") ∧ typeof(y,State
"Next"), we can be sure that x is in the Next state.
Transferring of permissions can be done as needed. Like in the initial example, a
permission was transferred to allow for a mutable operation. Additionally, we can transfer
permissions before computing the least upper bound of two assertions to avoid losing
“resources” and information (explained later).
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7.1.6 Protocol completion
To guarantee that protocols reach the final state in a system with access permissions, we
need to ensure that no access permissions (or “resources”) are lost unless the object is
already in the final state or in a state in which it can be “dropped”. The reason for this
is that if we were able to arbitrarily “forget” about an alias, this would mean that we
could also “forget” about other aliases, and potentially lose all references to an object for
which the protocol did not complete. To this end, we analyze each pair of consecutives
assertions (i.e. pair where the first implies the second) in the code to check if there was
some access permission in the first that was completely lost in the second. If that was
the case, and if the object was not in the final state nor in a state in which it could be
“dropped”, we report an error. We also check the end of methods to ensure objects have
their protocol completed, unless we know that the object will be “returned” to the caller,
via the post-condition.
7.1.7 Implication
It is important to mention that the pre-condition strengthening rule (figure 7.1) and the
post-condition weakening rule (figure 7.2), which apply to Hoare logic [39, 36], also apply
to our language of assertions. What needs to be specified is how to know if an assertion
implies or is implied by another assertion.
` P =⇒ P ′ ` {P ′} C {Q}
` {P } C {Q}
Figure 7.1: Pre-condition strengthening
` {P } C {Q′} `Q′ =⇒ Q
` {P } C {Q}
Figure 7.2: Post-condition weakening
As presented before, our language of assertion includes access, equality, typeof, packed
and unpacked predicates.
Packing and unpacking serve the purpose of coercing between the abstract view and
the concrete view of objects, to hide or expose the facts about the fields of the objects.
Because of that, any assertion where an object is packed, implies an assertion resulting
from unpacking the object, and any assertion where an object is unpacked and its fields
are consistent with the object’s invariant (to allow for packing), implies an assertion
resulting from packing the object. In the following paragraph, assume that the objects
are all unpacked in the assertions.
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An assertion a implies an assertion b if when a holds, b also holds. In other words, a
implies b if b is a weaker version of a. To check if a implies b, we need to check for each
predicate in b, if there is a predicate in a that implies it. An access predicate is implied by
another access predicate, for the same access location, if the first offers an equal or greater
access permission than the second. An equality predicate that holds in b must also hold in
a. A typeof predicate is implied by another typeof predicate, for the same location, if the
type in the first predicate is a subtype of the type in the second predicate. The following
are some examples of implications that are true or false.
access(x,1) =⇒ access(x,0)
The implication is true since full permission is greater than no permission.
access(x,0) 6=⇒ access(x,1)
The implication is false since we cannot ensure that full permission is available from
having no permission.
access(x,1)∧ typeof (x,Null) =⇒ access(x,1)∧ typeof (x,Unknown)
The implication is true since Null is a subtype of Unknown.
access(x,1)∧ typeof (x,Object) 6=⇒ access(x,1)∧ typeof (x,Null)
The implication is false since Object is not a subtype of Null.
access(x,0.5)∧ access(y,0.5)∧ eq(x,y) =⇒ access(x,0.5)∧ access(y,0.5)
The implication is true since an assertion without information about an equality is
implied by one where that equality holds.
access(x,0.5)∧ access(y,0.5) 6=⇒ access(x,0.5)∧ access(y,0.5)∧ eq(x,y)
This implication is not true because we cannot assert that an equality is true without
having knowledge of that.
The following listing presents a ML implementation of a function that checks if one
assertion implies another assertion.
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Listing 7.13: implies function
1 let implies (a:assertion) (b:assertion) (inv:ttype->assertion) : bool =
2 let (a, b) = unpackNecessary a b inv in
3 for_all (fun (Access(l, fB)) ->
4 let Access(_, fA) = getAccess a l in gteFrac fA fB
5 ) b.accesses &&
6 for_all (fun (Equality(x,y)) ->
7 areEqual a x y
8 ) b.equalities &&
9 for_all (fun (TypeOf(l, tB)) ->
10 let TypeOf(_, tA) = getTypeOf a l in isSubtype tA tB
11 ) b.typeOfs
The function implies starts by ensuring that all the locations that are packed or un-
packed in a are also packed or unpacked (respectively) in b (using the unpackNecessary
function). Following that, the function checks that for each access permission available
in b, there is a greater or equal access permission in a (using the getAccess and gteFrac
functions), it checks that for each equality that holds in b, the same equality holds in a
(using the areEqual function), and that for each typeof predicate in b, there is one in a
associated with a type that is subtype of the type in the predicate in b (using the getTypeOf
and isSubtype functions).
The implementation uses some helper functions. The unpackNecessary function, given
two assertions, returns two new assertions where the locations that are packed/unpacked
in one are also packed/unpacked in the other (respectively). The getAccess function
attempts to find an access predicate in the given assertion for the given location. If none
is found, it is assumed that there is no permission for that access location. The gteFrac
returns true if the first fractional permission is greater or equal than the second. The
areEqual function checks if in the given assertion, the two given locations are known to
refer to the same object. The getTypeOf function finds an typeof predicate in the given
assertion for the given location. If none is found, it is assumed the type Unknown for that
location. The isSubtype function returns true if the first type is a subtype of the second.
Note that the above implementation is simplified. It does not consider equality transi-
tivity, it does not consider the fact that if two locations refer to the same object all its fields
are also the same, and it does not perform permission transfer to cover other possible
implications.
7.1.8 Assertions’ upper bound
It is important to define how to compute the least upper bound of two assertions. For
example, after executing an if-else statement, we need to know what the assertion will be
by combining the assertions of the if and else branches. When dealing with types, one
just needs to compute the union of the types from both branches. When dealing with
access permissions, the result is more difficult to define.
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Imagine, for example, an if branch where an object is passed to a method call, leaving
the current context with no permission to access it, and an else branch which keeps
full access to the object in the current context. In this example, we need to combine
two different access predicates: access(x.0,0) and access(x.0,1). One solution could be
to support disjunctions in assertions, like so: access(x.0,0) ∨ access(x.0,1). The problem
is that the checking would become more complex to perform without much gain, since
there would always be the chance that we lost access to the object, which meant we would
need to report an error anyway, if the object were to be used. A different solution is to
choose the “worst” scenario, in other words, choose the smaller fraction value. This makes
sense because in actuality, a non-aliased type is a subtype of an aliased-type, so when
merging the assertions, the “upper bound” can be chosen. Unfortunately, this means
that “resources” can be lost, which would compromise the assurance that protocols reach
completion. To avoid that, we report an error if the fractional values are not the same and
the object is neither in the final state or in a state in which it can be “dropped”.
Assertions are also composed of equality predicates. When computing the least upper
bound between two assertions, one where an equality is true, and another where the
equality is false or unknown, we do not preserve the knowledge about the equality.
Finally, it is important to define the case where in one assertion, an object is packed,
and in another, the object is unpacked. One solution could be to unpack the object (in the
assertion it is packed) and compute the upper bound like previously explained. Another
solution could be to try to pack the object (in the assertion it is unpacked), and report
an error if that was not possible. In this instance, we believe we can preserve precision
without much overhead, so we chose the first solution.
The following listings present some scenarios where the least upper bound between
two assertions is computed. Assume that there is always full permission to read or to
write into the local variables.
Listing 7.14: Assertions’ upper bound: example 1
1 Cell cell = new Cell();
2 // access(cell.0,1) ∧ packed(cell) ∧ typeof(cell,State "NoItem")
3
4 if (condition) {
5 take(cell);
6 // access(cell.0,0)
7 } else {
8 addItem(cell);




The first scenario (listing 7.14) uses a cell which stores an item. If a certain condition
is true, the cell is “moved” and the current context loses permission to access it. If the
condition is false, the cell is temporarily borrowed. In this example, we combine two
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access permissions, one with full permission, and one with no permission to the cell,
resulting in one with no permission. Since with no permission to an object, we cannot
ensure that it is packed or that it is in a given typestate, such information is not preserved.
An error is also reported since a “resource” might have been lost.
Listing 7.15: Assertions’ upper bound: example 2
1 Cell cell1 = new Cell();
2 Cell cell2 = null;
3 // access(cell1.0,1) ∧ packed(cell1) ∧ typeof(cell1,State "NoItem") ∧
4 // typeof(cell2,Null)
5
6 if (condition) {
7 cell2 = cell1;
8 // access(cell1.0,0) ∧ eq(cell1,cell2) ∧
9 // access(cell2.0,1) ∧ packed(cell2) ∧ typeof(cell2,State "NoItem")
10 } else {
11 cell2 = new Cell();
12 // access(cell1.0,1) ∧ packed(cell1) ∧ typeof(cell1,State "NoItem") ∧
13 // access(cell2.0,1) ∧ packed(cell2) ∧ typeof(cell2,State "NoItem")
14 }
15
16 // access(cell1.0,0) ∧
17 // access(cell2.0,1) ∧ packed(cell2) ∧ typeof(cell2,State "NoItem")
In the second example (listing 7.15), one cell is created, and stored in variable cell1,
and variable cell2 is assigned to null. If the condition is true, cell2 becomes an alias for
the cell also referenced from the local variable cell1. If the condition is false, cell2 will
reference a new cell object. Notice how the permission for the object pointed by cell2 is
the same in both branches, and that in both branches, the object is packed and is in state
NoItem. Because of that, such information is preserved. But since in the if branch, there
is no access to the object referenced by cell1, the upper bound of the two assertions will
affirm that there is no access to the object. The information about the equality between
cell1 and cell2, which was true in the if branch, is not included in the resulting assertion,
since access to the object pointed by cell1 was lost and because that equality was unknown
in the else branch. Notice how if the condition were to be false, the object referenced by
cell1 would just be lost. Because of that, an error needs to be reported, since protocol
completion might have been compromised.
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Listing 7.16: Assertions’ upper bound: example 3
1 Cell cell = new Cell();
2 c.setItem(new Item());
3
4 Item item = null;
5 // access(cell.0,1) ∧ packed(cell) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem") ∧
6 // typeof(item,Null)
7
8 if (condition) {
9 item = cell.getItem();
10 // access(cell.0,1) ∧ access(cell.item.0,0) ∧
11 // access(item.0,1) ∧ eq(cell.item,item) ∧
12 // typeof(cell,State "OneItem") ∧ unpacked(cell) ∧
13 // typeof(item,NoProtocol) ∧ packed(item)
14 } else {
15 // Unpacking to compute the upper bound...
16
17 // access(cell.0,1) ∧ access(cell.item.0,1) ∧
18 // typeof(cell,State "OneItem") ∧ unpacked(cell) ∧




23 // access(cell.0,1) ∧ access(cell.item.0,0) ∧
24 // typeof(cell,State "OneItem") ∧ unpacked(cell) ∧
25 // typeof(item,NoProtocol | Null) ∧ packed(item)
In the third scenario (listing 7.16), a cell is created and an item is stored on it, and
a local variable item is declared with the value null. If the condition is true, the item
is borrowed and assigned to the local variable item. This results in the cell becoming
unpacked. If the condition is false, nothing happens, and the cell remains packed with
one item, and the local variable remains with the value null. In this scenario, the cell is
unpacked in one branch, and packed in a different branch. To compute the least upper
bound, the cell object is unpacked in the assertion from the else branch, and then the
upper bound is computed as explained before. The resulting assertion gives full access
to the cell object, no access to the item via the item field, asserts that the cell remains in
the OneItem state, and that it is packed. The local variable item may refer to the item or it
may have value null. If it refers to the item, we may also say that it is packed.
The following listing presents the ML implementation of a function that computes
the least upper bound between two assertions.
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Listing 7.17: assertionsUpperBound function
1 let assertionsUpperBound (a:assertion) (b:assertion) (inv:ttype->assertion) : assertion =
2 (* Returns a new assertion without the predicates that may no longer hold *)
3 let pruneInvalid (a:assertion) : assertion = ... in
4 (* Perform the necessary unpacks *)
5 let (a, b) = unpackNecessary a b inv in
6 pruneInvalid {
7 accesses = map (fun (Access(l, f)) ->
8 accessUpperBound (Access(l, f)) (getAccess b l)
9 ) a.accesses;
10 equalities = filter_map (fun (Equality(x,y)) ->
11 if areEqual b x y then Some(Equality(x,y)) else None
12 ) a.equalities;
13 typeOfs = map (fun (TypeOf(l, t)) ->
14 typeOfUpperBound (TypeOf(l, t)) (getTypeOf b l)
15 ) a.typeOfs;
16 packs = a.packs @ b.packs;
17 unpacks = a.unpacks @ b.unpacks;
18 }
The implementation starts by finding the locations that are packed in one assertion
and not in the other, and then proceeds to unpack those. Given two assertions, where
locations that are packed (or unpacked) in one, are also packed (or unpacked) in the
other, the computing of the least upper bound continues: the upper bound of the access
predicates is computed, by choosing the smaller fractional values; if an equality holds
in one assertion and not in the other, it is not included in the final result; the upper
bound of the typeof predicates is computed, by producing an union type; and the lists
of pack and unpack predicates are concatenated. Finally, predicates that may no longer
hold, because some access predicate now has fractional value zero, are removed in the
pruneInvalid function.
Note that the above implementation is simplified. It does not consider equality transi-
tivity, it does not consider the fact that if two locations refer to the same object all its fields
are also the same, and it does not perform permission transfer to cover other possible
implications.
7.1.9 Nullable values and union types
In this section, we address how access permissions, packed and unpacked predicates, func-
tion in the situation a location stores the null value. Additionally, we explain how an
invariant is computed given an union type.
If a location stores the null value, we may assume that we have full access permission
to it. This is correct since we can think of null as an immutable object with no fields,
which can be arbitrarily shared. With that reasoning, we can also say that null is packed
or even unpacked, since it has no fields. This device allows us to avoid losing information
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when computing the least upper bound between two assertions, one in which a value is
null and other in which it is not null (like in the third example of the previous section).
When speaking about fields of a potentially null value, we can also assert that we have
full permission to access them and that they have the Bottom type. This works because
accessing a field of a null value would result in a null pointer error anyway, which the
type-checker detects and reports in compile-time. By assuming that we have full access
to the field, we also avoid reporting two errors when an access is made.
To compute an invariant given an union type, we establish that the assertion the inv
function returns, is the result of computing the least upper bound of the invariants of
each typestate in the union. If one of the types in the union type is Null, we default for an
assertion that gives full access to any field, to avoid losing information when computing
the upper bound, using the previously explained reasoning.
To illustrate how nullable values and union types are handled in practice, suppose
there is a cell object which may or may not include an item stored inside of it and that is
packed.
access(cell.0,1)∧ packed(cell)∧ typeof (cell,State”OneItem”|State”NoItem”)
To unpack the object, we need to obtain the invariants for both states, OneItem and
NoItem. For this example, assume that the cell object has a item field where the item is
stored, and that the invariants for both states are the following, respectively.
access(item,1)∧ access(item.0,1)∧ packed(item)∧ typeof (item,NoP rotocol)
access(item,1)∧ typeof (item,Null)
Before performing the actual unpack operation, we need to compute the least upper
bound between these two assertions. Notice that in the NoItem state, the item is null.
To avoid losing information, we arbitrarily include some access and packed predicates,
resulting in the following assertion for the NoItem state.
access(item,1)∧ access(item.0,1)∧ packed(item)∧ typeof (item,Null)
Computing the least upper bound between the invariants of both states results in
what follows.
access(item,1)∧ access(item.0,1)∧ packed(item)∧ typeof (item,NoP rotocol|Null)
With the previous assertion for the type OneItem | NoItem computed, we can unpack





packed(cell.item)∧ typeof (cell.item,NoP rotocol|Null)
7.2 Inference algorithm
Until now, we have presented the language of assertions as if the programmer would write
them explicitly in the code. Since that could become a burden to the programmer, in this
section, we are going to present an algorithm to automatically infer the assertions from
the code. This algorithm is inspired by the work done in [30]. In that work, a constraint
system over symbolic permissions, which expresses the requirements at each program
point, is inferred and then solved using linear programming [21]. A similar approach
was also previously presented in [90].
Just like in Hoare logic [39], each statement in the code has one assertion that precedes
it, supplying the pre-conditions to be met for the code to run correctly, and one assertion
that follows it, with the facts resulting from executing that statement.
The inference algorithm analyzes each statement in the code and produces constraints.
These constraints limit the possible assertions that occur before or after each statement.
For example, for the statement iterator.next(), the assertion that precedes it must allow
the iterator variable to be read, it must indicate that the object is in a state that allows for
the next call, and the permission to modify that state must be provided. The assertion
that follows it must provide the effects of calling the next method.
After inferring the constraints, these are provided to the Z3 Solver [22] to ensure that
they are satisfiable.
The implementation was done in Kotlin and relies on the Checker Framework, like
the first version of the tool, and on the Z3 Solver. Although we use Z3, the algorithm
produces input for any SMT Solver1.
7.2.1 Implementation
The implementation of the inference algorithm is composed of four steps: a skeleton for
the assertions for each method of each class is constructed, assertions are instantiated
and associated with each expression or statement in the code, constraints are inferred on
those assertions, and then the Z3 Solver [22] is used to find a satisfiable solution.
Like discussed in previous sections, assertions are composed of access, typeof, eq, packed
and unpacked predicates. Access predicates specify the permissions for access locations (i.e.
variables, fields or objects pointed by variables or fields). Typeof predicates indicate the
1http://smtlib.cs.uiowa.edu/
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current type of locations (i.e. variable or fields). Eq predicates assert that two locations
are aliases. Finally, packed and unpacked predicates indicate if the information about the
fields of an object is hidden behind an abstract view or exposed.
To build an initial structure for the assertions, each method of each class is analyzed
and all the variables and associated fields are gathered. For now, we are working with all
the objects unpacked and we are ignoring subtyping. To know the fields associated with
variables, we check the Java type of each variable (which is statically known), find the
class declaration, and gather all the declared fields. We also check the Java type of each
field and gather all the fields of those, recursively. After gathering all these, we build a
list of possible equalities that would need to be tracked, by combining two by two the
variables or fields that have compatible Java types, making sure that all equalities that
could be true by transitivity are also included in the list.
With an assertion skeleton constructed for each method, concrete assertions are in-
stantiated before and after each expression or statement in each method, with symbolic
permissions associated with each access location and symbolic types associated with each
location. Each assertion is also associated with symbolic equalities (with boolean type)
where each represents if a given equality (from the list of possible equalities) is true in
that assertion. These symbols are the values for which Z3 will try to find satisfiable values.
Additionally, assertions for the pre- and post-conditions are associated with each method.
During this instantiation, consecutive assertions are connected to track which assertions
imply which.
Following that, each expression and statement is analyzed independently and con-
straints are inferred on the assertion that precedes each and the assertion that follows
each.
Finally, the solving phase is performed in two sub-phases. First, the constraints over
the symbolic permissions and symbolic equalities are given to Z3 to find a satisfiable answer.
Using the model produced by Z3, the constraints over the symbolic types are simplified
(replacing the symbolic permissions and symbolic equalities with concrete fractional and
boolean values, respectively), and given to Z3 to find a satisfiable answer. Splitting the
solving phase in two sub-phases works because the access permissions and equalities
inferred do not depend on the types, but the inferred types do depend on these, for
example, to assert that an object has a given type, there needs to be enough permission.
Additionally, performance is improved.
The code is only considered correct if, and only if, the two solving phases report that
there are satisfiable interpretations for the constraints. If the first phase does not provide
a satisfiable model, the second phase does not occur.
7.2.2 Constraints
In this section are presented the constraints inferred when statically analyzing each piece
of code. Previously, the assertions were presented as if they were manually provided
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in the code, and the access permissions were presented with concrete fractional values.
Now that we want to infer the assertions, and for the purposes of explaining the inferred
constraints, we will extend the language of assertions with variables (e.g. f1), arithmetic
(e.g. f1 + f2), number equalities and inequalities (e.g. f1 = f2 or f3 > 0), implication,
predicates and functions, which will be explained in the following sections. The variables
are the values for which the Z3 Solver will try to find satisfiable answers.
7.2.2.1 Method declarations
Each method is associated with a pre-condition and a post-condition. The requirements
needed for the method call (expressed in the pre-condition) and the results produced by
the method call (expressed in the post-condition), are inferred by analyzing the body of
the method.
To allow the tracking of the information about the objects passed in the parameters
of the object, there are ghost variables that hold references to those objects. Thus, these
ghost variables hold the same references that the parameters hold. This artifact is needed
because in Java, one can assign to the parameters of the method, which would mean that
we could lose track of the access permissions and types of the objects passed.
For example, a method which accepts two parameters (a and b), would be analyzed as
if the parameters were constant and assigned to the corresponding local variables at the
beginning of the method’s code.
Listing 7.18: Parameters with their counterparts
void method(final A param0, final B param1) {
A a = param0;
B b = param1;
// ...
}
Additionally, all the possible equalities for the given method are constrained to be
false. Without this enforcement, Z3 could arbitrarily assign true to these, meaning that all
the possible equalities would hold, which would be incorrect, because Z3 only attempts
to find a satisfiable model that makes the constraints hold.
With respect to all the other variables and fields referenced in the method, the pre-
condition provides no permissions to those. These are introduced when variables are
declared, when other methods are called, etc. . . For a method with no arguments, the
pre-condition corresponds to the empty assertion. The empty assertion is an assertion
in which no locations have permissions. It is similar to the “empty heap” assertion in
separation logic [73] and also corresponds to the true assertion.
To keep track of the permissions and the type of a value returned by a method, we
also make use of a ghost variable that represents such value. So, a return statement, is
seen as an assignment to that ghost variable.
121
CHAPTER 7. TYPESTATE-ORIENTED TOOL: VERSION 2






returnValue = new Object();
}
7.2.2.2 Variable declarations
When a variable is declared, full access to that variable is introduced and its type is
Unknown. All the associated fields get no permissions and the Unknown type. All the
other variables and fields remain with their access permissions and types.




To read from a variable, there needs to be read access to that variable. Reads have no side-
effects so, any fact that was true before this expression, remains true after this expression.
Listing 7.21: Constraints inferred for variable reads
// access(x,f1) ∧ f1 > 0
x;
7.2.2.4 Field reads
To read from a field, there needs to be read access to the variable or field that holds the
object, its type should be a subtype of Object (ensuring it is not null), and there needs
to be read access to the field itself. Reads have no side-effects so, any fact that was true
before this expression, remains true after this expression.
Listing 7.22: Constraints inferred for field reads
// access(x,f1) ∧ access(x.y,f2) ∧ f1 > 0 ∧ f2 > 0
// typeof(x,t1) ∧ isSubtype(t1,Object)
x.y;
7.2.2.5 Assignments
Assignments are very common in imperative programming languages and they are the
instructions that introduce aliasing so, it is important to handle these correctly. To assign
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to a variable, there needs to be write access to that variable. To assign to a field, there
needs to be read access to the variable or field that holds the object, its type should be a
subtype of Object (ensuring it is not null), and there needs to be write access to the field
itself.
Since assignments overwrite the value previously stored, it is important to not lose
the “residual” access permission and type of the previous object pointed by the variable
(or field). To keep track of this “residual” information, we use a ghost local variable that
represents the previous object. With this artifact, no facts about that object are lost. To
ensure protocol completion of all objects, the state of these ghost variables is checked
at the end of methods and at the end of loops. Since a loop may contain assignments in
its body and execute an arbitrary number of times, there is no enough amount of ghost
variables that can be created to represent all possible values, so the end of loops must be
checked as well.
The use of ghost variables is a technique already used by verifiers to facilitate the
verification process. For example, they may be used to refer to a value of a variable at
some program point different from the point where an assertion is declared [40]. In this
instance, ghosts variables are used to keep track of the previous values of variables before
they get assigned to.
In practice, when analyzing the assignment, we imagine the existence of an assign-
ment to a ghost variable before the actual assignment is performed. In other words, if
we are analyzing an assignment such as x = y, we need to consider the assignment oldX
= x before. To ensure the total amount of permissions is preserved, each assignment
transfers all the access permissions and type information from the assigned expression
to the assignee, leaving the assigned expression with no permission and the Unknown
type. After the main assignment, there is an equality that holds between the assigned
expression and the assignee. With that, permissions can be transferred again if necessary
later.
Listing 7.23: Constraints inferred for an assignment
// access(x,1) ∧ access(y,f1) ∧ f1 > 0
// access(x.0,f2) ∧ access(y.0,f3)
// typeof(x,t1) ∧ typeof(y,t2)
oldX = x;
// access(oldX, 1) ∧ access(x,1) ∧ access(y,f1)
// access(oldX.0,f2) ∧ access(x.0,0) ∧ access(y.0,f3)
// typeof(oldX,t1) ∧ typeof(x,Unknown) ∧ typeof(y,t2)
x = y;
// access(oldX, 1) ∧ access(x,1) ∧ access(y,f1)
// access(oldX.0,f2) ∧ access(x.0,f3) ∧ access(y.0,0)
// typeof(oldX,t1) ∧ typeof(x,t2) ∧ typeof(y,Unknown)
// eq(x,y)
Since assignments have side-effects, it is important to infer the correct constraints to
represent the changes that are performed and to preserve information about locations
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that were not modified. The permissions for the assignee and the assigned expression
remain the same, the permission and type of the object pointed by the ghost variable
in the post-condition correspond to the permission and type of the object pointed by
the assignee in the pre-condition, the permission and type of the assignee in the post-
condition correspond to the permission and type of the assigned expression, and the
assigned expression is left with no permission and the Unknown type.
To handle equalities, it is not enough to include eq(x,y) in the post-condition. To
facilitate the reasoning, we employ the assignment rule of Hoare logic [39].
{P [E/x]} x := E {P }
Figure 7.3: Assignment rule
By applying the assignment rule of Hoare logic in the two assignments presented, we
get the following intermediate assertions.






This means that each equality holds in the post-condition if and only if it holds in
the pre-condition by replacing the assignee with the assigned expression and replacing
the ghost variable with the assignee. By looking at the previous example, we know that
eq(x,y) holds in the post-condition since eq(y,y) trivially holds in the pre-condition.















When a new object is initialized, there is full access to it and to its fields, and the object is
in its initial state, according to the corresponding protocol. In the following listing, the
rules for assignment and method calls also apply but are ignored for brevity.
Listing 7.27: Constraints inferred for new objects
x = new SomeClass();
// access(x.0,1) ∧ typeof(x,initialState(SomeClass))
7.2.2.7 Method calls
In general, to call a method, an assertion that implies the pre-condition of the method
must hold. After the method call, the post-condition, and any assertion implied by it,
hold. The constraints upon the pre- and post-conditions are found when analyzing the
code of the method.
Non-static method calls, i.e. method calls on objects, are reasoned with as if the
method had one additional argument representing the this value, which means that, for
example, iterator.next() would be interpreted as next(iterator). Furthermore, when calling
methods on objects, there are some additional constraints. To call the method, the object
must be in a state that allows for that method call (i.e. available(t1,method)), and after
the method call, the object is in the state corresponding to the transition via that method
call (i.e. transition(t1,method)). If the method changes the state of the object, then full
permission to the object is also required.
Listing 7.28: Constraints inferred for mutable methods
// access(x,f1) ∧ f1 > 0 ∧ access(x.0,1)
// typeof(x,t1) ∧ available(t1,method)
x.method();
// access(x,f1) ∧ access(x.0,1)
// typeof(x,transition(t1,method))
If according to the protocol, the object remains in the same state after the method
call, then full access permission is not required (i.e. access(x.0,f2) ∧ f2 > 0 instead of
access(x.0,1)).
Listing 7.29: Constraints inferred for readable methods
// access(x,f1) ∧ f1 > 0 ∧ access(x.0,f2) ∧ f2 > 0
// typeof(x,t1) ∧ available(t1,method)
x.method();
// access(x,f1) ∧ access(x.0,1)
// typeof(x,t1)
For the method to be called, the permissions of the arguments need to be equal or
greater than the permissions of the corresponding parameters in the pre-condition, and
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the types of the arguments need to be subtypes of the types of the corresponding param-
eters in the pre-condition.
Listing 7.30: Method’s requirements (1)









Cell c1 = new Cell();
Cell c2 = new Cell();
fillCells(c1, c2);
}
In this example, to call the method fillCells, the permission for the object in param1
needs to be equal to one, the permission for the object in param2 needs to be equal to one
as well, and both objects need to be in the NoItem state. This means that the permission
for the object in c1 needs to be equal to one (because c1 corresponds to param1), the
permission for the object in c2 needs to be equal to one (because c2 corresponds to param2),
and both objects need to be in the NoItem state.
Although each argument expression corresponds in general to a single parameter,
such is not always the case. For example, if a method that requests two objects is called
with the same object in both arguments, then the permission for that object needs to
be equal or greater than the sum of the requested permissions of both parameters in
the method’s pre-condition. If this was not the case, we could potentially allow for the
duplication of permissions, which would be incorrect.
Listing 7.31: Method’s requirements (2)
void main() {
Cell c = new Cell();
fillCells(c, c);
}
In this second example, the object in c would correspond to both param1 and param2
in the fillCells method, which means that the permission for that object would need to be
at least two. This is impossible since permissions are values between zero and one and an
error would be reported as intended.
After the method is called, the permissions and types of the arguments must take into
account the effects the method produced, which include if locations were modified. A
location is considered modified if the method requested full permission to it or to any
location that reaches the first. For example, if full permission is requested for cell.item,
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then cell.item.state may be modified indirectly by replacing the object in cell.item for
another one.
For each argument (and corresponding fields), if it was modified, then the corre-
sponding permissions and types are only those ensured by the method’s post-condition;
otherwise, the corresponding permissions are the subtraction between the permissions
before the method call and the permissions the method call took, and the corresponding
types remain the same.
Listing 7.32: Method’s effects (1)





param1.item = new Item();







Cell c1 = new Cell();
Cell c2 = new Cell();
fillCells(c1, c2);
}
To discuss how the effects of methods are handled, consider this third example where
the code of setItem was inlined. The method requests full permission to the item fields in
param1 and param2, requests that they hold the null value, ensures that full permissions
remain, and that the fields hold an item in the S0 state. Since c1 corresponds to param1
and c2 corresponds to param2, and since the method requested full permission to mod-
ify their fields, the permissions and types for c1.item and c2.item are those ensured for
param1.item and param2.item (respectively) in the method’s post-condition.
The effects of methods also have an impact on which equalities hold after a method
call. For each pair of locations that may refer to the same object, we build constraints such
that: if the locations were not modified, then the equality is true if and only if it was true
before the method call; if both locations were modified, then the equality is true if and
only if that is asserted in the post-condition; if only one location was modified, then the
equality is true if and only if that is asserted in the post-condition or that can be proven
via transitivity (i.e. if now exists a location that is equal to the modified location and the
non-modified location).
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Listing 7.33: Method’s effects (2)
class Cell {








Cell cell = new Cell();




In this example, a cell and an item are instantiated, and then the setItem method
is called to store the item in the cell. This method requires full permission to write
into the item field and ensures that the field holds the item passed in the parameter (i.e.
eq(this.item,param1)). Since cell.item corresponds to this.item, which is modified, and item
corresponds to param1, the equality between cell.item and item in the main context holds
because the equality between this.item and param1 holds in the post-condition of the
setItem method.
Listing 7.34: Method’s effects (3)
void main() {
Cell cell = new Cell();
Item item = new Item();







Suppose now that there is an alias for the item object in variable item2 (i.e. eq(item,item2)).
The equality between item and item2 holds after the method because it holds before the
method and none of those variables was modified. The equality between cell.item and item
holds after the method call as previously explained. Finally, the equality between cell.item
and item2 after the method call is proven by transitivity, because there is a variable (i.e.




With our tool, threads are associated automatically with a protocol with three states:
not_started, started and end. When a thread object is instantiated, it is in the not_started
state. In this state, only the start method is available which, when called, changes the
state of the thread to started. Only in the started state, the join method is available, which
waits for the thread to finish, and changes the state of the thread to the final state, end.
Currently, threads are only supported if instantiated with a lambda expression and if
used in the local context where they were created.
The pre- and post-conditions of the start and join methods are inferred from the pre-
and post-conditions of the associated lambda expression. The pre-condition of start is
the pre-condition of the lambda expression. The post-condition of start is such that the
permissions requested by the thread are not returned to the caller. The pre-condition of
join requires nothing (except that the thread is in the started state and full permission
is available to it). The post-condition of join corresponds to the post-condition of the
lambda expression, to allow for the permissions to be returned to the caller.
7.2.2.9 Control flow statements
In Java, statements are generally executed from top to bottom, in the order that they
appear. However, control flow statements are used to break up the flow of execution.
These include decision-making statements (if-else, switch), looping statements (for, while,
do-while), and branching statements (break, continue, return) [18].
To ease the reasoning about the flow of execution of programs, each method declara-
tion is analyzed not by visiting each node in the abstract syntax tree, but by visiting each
node in a control flow graph [3], which is built by the Checker Framework.
As previously mentioned, each expression or statement in the code has an assertion
that precedes it and an assertion that follows it. For expressions that evaluate to a boolean
value, there are two assertions that follow it, one for when the expression is true, and other
for when the expression is false. In terms of the control flow graph, this means that each
node in the graph is associated with an assertion that precedes it and an assertion that
follows it (or two assertions that follow it). Additionally, the assertions that follow each
node, imply the assertions that precede the successor nodes (i.e. nodes that can be reached
by following the out-edges).
For example, when considering an if-else statement, we know that the assertion that
follows it is the result of computing the upper bound of the assertions resulting from the
if and the else branches (represented as a1 and a2, respectively, in the following listing).
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Another way to look at an if-else statement is to consider that the assertion resulting
from the if branch and the assertion resulting from the else branch need both to imply
the assertion that immediately follows the if-else statement (represented as a3, in the
following listing).








// (a1 =⇒ a3)∧ (a2 =⇒ a3)
// a3
The analysis of loop statements especially benefits from looking at the code via a
control flow graph. In Java there are three types of loop statements: while, do-while, and
for [48]. In a while loop, the condition is evaluated, and if true, the loop body is executed
and control returns to the condition, otherwise, the loop exits. In a do-while loop, the loop
body is executed at least once, and iterations continue until the condition is false. In the
for loop, the declarations are executed (if any), and while the condition is true, the loop
body and then the update expression are executed.
Loops may contain break and continue statements. When a break statement is executed,
control is transferred to the enclosing labeled statement (or the innermost enclosing while,
do-while, or for statement, if no label is given) and immediately completes [48]. When a
continue statement is executed, control is transferred to the enclosing labeled statement
(or the innermost enclosing while, do-while, or for statement, if no label is given) and
immediately ends the current iteration and begins a new one (starting with the evaluation
of the condition) [48].
An example of a control flow graph of a while statement, without branching state-
ments, can be seen in figure 7.4.
Let pre(Cond) be the pre-condition for Condition, and post(CondTrue) and post(CondFalse)






Figure 7.4: While’s control flow graph
pre(LoopBody) and post(LoopBody) be the pre- and post-conditions (respectively) for the
Loop Body.
For the while loop, the inference algorithm will produce constraints such that pre(Cond)
is implied by the assertion that holds before executing the loop statement, post(CondTrue)
implies pre(LoopBody), post(LoopBody) implies pre(Cond), and post(CondFalse) implies the
assertion that holds when the loop exits.
If we look at the while rule in Hoare logic [39], we may observe the similarities.
{B∧ P } S {P }
{P } while B do S done {¬B∧ P }
Figure 7.5: While rule
The assertion B∧ P corresponds to post(CondTrue) and pre(LoopBody), P corresponds
to pre(Cond) and post(LoopBody), and ¬B∧ P corresponds to post(CondFalse).
What we are left to define are the specific constraints that together build the implica-
tions between assertions.
7.2.2.10 Implications
As previously explained, one of the initial phases of the inference algorithm is responsible
for connecting consecutive assertions with implications. Because of the different flows
of execution that are possible in programs, an assertion might be implied by more than
one assertion. For example, as we seen, the assertion that immediately follows an if-else
statement, is implied by the assertions that result from the if and else branches.
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In this section, we will explain which concrete constraints are produced so that the
implication between assertions is enforced while allowing for the transferring of permis-
sions.
For the purposes of explanation, we will be using an if-else statement as example.
Let x and y be two variables which may point to an object with a z field. Let tail be
the assertion that follows the statement and let headif and headelse be the assertions that
result from the if and else branches, respectively, which imply tail (i.e. headif =⇒ tail
and headelse =⇒ tail).
headif ⇐⇒
access(x,f1)∧ access(x.0, f2)∧ access(x.z, f3)∧
access(y,f4)∧ access(y.0, f5)∧ access(y.z, f6)∧
typeof (x, t1)∧ typeof (y, t2)
headelse ⇐⇒
access(x,f7)∧ access(x.0, f8)∧ access(x.z, f9)∧
access(y,f10)∧ access(y.0, f11)∧ access(y.z, f12)∧
typeof (x, t3)∧ typeof (y, t4)
tail ⇐⇒
access(x,f13)∧ access(x.0, f14)∧ access(x.z, f15)∧
access(y,f16)∧ access(y.0, f17)∧ access(y.z, f18)∧
typeof (x, t5)∧ typeof (y, t6)
For each one of the variables in tail, the access permission of each is the minimum
between the access permissions of the same variable in headif and headelse. For example,
if the permission for variable x in headif is f1, and the permission in headelse is f7, then
the permission for x in tail (i.e. f13) is min(f1, f7).
f13 =min(f1, f7)
f16 =min(f4, f10)
For each one of the fields in tail, the access permission of each needs to consider the
possible existence of aliases between the objects. For example, if the permission for field
x.z in headif is f3, and the permission in headelse is f9, and no aliases for x are known,
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then the permission for x.z in tail (i.e. f15) is min(f3, f9). If, for example, y is an alias of x
(which means that y.z and x.z are the same location), then the following holds:
min(f3, f9) +min(f6, f12) = f15 + f18
Which is equivalent to:
(min(f3, f9)− f15) + (min(f6, f12)− f18) = 0
With this constraint, f15 and f18 are not fixed, thus allowing the transferring of permis-
sions. We also note that each term of the sum is the subtraction between the minimum of
the permissions in headif and headelse, and the permission in tail, which together amount
to zero, meaning that there is conservation of permissions between aliases. By looking
at this pattern, we realize that we can use the set of possible equalities (computed in the
initial phases of the algorithm) and build all the necessary formulas.
Assuming there can be no other aliases for x and y, we would produce the following
constraint when constraining the access permission for x.z:
(min(f3, f9)− f15) + (if eq(x,y) then min(f6, f12)− f18 else 0) = 0
And we would produce the following constraint when constraining the access permis-
sion for y.z:
(min(f6, f12)− f18) + (if eq(y,x) then min(f3, f9)− f15 else 0) = 0
In practice, if eq(x,y) were true in both headif and headelse, then the constraints would
correspond to:
(min(f3, f9)− f15) + (min(f6, f12)− f18) = 0
(min(f6, f12)− f18) + (min(f3, f9)− f15) = 0
If eq(x,y) were false in headif or in headelse, then the constraints would correspond to:
min(f3, f9) = f15
min(f6, f12) = f18
For each one of the variables and fields in tail, the access permission of each to the
object pointed by each, follows the same reasoning as explained before. The difference
is that instead of talking about the permission to a field, we would be talking about
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the permission for the object pointed by a variable or field. For example, given that
the permission for the object pointed by x is f2, f8 and f14 in headif , headelse and tail
(respectively), and the permission for the object pointed by y is f5, f11 and f17 in headif ,
headelse and tail (respectively), then the following constraints would be produced:
(min(f2, f8)− f14) + (if eq(x,y) then min(f5, f11)− f17 else 0) = 0
(min(f5, f11)− f17) + (if eq(y,x) then min(f2, f8)− f14 else 0) = 0
For each one of the variables and fields in tail, the type of each is, in general, the
union of the types in headif and headelse. If aliases are known in headif and headelse, then
the type is refined by intersecting with the types of the aliases. For example, given two
variables x and y, and given that the type of x is t1, t3 and t5 in headif , headelse and tail
(respectively), and the type of y is t2, t4 and t6 in headif , headelse and tail (respectively),
then the following constraints would be produced:
intersection(union(t1, t3), if eq(x,y) then union(t2, t4) else Unknown) = t5
intersection(union(t2, t4), if eq(y,x) then union(t1, t3) else Unknown) = t6
In practice, if eq(x,y) were true in both headif and headelse, then the constraints would
correspond to:
intersection(union(t1, t3), union(t2, t4)) = t5
intersection(union(t2, t4), union(t1, t3)) = t6
If eq(x,y) were false in headif or in headelse, then the constraints would correspond to
the following. Note that intersection(t,Unknown) is always t.
union(t1, t3) = t5
union(t2, t4) = t6
For each pair of possible equalities between variables and fields, an equality holds in
tail if it holds both in headif and headelse.
Additionally, to make sure that the assertions remain well-formed after some permis-
sion transfer has happened, and following the properties presented in section 7.1.3, we
constraint the symbolic permissions and the symbolic types in the tail assertion so that:
• An access permission greater than zero to the object pointed by a variable or field
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is only available if the permission to the variable or field is also greater than zero
(property 1);
f13 = 0 =⇒ f14 = 0
f16 = 0 =⇒ f17 = 0
• An access permission greater than zero to a field is only available if the permission
to the variable or field that holds the corresponding object is also greater than zero
(property 2);
f13 = 0 =⇒ f15 = 0
f16 = 0 =⇒ f18 = 0
• An equality only holds if there are permissions greater than zero for the variables
or fields the predicate refers to (property 3);
• A type may be Null or Primitive only if there is a permission greater than zero for
the corresponding variable and field. Otherwise, the type is Unknown (properties 4
and 5);
• A type may be an object type only if there is a permission greater than zero for the
variable and field that holds the reference to that object and if there is a permission
greater than zero to the object itself. Otherwise, the type is Unknown (properties 4
and 6).
xIsObject = ¬isSubtype(union(t1, t3),Null | P rimitive)
yIsObject = ¬isSubtype(union(t2, t4),Null | P rimitive)
f13 = 0∨ (f14 = 0∧ xIsObject) =⇒ t5 =Unknown
f16 = 0∨ (f17 = 0∧ yIsObject) =⇒ t6 =Unknown
Properties 7, 8 and 9, which speak about the packed and unpacked predicates, always
hold because in the current implementation, objects are always unpacked. Property 10,
which ensures that the sum of the access permissions that refer to the same memory
location do not exceed one, is enforced by the constraints presented before, which pre-
serve the total amount of permissions. In conclusion, as long as the assertions headif and
headelse are well-formed, tail will always be well-formed.
7.2.3 Implementation details
In this section, we will discuss some details regarding the implementation of the inference
algorithm that we not explained before for simplicity.
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7.2.3.1 Expressions
Expressions in Java may evaluate to object references for which we need to track the access
permissions and types. In the implementation, expressions are like variables or fields,
which means that they appear in the assertions like any other variable or field.
But since, for example, typeof("new Object()",Object) was not considered as part of the
language of assertions, we can instead suppose the existence of ghost variables that are
unique for each expression and that track all the permissions and types of each expression.
Listing 7.37: Tracking permissions and types of expressions
expr1 = new Object()
// access(expr1,1) ∧ access(expr1.0,1) ∧
// typeof(expr1,Object)
7.2.3.2 Analysis of expressions
In the first version of the tool, the result of analyzing each expression was composed by
a then store and an else store, which include the type information that is true when the
expression is true or when it is false, respectively. In this version of the tool, a similar
thing is employed. The difference is that instead of two stores, we have two assertions. If
the expression does not evaluate to a boolean value, then these two assertions are actually
the same.
7.2.3.3 Z3 definitions
For Z3 [22] to solve the constraints, it requires some definitions.
Each symbolic fraction is associated with a constant declaration of a real value, con-
strained to be between zero and one. Since real values are represented in Z3 as fractional
values, precision is not lost.
Listing 7.38: Symbolic fraction in Z3
1 (declare-const f20 Real)
2 (assert (<= 0 f20))
3 (assert (<= f20 1))
Each symbolic equality is associated with a constant declaration of a boolean value
which is true when an equality between two locations holds in a given assertion. This
implies that for each assertion and for each pair of possible equalities, there is an unique
boolean value that expresses if that equality holds.
Listing 7.39: Symbolic equality in Z3
1 (declare-const eq4 Bool)
During the implementation process, we attempted to represent types in various ways.
First we attempted to define constants for each singleton type, use a function with two
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arguments to represent the union between two types, and then define some properties
over that function. Then we tried to represent union types with a list of singleton types.
And finally, we attempted to represent union types with a set of singleton types. Unfortu-
nately, for each one of these experiments, Z3 was too slow in proving properties over the
subtyping relationships between types. Because of this, it was likely that the inference
algorithm would perform poorly in trying to find satisfiable types that would fulfill the
subtyping constraints.
For these reasons, each symbolic type is associated with a constant declaration of a
value that belongs to an enumeration. This enumeration includes values representing
each one of the singleton types and values representing some union types. To avoid the
need to compute all the possible unions types, the set of union types that we consider are
those that are mentioned in the constraints produced. This seems to be a good compro-
mise between performance and precision. With this approach, all the types considered all
discretely defined, allowing us to define functions over types for all the possible combi-
nations using the Z3 API. The functions over types used in the Z3 context are: isSubtype,
union and intersection.
Listing 7.40: Symbolic types in Z3
1 (declare-datatypes () ((Type
2 Unknown Bottom Object NoProtocol Null Primitive Ended State1 State0 Union_State1_State2
3 )))
4 (assert (distinct
5 Unknown Bottom Object NoProtocol Null Primitive Ended State1 State0 Union_State1_State2
6 ))
7 (declare-const t15 Type)
To define the isSubtype function, we combine the types in pairs and for each pair we
call the isSubtype function written in Kotlin, and place the result (true or false) directly
in the function definition.
Listing 7.41: isSubtype function in Z3
1 (define-fun isSubtype ((a Type) (b Type)) Bool
2 (and
3 (=> (= a Unknown) (and
4 (=> (= b Unknown) true)
5 (=> (= b Bottom) false)
6 (=> (= b Object) false) ...
7 ))
8 (=> (= a State1) (and
9 (=> (= b State0) false)
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To define the union function, we combine the types in pairs and for each pair we call
the union function written in Kotlin. For each result, we check if it belongs to the list
of types considered. If it does, the result is placed directly in the function definition.
Otherwise, the closest supertype that does belong in the list is placed in the function
definition. This is important because we are not considering all the possible types, just
an approximation.
Listing 7.42: union function in Z3
1 (define-fun union ((a Type) (b Type)) Type
2 (ite (= a Unknown)
3 (ite (= b Unknown)
4 Unknown




9 (ite (= a State1)






To define the intersection function, we combine the types in pairs and for each pair
we call the intersection function written in Kotlin. For each result, we check if it belongs
to the list of types considered. If it does, the result is placed directly in the function
definition. Otherwise, the closest supertype that does belong in the list is placed in the
function definition.
Listing 7.43: intersection function in Z3
1 (define-fun intersection ((a Type) (b Type)) Type
2 (ite (= a Unknown)
3 (ite (= b Unknown)
4 Unknown




9 (ite (= a State1)






Previously, to explain which constraints are produced when analyzing method calls on
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objects, we used the available and transition functions. The available function indicates if a
method is available in a given typestate. The transition function, given an initial typestate
and a method, returns the typestate to which the object transits via that method call. The
available function does not need to be defined in Z3. When analyzing the method call,
we pre-compute the typestates in which the object must be in, and constraint the current
type to be subtype of the union of those typestates. To handle transitions, specialized
transition functions are defined in Z3 for each method, which given the current typestate,
returns the new typestate resulting from that method call. Note that these specialized
functions only need to consider as input the typestates in which the method is available
to be called.
Listing 7.44: Specialized transition function for the setItem method in Z3
1 (define-fun transition_setItem ((a Type)) Type
2 (ite (= a State_NoItem)
3 State_OneItem
4 (ite (= a State_OneItem)
5 State_OneItem







7.2.4 Limitations of the implementation
The current implementation of the inference algorithm includes some limitations. Cur-
rently, all objects are considered to be unpacked. This causes problems if for example
we want to work with recursive data structures, like a linked-list, where each node has a
reference for the following node via a field (e.g. next). The problem is that it is impossible
to gather all the possible “chains” (e.g. node.next.next) to build the structure of the asser-
tions, since a linked-list may have an arbitrary number of connected nodes. The ideal
solution would be to infer when an object may be packed and when it must be unpacked,
but we leave that as subject of future work.
Another limitation is that the analysis of threads only works if the thread is started
and waited upon in the context in which it was created. If a thread object is passed to
another method, the information about which permissions it retains (upon the start call)
and which permissions it gives back (upon the join call) is lost.
Like mentioned, subtyping is not yet considered. When analyzing a method call, the
pre-conditions and post-conditions of the method are obtained by looking at the pre-
and post-conditions associated with the method declaration (instantiated in the initial
phases of the algorithm). This ignores dynamic method dispatch in Java, where the actual
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method to be called is resolved at runtime, rather than compile-time.
Finally, we need to investigate how to better report errors to the programmer. When
Z3 reports that it did not find any satisfiable solution for the constraints, it returns a set of
constraints that together produce a contradiction. We would like to take this information
and indicate to the programmer the code location where the error is. Assuming that this
set of constraints is simplified to highlight the concrete contradiction, and by tracking in
which code locations certain constraints were inferred, we can give the programmer an
approximation of where the error lies.
7.2.5 Protocol inference
Although the programmer is free from explicitly writing all the assertions, it still needs
to write the protocol for classes. It would be possible to try to infer the protocol itself,
by finding which methods’ post-conditions imply the pre-conditions of other methods,
and building the protocol that allows for those sequences of method calls, following a
strategy like [85].
The problem with inferring the protocol specification is that we might hit, what some
would call, the Assertion Inference Paradox [31]. In general, a program is correct if the
implementation satisfies the specification. But if we also infer the specification, we might
be reasoning in a circle. Nonetheless, inferring the specification is useful to compare it
for consistency with the intended behavior. Additionally, the inference process might
produce an inconsistent specification, which can reveal a flaw in the implementation.
Another concern is that inferring the protocols would not be useful given the current
language of assertions. This language of assertions deals with access permissions, aliasing
and the types of objects, and it is not expressive enough to, for example, assert some
properties over integers values. Because of that, it is likely that the inferred protocols
would allow for many undesired sequences of method calls, which the programmer would
need to remove anyway.
Considering the points presented, we still believe that inferring the protocols is use-
ful, providing a base specification from which the programmer can work, but given the
current expressiveness of the language, we leave this topic as subject of future work.
7.3 Comparison with other languages
The following tables compare the access annotations from different languages as they
relate with how one can require access to some part of the memory. As one can observe,
our language is not completely new and it is inspired by already existent ideas, even if
the notation is slightly different.
The annotations in table 7.1 are used when one requires full permission to a memory
location, so that it can be read and modified.
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Our language Spec# Chalice Dafny VeriFast
access(x,1) modifies x acc(x) modifies `x x 7→ _
access(x.y,1) modifies x.y acc(x.y) modifies x`y x.y 7→ _
Table 7.1: Full access annotations
Our language (0 < f < 1) Chalice VeriFast (0 < f < 1)
access(x,f) rd(x) [f]x 7→ _
access(x.y,f) rd(x.y) [f]x.y 7→ _
Table 7.2: Read access annotations
The annotations in table 7.2 are used when one only needs read permission to a
memory location.
Additionally, the concept of packing and unpacking, as well as unpacking of poten-
tially aliased objects, can be replicated in VeriFast. One just needs to consider the use of
an Invariant predicate which represents the object being packed.
Listing 7.45: Summing two number objects: VeriFast
1 //@ predicate Invariant(Number num; int value) = num.value |-> value;
2
3 int sum(Number a, Number b)
4 //@requires [1/2]Invariant(a, ?i1) &*& [1/2]Invariant(b, ?i2);
5 //@ensures [1/2]Invariant(a, i1) &*& [1/2]Invariant(b, i2);
6 {
7 //@assert [?f1]a.value |-> _ &*& [?f2]b.value |-> _;
8 //@assert f1 == 1/2 &*& f2 == 1/2;
9 return a.value + b.value;
10 }
Consider for example two Number objects which store an integer value in their value
fields, and a sum method which returns the sum of those two integer values. The method
requires that the invariants of the objects be meet with fraction 1/2, allowing the same
object to be passed in both parameters. This implies that we have 1/2 permission to the
heap location corresponding to the field, which is verified by the assertions in lines 7 and
8. Similar annotations in our language are shown in listing 7.46.
Listing 7.46: Summing two number objects: Language of assertions
1 int sum(Number a, Number b)
2 //requires: access(a.0, 1/2) ∧ packed(a) ∧ access(b.0, 1/2) ∧ packed(b)
3 //ensures: access(a.0, 1/2) ∧ packed(a) ∧ access(b.0, 1/2) ∧ packed(b)
4 {
5 // access(a.0, 1/2) ∧ unpacked(a) ∧ access(a.value, 1/2)
6 // access(b.0, 1/2) ∧ unpacked(b) ∧ access(b.value, 1/2)
7 return a.value + b.value;
8 }
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Even though it is possible to replicate ideas of our language of assertions in other lan-
guages and tools, our tool has a particular focus on providing typestate-oriented features
without much annotation burden, thanks to the inference algorithm. Additionally, our
tool ensures that the protocols of objects are completed. To our knowledge, this is not sup-
ported by mainstream tools, even those which allow for very expressive specifications.
7.4 Working examples
In this section are presented six examples: four with well-behaved code (i.e. methods
are called in correct order, there are no data-races at the level of variables or fields, and
there is no interference between concurrent calls of methods that change the state of the
object), and two with code that is not well-behaved, because it allows for interference.
These examples make use of a cell object and an item object, like the motivating
example in section 5.5. The protocol of the item was slightly modified by the addition
of the getState method that returns the current value of the state field, while leaving the
object in the same typestate.
The inferred assertions for well-behaved code are presented as comments. Note that
when an access predicate is not mentioned, it is assumed that there is no permission to
that access location, and when a typeof predicate is not mentioned, it is assumed that the
asserted type is Unknown. Additionally, if an equality is not mentioned, it means that it
does not hold in that program point. When the code is not well-behaved, no assertions
are inferred.
All six examples start with the initialization of a cell object, the initialization of an
item object, which is stored inside the cell via the setItem method, and the retrieval of
the stored item via the getItem, which is then assigned to the local variable item. For
the well-behaved examples, the inferred assertions for the first three code statements are
presented as comments in listings 7.47, 7.48, and 7.49.
Listing 7.47: Examples introduction (Part 1)
1 Cell cell = new Cell();
2 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "NoItem")
3 // access(cell.item,1)
After the cell object is initialized and assigned to the cell variable (line 1), there is full
access to the variable, full access to the object pointed by the variable (i.e. the cell), the
cell is in the NoItem state, and there is full permission to the item field of the cell. At
initialization, the field has the null value, but since the field will be overwritten in the
next statement, Z3 just attributed the Unknown type instead of Null. This is correct since
Unknown is the supertype of all types.
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Listing 7.48: Examples introduction (Part 2)
5 cell.setItem(new Item());
6 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
7 // access(cell.item,1) ∧ access(cell.item.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell.item,State "S0")
8 // access(cell.item.state,1) ∧ typeof(cell.item.state,Primitive)
After the item is stored on the cell (line 5), there is still full permission to the cell
variable and the cell object, but now the cell is in the OneItem state (line 7). There is full
permission to the item field, and full permission to the item object, which is the S0 state
(line 8). Additionally, there is full permission to the state field of the item, which holds a
primitive value (line 8).
Listing 7.49: Examples introduction (Part 3)
10 Item item = cell.getItem();
11 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
12 // access(cell.item,1)
13 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
14 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
15 // eq(item,cell.item)
After the item is retrieved from the cell (line 10), there is still full permission to the
cell variable and the cell object, the cell remains in the OneItem state, and there is full
permission to the item field (lines 11 and 12). However, the permission to the item object
is now available via the item variable instead of the item field on the cell (lines 13 and
14), and an equality between both is now asserted (line 15). Notice how the total amount
of permissions is preserved, without duplication, and the fact that item and cell.item are
aliases is known.
Listing 7.50: Example 1 (Part 1)
1 item.changeState();
2 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S1")
3 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)




8 Item item2 = cell.getItem();
9 // access(item,1)
10 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
11 // access(cell.item,1)
12 // access(item2,1) ∧ access(item2.0,1) ∧ typeof(item2,State "S1")
13 // access(item2.state,1) ∧ typeof(item2.state,Primitive)
14 // eq(item,item2) ∧ eq(item,cell.item) ∧ eq(cell.item,item2)
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Listing 7.51: Example 1 (Part 2)
16 item2.changeState();
17 // access(item,1)
18 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
19 // access(cell.item,1)
20 // access(item2,1) ∧ access(item2.0,1) ∧ typeof(item2,State "S1")
21 // access(item2.state,1) ∧ typeof(item2.state,Primitive)
22 // eq(item,item2) ∧ eq(item,cell.item) ∧ eq(cell.item,item2)
In the first example (listings 7.50 and 7.51), with the item object now available in
the item local variable, the state of the item is changed from S0 to S1 (line 1). All the
permissions remains the same and the cell remains in the same state. Then the item
is retrieved again from the cell, being now referenced from the item2 variable as well
(line 8), which means that there is aliasing between cell.item, item and item2. Since in the
following statement there is an attempt to change the state of the item again (line 16), but
now via the item2 variable, the permissions concerning the item are transferred to item2
to allow for that operation. Since the item was already in the S1 state, it remains in the
S1 state according to the protocol.
Listing 7.52: Example 2 (Part 1)
1 Thread t = new Thread(() -> {
2 // access(item,3/4) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
3 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
4 item.changeState();
5 // access(item,3/4) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S1")
6 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
7 });
8
9 // access(t,1) ∧ access(t.0,1) ∧ typeof(t,State "NotStarted")
10 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
11 // access(cell.item,1)
12 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
13 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
14 // eq(cell.item,item)
In the second example (listings 7.52 and 7.53), with the item object available in the
item local variable, the state of the item will be changed from S0 to S1 in a thread (line 4).
All the permissions and types remain the same after the thread object was created (with
the exception of the thread being introduced in the NotStarted state), since threads only
start upon the start call.
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Listing 7.53: Example 2 (Part 2)
16 t.start();
17
18 // access(t,1) ∧ access(t.0,1) ∧ typeof(t,State "Started")







26 // access(t,1) ∧ access(t.0,1) ∧ typeof(t,Ended)
27 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
28 // access(cell.item,1)




33 Item item2 = cell.getItem();
34
35 // access(t,1) ∧ access(t.0,1) ∧ typeof(t,Ended)
36 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
37 // access(cell.item,1)
38 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S1")
39 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
40 // access(item2,1)




45 // access(t,1) ∧ access(t.0,1) ∧ typeof(t,Ended)
46 // access(cell,1) ∧ access(cell.0,1) ∧ typeof(cell,State "OneItem")
47 // access(cell.item,1) ∧ access(item,1)
48 // access(item2,1) ∧ access(item2.0,1) ∧ typeof(item2,State "S1")
49 // access(item2.state,1)
50 // eq(cell.item,item) ∧ eq(item2,item) ∧ eq(item2,cell.item)
After the thread is started (line 16), 3/4 of permission is used in the thread to read
the item variable, and only 1/4 is left in the current context. Additionally, the thread
requests full access to the item object and its state field, so that its typestate and field
can change. The thread is now in the Started state. After that, the join method is called
(line 24), which waits for the thread to finish. After the thread finishes, full permission
to the item variable, the item object and its field are restored. Following that, like in the
previous example, the item is retrieved again from the cell and used (lines 33 and 43).
The operation is allowed because full permission to the item is available.
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Listing 7.54: Example 3











The third example (listing 7.54) is similar to the second example except there is an
attempt to change the state of the item before waiting for the thread to finish (line 9).
This code is not well-behaved because it presents interference: both the thread and the
main thread attempt to change the state of the item concurrently. This is detected by the
fact that the thread as requested full permission to the item but has not given it back yet.
This creates a contradiction in the constraints, since the permission for the item in the
main thread before line 9 is zero, while one is required.
Listing 7.55: Example 4 (Part 1)
1 Thread t1 = new Thread(() -> {
2 // access(item,1/4) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0" | State "S1")
3 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
4 item.changeState();
5 // access(item,1/4) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S1")
6 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
7 });
8
9 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,State "NotStarted")
10 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
11 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
12
13 Thread t2 = new Thread(() -> {
14 // access(item,1/4) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0" | State "S1")
15 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
16 item.changeState();
17 // access(item,1/4) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S1")
18 // access(item.state,1) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
19 });
20
21 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,State "NotStarted")
22 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,State "NotStarted")
23 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")




In the fourth example (listings 7.55 and 7.56), two threads are instantiated (lines 1
and 13), and both of them will attempt to change the state of the item (lines 4 and 16).
Additionally, both threads require 1/4 of permission to read from the item variable and
require full permission to the item object to change its state.
Listing 7.56: Example 4 (Part 2)
26 t1.start();
27
28 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,State "Started")





34 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,Ended)
35 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,State "NotStarted")





41 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,Ended)





47 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,Ended)
48 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,Ended)
49 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S1")
50 // access(item.state,1)
The thread t1 is started first (line 26). Notice how only 3/4 of permission is left for
the item variable and no permission is available for the item object in the main thread.
After that, the join method is called on t1, which restores full permission to the item (line
32). Following that, the thread t2 can be started (line 39) and waited upon (line 45). The
code is well-behaved because the two threads do not concur.
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Listing 7.57: Example 5
1 Thread t1 = new Thread(() -> {
2 item.changeState();
3 });









The fifth example (listing 7.57) is similar to the previous one except that the two
threads will concur. Notice how t1 is started and then t2 is also started without waiting
for the thread t1 to finish. Since both of them will attempt to change the state of the item
concurrently, thus requiring both full permission to it, the inference algorithm does not
find any satisfiable answer, as expected.
Listing 7.58: Example 6 (Part 1)
1 Thread t1 = new Thread(() -> {
2 // access(item,1/6) ∧ access(item.0,1/6) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
3 // access(item.state,1/6) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
4 item.getState();
5 // access(item,1/6) ∧ access(item.0,1/6) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
6 // access(item.state,1/6) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
7 });
8
9 Thread t2 = new Thread(() -> {
10 // access(item,1/6) ∧ access(item.0,1/6) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
11 // access(item.state,1/6) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
12 item.getState();
13 // access(item,1/6) ∧ access(item.0,1/6) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
14 // access(item.state,1/6) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
15 });
16
17 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,State "NotStarted")
18 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,State "NotStarted")
19 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
20 // access(item.state,1/3) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
The sixth example (listings 7.58 and 7.59) is similar to the previous one except instead
of both threads trying to change the state of the item, they only attempt to read from it
(lines 4 and 12). Notice how both threads only require 1/6 of permission to read from the
item variable and 1/6 of permission to the item object, and use the item while in the S0
state without changing it.
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Listing 7.59: Example 6 (Part 2)
22 t1.start();
23
24 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,State "Started")
25 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,State "NotStarted")
26 // access(item,5/6) ∧ access(item.0,5/6) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")




31 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,State "Started")
32 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,State "Started")




37 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,Ended)
38 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,State "Started")
39 // access(item,5/6) ∧ access(item.0,5/6) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")




44 // access(t1,1) ∧ access(t1.0,1) ∧ typeof(t1,Ended)
45 // access(t2,1) ∧ access(t2.0,1) ∧ typeof(t2,Ended)
46 // access(item,1) ∧ access(item.0,1) ∧ typeof(item,State "S0")
47 // access(item.state,1/3) ∧ typeof(item.state,Primitive)
Although the two threads concur, since they only perform read operations on the item
object, the code is considered safe. Since each thread requires 1/6 of permission to the
item object, only 5/6 is left after the first start call (line 22), and only 4/6 (i.e. 2/3) of
permission is left after the second start call (line 29). After both join calls (lines 35 and
42), 2× 1/6 of permission is restored, which means that the main thread as restored full
access to the item. Notice how the information about the state of the item was never
lost because read access was still available in main thread while the other threads were
running. This example shows that sharing of objects is allowed as long as there is no












Conclusions and Future work
8.1 Summary
In this thesis, we presented a tool that type-checks a Java program where objects are
associated with typestates. The first version focused on providing basic features while
enforcing the linear use of objects. The features included the support for the association of
protocols with classes and verification of the use of instances of those classes, prevention
of null pointer errors, verification of the completion of protocols, and “droppable” states.
The second version allows aliasing of objects in a controlled way using a language of
assertions. This language guarantees that the usage of objects will follow the protocols, no
data-races occur at the level of variables and fields, and that method calls that change the
state of an object do not interfere. Additionally, the language allows unpacking of aliased
objects and transferring of permissions between aliases. To relieve the programmer from
manually writing the assertions, we implemented an inference algorithm which analyzes
the code statically and constructs all the required assertions.
The features provided are useful for real applications. For example, one can naturally
define a protocol for a Java readable stream to ensure that the data is only read when
available and that upon reading all the data, the stream is closed, freeing any resources
associated with it. Additionally, if the stream is connected to another stream from which
it gets all the data, the usage of the underlying stream is also verified. With the language
of assertions, one can also share objects. For example, one can create a producer object
and a consumer object which have references to each other. The producer notifies the
consumer that more data is available, and the consumer calls the methods of the producer
to retrieve the new data. Examples are available at the project’s repository1.
1https://github.com/jdmota/java-typestate-checker/
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8.2 Future work
The current version of the tool includes some limitations: the inference algorithm does
not infer when an object should be packed or unpacked; dynamic method dispatch in Java,
where the actual method to be called is resolved at runtime, rather than compile-time, is
not considered; and subtyping, as well as generics, are not yet supported. In the future,
we plan to start by fixing these limitations.
To support more use cases, we would also like to allow for concurrent write operations
to be performed on shared objects. The solution could be to change the access predicate to
inform if mutations can be performed in an object that is aliased. That additional informa-
tion could also indicate if the aliases are available only in a single threaded environment
or may be shared between threads. In a single threaded context, one would just need
to ensure that the object is left in a state from a set of states that all aliases agree upon
and, in this context, state refinements would be allowed. For example, calling the hasNext
method on a iterator in the HasNext state, to refine the state to Next, if the method returns
true, would be safe, since in a single threaded environment, there would be no operations
that could happen in between that would change the state of the object. If the aliases are
shared between threads, then additional care is needed. The object must be left in a state
from a set of states that all aliases agree upon but also, method calls on the object need to
be synchronized, and state refinements would not be performed, since there would be no
guarantee that other operations happened in between in different threads.
Another aspect that is subject of future work is how certain data structures could
be handled. For example, in doubly linked list, each internal node has a reference to
the following node and a reference to the previous node, and there may be an arbitrary
number of internal nodes in the structure. It would be useful to track the aliasing between
these internal nodes. Because of that, and also to deal with other kinds of collections (e.g.
arrays), there might be the need to include quantifiers in our language of assertions, and
extend the inference algorithm to find loop invariants that speak about collections, with
strategies like [31]. The support for collections is also important to verify the usage of
objects stored inside of collections.
Finally, it would be useful to be able to associate access permissions with locks or
monitors, which would become available when these were acquired.
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